FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER

1969

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When asked what the astronauts did after awakening from their first night's sleep back on earth, the flight surgeon quarantined with the Apollo 11 crew reported:

"They just sat around for awhile, eating breakfast and reading The New York Times."

The New York Times

LATE CITY EDITION

MEN WALK ON MOON

ASTRONAUTS LAND ON PLAIN; COLLECT ROCKS, PLANT FLAG

Voice From Moon: 'Eagle Has Landed'

A Powdery Surface Is Closely Explored

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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TO CAP THE VOLCANO

By McGeorge Bundy

THE summer of 1969 has seen men on the moon and almost half the American Senate voting against a defense decision supported by two Presidents. In the summer pride of the moon landing it is not pleasant to turn the mind back to the terrible topic of nuclear danger. Yet the splendid technical achievement of Apollo contains its own reminder that similar skills applied with similar single-mindedness have now led the two greatest powers of our generation into an arms race totally unprecedented in size and danger.

The next year or two offer to the United States and the Soviet Union what may be the best chance yet to limit their extravagant contest in strategic weapons. We Americans may not understand this opportunity very well, and our friends in Russia may not understand it either. That weakness of understanding, together with the transcendent importance of the subject, is an excuse for one more effort to put some light on it. I shall begin with a review of the ABM debate and then go on to consider some larger political questions which that debate did not address—questions which may grow in importance as strategic arms limitation talks (SALT for short) get started.

II

The debate on ABM deployment was remarkable less for its content than for the simple fact that it happened. The level of argument was high. In analytical force the Administration's supporters were less persuasive than its opponents. There were some excessive claims on both sides, but the overstatements of some Administration spokesmen, although not the President, offered particularly easy targets. What held a slim majority, in the end, was the traditional and powerful argument that in mat-

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ters of this sort—especially with international negotiations in the offing—the sober recommendation of the President is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Both the case against the ABM and the case for supporting the President are likely to be at least as strong in the future as they have been this past summer, and the task of reconciling them is an important element in the work ahead.

Yet the central significance of this debate is less in the competing arguments than in an underlying agreement which pervades the hundreds of pages of the *Congressional Record*—an agreement that the arms race is taking a new and highly unsatisfactory turn. Senators disagreed on the remedy, and what happens so often in hard debates happened again in this one: the case against a given line of action was easier to make than the case for an alternative. Those who opposed ABM deployment were fearful that American action would increase the world's danger; those who favored deployment found the same result in lack of action. But there were no voices to suggest that the continuing race is either safe or easy.

One heavy element in the argument of opponents was cost. Here the Administration encountered an unanticipated and widespread reaction against defense costs of all sorts, and still more against the seeming financial irresponsibility of the massive defense machine. The one amendment which carried as the debate concluded was a requirement for better financial accounting from the Pentagon. Efforts to emphasize the limited costs of initial ABM deployment were painfully reminiscent of earlier Pentagon underestimates, and opponents were able to remind the Senate of such high-cost and low-yield enterprises as the massive air defense program of the 1950s. On the evidence before the Senate it seems highly believable that a fully developed ABM system might cost much nearer 50 billion than 10. Yet cost alone was probably not the central issue for most Senators.

The central issue was danger. The supporters of the ABM had in mind the one-sided danger of an emerging Soviet strength, to which they ascribed the deeply alarming characteristic of a capability to knock out the American deterrent. If this argument had been persuasive to opposing Senators, they could hardly have voted as they did, because there is no significant sentiment in the Congress or in the country for acceptance of the notion that any other state should ever have—or even seem to have—the capacity to make a nuclear attack on the United States without receiving

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a devastating reply. It is no cause for complaint that the Defense Department in the nuclear age must address itself to this question, and no cause for surprise that military men put this question first.

What is now open for argument is whether this basic question is being asked in the right way. Certainly the Senators who voted against ABM did not think so. To them it was not the Soviet menace which was now most severe; it was the arms race itself. Quite aside from the prospect of a new order of cost, the technological implications of ABM and other new systems were seen as profoundly destabilizing. While questions can be asked about this analysis too, there is much force in the case that stands in the record. These new systems, whether designed for defense or for penetration, do appear to share one highly disturbing characteristic: no one seems to know just what they will and will not be able to do, and no one will ever know with certainty unless there comes a dreadful day of actual use.

This uncertainty is multiple. Each side is unsure of what its own systems can do, and is still less sure of the quality of the other side's systems. There is a tendency to place a high value on the effectiveness of a system when winning support for its adoption. But when it is in hand, the prudent military course is to place a minimum value on its effectiveness, precisely in order to plan against the worst possible future case. The ABM debate, like previous debates, found the Pentagon casting doubts upon the effectiveness of the very systems whose value it had most praised in earlier years. This was not disingenuous; it was a natural product of the rhythm of technological contest.

It is still worse when one estimates what the adversary has or can have. Just as Soviet deployment of primitive defensive missiles around Moscow played a major role some years ago in turning us toward the new system of penetration called MIRV, so our own plans for an ABM force, carefully limited though they have been in different ways by different Presidents, must have important meaning for Soviet military planners. As they must see it, maybe our system will stay small, and maybe it is as ineffective as its critics claim—but maybe not.

It is not clear just how far the technological uncertainties of the next stage are more destabilizing than those of the last twenty years. On this point opinions have differed. Certainly it will be much harder to be sure about the number and quality of multiple

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warheads than about the number and size of fixed missile sites. But much depends upon highly sophisticated and subtle techniques of observation and analysis about which no outsider can be dogmatic. The first half of the 1960s saw an extraordinary increase in the capacity of each side to know the strategic strength of the other, and it is not likely that the technological revolution of intelligence is at an end. Unfortunately there is a long and growing distance between what the intelligence analyst knows and what is immediately apparent to his political superiors. In the great case of the missiles in Cuba, it was the persuasive conviction of the experts and not the naked appearance of the first photographs which was immediately conclusive to President Kennedy on October 16. If he had not learned to know and trust these experts, he might well have doubted their story. This problem may be more acute today.

If the danger of uncertainty and imperfect communication exists in the small circle of those who have full and current knowledge of the evidence, it is reasonable to suppose that the distance from that evidence to public understanding and confidence may be greater still. Moreover, at best, technical intelligence can show us only what exists and not what may be intended. The best example here may be our own Sentinel/Safeguard ABM system. The new Administration did not change the basic characteristics of that system when it changed its name, but there is a wide difference between the declared purposes of Secretary McNamara and those of Secretary Laird. Which one should a Soviet planner believe? The right answer may be "both," but if so, one's sympathy for such a planner must increase.

At the edges of the Senate debate, and more visibly in other public comment, another danger could be seen—that of polarization. Some of those supporting the Administration seemed to set no limit upon the number, cost and variety of desirable nuclear weapons systems. To such men the nuclear superiority—or even supremacy—of the United States was an absolute requirement. At the other extreme, and clearly growing in their importance, were those to whom any nuclear weapons system—and *a fortiori* any new one—must be bad. Ironically, to both sets of extremists the real relation between our power and that of the Soviet Union was irrelevant. Both were proceeding on the assumption that nuclear danger could somehow be handled by the United States alone. In so far as they considered Soviet behavior at all, it

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was only to assume it into conformity with their own preferences.

We have had sharp differences at the fringes of opinion throughout the nuclear age, but the debate of 1969 suggests that if the arms race does continue to expand, both fringes may grow sharply in strength. A rapidly expanding nuclear budget would probably require much more tub-thumping than we have seen this year, and the predictable response would be an increasing rejection of the whole notion of nuclear deterrence. Such a division would be very different from the sober debate we have just come through, and its consequences for nuclear safety could be grave. In Western Europe, for example, there is not yet any substitute for a stable, reliable and defensive American nuclear presence. Throughout the last twenty years the decisive military element in the safety of that part of the world has been the nuclear strength and commitment of the United States. That dependence has been uncomfortable but inescapable. One element in its acceptability has been the generally sober and responsible behavior of the United States in nuclear matters. If that sobriety and responsibility should be called in question, either by increasing nuclear militarism or increasing rejection of all nuclear weapons, or both, then the relations within the Atlantic Alliance could be shaken, and the temptation for Soviet adventure increased.

It is a long way from the wonder of Apollo 11 to this morass of division, doubt and danger. Yet both are products of technology and teamwork. Why should the technology and teamwork which can electrify mankind in one context spread so much fear and confusion in another? The most obvious answer is of course that modern weapons are instruments of totally inhuman destructive power, but for our present purposes there is a different and perhaps a more enlightening answer. The race to the moon is like a game of golf—each player is responsible for his own performance alone—and in the case of Apollo the last stages of the course were played out in an atmosphere comfortably free of competition. But the arms race is like a boxing match: what each contestant does depends as much on his opponent as on himself. It is this fact of interlocking behavior which decisively separates decisions on nuclear weapons systems from decisions on reaching the moon. In a boxing match and in the nuclear arms race a defense may be imperfect and yet seem necessary; a threat may be uncertain and yet seem compelling. So the very technological

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capability which can be used to insure complete reliability on the way to the moon becomes a force for uncertainty and terror. In their dependence on technology and teamwork the two undertakings are brothers, but the environments in which they live and interact are almost wholly opposite.

The endangering effect of technological gamesmanship is a subject on which others have spoken with the authority of close experience, and I cannot do better than to refer the interested reader to a paper by Dr. Herbert York in the August issue of *Scientific American*. Writing primarily from experience gained as Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Eisenhower Administration, Dr. York reaches the conclusion that if there is to be any escape at all from the rapid crescendo of strategic cost and uncertainty, it must be through political and not technological decisions. I find this conclusion compelling, and the remainder of this paper is addressed to the present political situation and the prospects for such escape.

III

The first characteristic of the political scene is the dominant role of two nuclear powers. The nuclear age has other dangers which we cannot afford to neglect; there is persistent importance in controlling our own systems, for example, and also in preventing nuclear proliferation. But the heart of the matter in 1969 is in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Throughout the nuclear age the two superpowers have made their strategic nuclear decisions almost exclusively in relation to one another, and the prospect of escalation makes this lonely interdependence more apparent than ever. No one is suggesting the early appearance of ABMs or MIRVs in any other countries. Whatever adjustment either power may wish to make because of its awareness of nuclear weapons in the hands of third parties, this element in the problem is marginal in comparison to the nuclear arsenals of the two great powers.

The dominance of the two-power relationship does not make it simple. The debate this summer sufficiently illustrates the complexity of decision-making in the United States. We have groups with special interests in and out of uniform, and on both sides of the question. What we tend to forget is that there are competing interests and attitudes in the Soviet Union too. There is evidence of at least four such forces. The first, and undoubtedly still the

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most important, is that of the party apparatus. Both doctrine and history confirm the importance of this element, and some of its characteristics are painfully familiar: conspiratorial suspicion of all non-communists and most non-Russians, massive preoccupation with the protection of power positions already occupied, practical concern for whatever crisis is most immediately dangerous to itself. A second major force is that of the managers and planners. Where these men are not military, we may expect them to have a heavy concern for the husbanding of scarce resources and the limitation of defense budgets. They may well be better placed in this respect than Americans with similar concerns who too casually assume that what is saved on weapons will automatically be spent on the cities. A third element is the military, and to put it mildly there is no reason to suppose that they are less powerful than our own defense establishment, although like our own military men they appear to have important differences among themselves on the priorities of different weapons systems. Finally, there are scientists and intellectuals. Though their views are better known in the West than they are to most of their countrymen, they clearly constitute a force for reconciliation. They operate on a sufferance which expands and contracts at the will of the party apparatus, and in the last year they have come under renewed restraints.

Sometime in the first half of 1968, the Soviet Government did reach the conclusion that it would be sensible to open a negotiation with the United States on strategic weapons. This decision in and of itself does not tell us much. The Soviet purpose in negotiation with non-communist powers is not always benign, and Soviet alertness for a one-sided advantage is proverbial. (There is no reason for resentment; in another context similar behavior is praised as Yankee shrewdness.) If one may extrapolate from the American experience, it seems likely that different elements in the Soviet Government may have had different reasons for urging or accepting negotiations of this sort. But at a minimum it must have been the judgment of the Soviet Government that the opening of negotiations might lead to an improvement in terms of Soviet interest and offered no unacceptable risks. A similar judgment had long been held by the Johnson Administration in Washington, and this spring the Nixon Administration has reaffirmed it. So both sides seem ready, at least in principle, for a major negotiation.

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The prospect of negotiation is not in itself a prospect of progress. Under the pressure of world opinion the great powers have been discussing nuclear arms control in different forums and in different ways for a generation. During the ABM debate, one Senator extracted from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency the interesting statistic that there have been more than 1500 arms-control meetings between American and Soviet negotiators. The vast majority of these meetings have been fruitless, and with the single exception of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, neither of the great powers has accepted any significant restriction on its own capabilities. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have grown expert in the plausible presentation of proposals which they know in advance will be unacceptable to the other side. Even in minor matters each faces a complex task in framing a position which does not produce unacceptable opposition from internal interests. Neither one can wholly separate the nuclear problem from other questions. So discussions have been delayed at one time or another, by one side or the other, because of trouble in Berlin, Viet Nam or Czechoslovakia. In midsummer there seemed to be still another pause, this time in Moscow.

It seems reasonable to expect, therefore, that even without further delay in the opening of strategic arms talks there will be a wide distance between the parties at the outset. The first formal position of the Soviet Union may not go much beyond the enigmatic formulas in the Soviet memorandum of July 1, 1968. That memorandum did express readiness to discuss limitations of strategic delivery systems, and it also addressed itself to many other elements of the nuclear problem, but it is little more than a set of topic headings—hardly even an agenda. The initial American position, in turn, may well be more forthcoming in appearance than in reality. One may guess that there will be emphasis on inspection and verification, and there may also be an initial resistance to any possibility of an unpoliced moratorium on the development or deployment of new systems. Yet the slim progress we have made in the last twenty years has been possible only when we have skirted the issue of agreed international inspection, and it seems most unlikely that the particular weapons systems which are now in the offing can be restricted without some such initial device as a moratorium. If the last positions of the two great states are not different from their first

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ones, therefore, little will come of these negotiations, and there will be no successful transfer of the problem from technology to politics. Indeed, if the discussions are like those which have occurred in most of the 1500 earlier meetings, they will merely transfer to the language of diplomacy the differences of the technological contest itself. So we shall not meet the challenge of Dr. York's conclusion merely by moving from the nuclear laboratory to the conference table. If we are to escape from technology to politics, we must do something more.

IV

The neglected truth about the present strategic arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union is that in terms of international political behavior that race has now become almost completely irrelevant. The new weapons systems which are being developed by each of the two great powers will provide neither protection nor opportunity in any serious political sense. Politically the strategic nuclear arms race is in a stalemate. It has been this way since the first deliverable hydrogen weapons were exploded, and it will be this way for as far ahead as we can see, even if future developments should be much more heavily one-sided than anything now in prospect. This proposition does not square with the complex measurements of comparative advantage which dominated the ABM debate, but I think it can be supported both by logic and by history.

In light of the certain prospect of retaliation there has been literally no chance at all that any sane political authority, in either the United States or the Soviet Union, would consciously choose to start a nuclear war. This proposition is true for the past, the present and the foreseeable future. For sane men on both sides the balance of terror is overwhelmingly persuasive. Given the worst calculations of the most pessimistic American advocate of new weapons systems, there is no prospect at all that the Soviet Government could attack the United States without incurring an overwhelming risk of destruction vastly greater than anyone but a madman would choose to accept. Conversely, even the most cold-blooded of American planners has always understood, at least since 1954, that the concept of a strategic first strike by the United States is wholly unacceptable because of the prospect of Soviet retaliation.

There is an enormous gulf between what political leaders

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really think about nuclear weapons and what is assumed in complex calculations of relative "advantage" in simulated strategic warfare. Think-tank analysts can set levels of "acceptable" damage well up in the tens of millions of lives. They can assume that the loss of dozens of great cities is somehow a real choice for sane men. They are in an unreal world. In the real world of real political leaders—whether here or in the Soviet Union—a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable. Yet this unthinkable level of human incineration is the least that could be expected by either side in response to any first strike in the next ten years, *no matter what happens to weapons systems in the meantime*. Even the worst case hypothesized in the ABM debate leaves at least this much room for reply. In sane politics, therefore, there is no level of superiority which will make a strategic first strike between the two great states anything but an act of utter folly.

My argument evidently rests upon an assumption of sanity. It does not protect against madness. But neither is there any protection against the madman in close calculations of "assured survivable destruction capability." Indeed it may be easier for a madman to understand the simple horror of *any* exchange between the superpowers than to be persuaded by intricate calculations of residual "advantage" after the world as we know it is destroyed.

What we have somehow forgotten, in the expanding megatonage of the age of missiles, is that already fifteen years ago we were scorpions in a bottle, able to sting each other only at the price of death. Yet what either side had then was insignificant in comparison to what both sides have now. Moreover, we have somehow let the necessary comparisons of one weapons system with another delude us into a belief that these calculations of cost-effectiveness are also calculations of real advantage. Certainly when we determine that a certain level of deterrent strength is needed (a calculation which has always been generous in both our countries), it makes very good sense to do our best to pick the systems that will do the job most economically, and it follows that close comparative analysis is well worthwhile. But the fact that Minuteman is better in these terms than the

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B-70—or Poseidon better than Polaris—does not tell us anything about the real value, politically, of any one system, or of all our systems together. Their one purpose is deterrence. They must not do less, and they cannot do more.

Thus the basic consequence of considering this matter politically and not technically is the conclusion that beyond a point long since passed the escalation of the strategic nuclear race makes no sense for either the Soviet Union or the United States. Nothing in the national interest, the ideology or the personal political position of any leader in either country can be advanced by any strategic nuclear exchange. No weapons systems now in sight for either side can change that fact. It follows that in political, as distinct from technical, terms we have all been wrong to talk of nuclear superiority. President Nixon was surely right when he changed the terms of the discussion from "superiority" to "sufficiency." Sufficiency is what we both have now, in ample measure, and no superiority worth having can be achieved. It is sometimes argued that in the past nuclear superiority—ours over the Soviet Union or that of the Soviet Union over Western Europe—has had a decisive influence on events. I find this a very doubtful proposition. This is not the place for a close reëxamination of relevant crises like Suez, Berlin and Cuba, but my own belief is that in none of the three has the nuclear "superiority" of any major power been decisive. In all three cases the risk of escalation has certainly been an element in the problem, and in all three, in different ways, that risk has been a deterrent to action. But in all three cases, questions of will and purpose have been more important than questions of nuclear numbers. In none of the three cases, I feel confident, would the final result have been different if the relative strategic positions of the Soviet Union and the United States had been reversed. A stalemate is a stalemate either way around.

Since it is vital to avoid misunderstanding, let me emphasize here that in asserting the preëminence of the political judgment on the use and non-use of nuclear weapons I am not at all downgrading the importance of technical proficiency in the deterrent forces we do decide to maintain. It seems to me wholly plain that a credible strategic nuclear deterrent is indispensable to the peace, and for that reason no task is more clearly indispensable than that of maintaining and protecting such a force. There is a great distance between a belief in strategic stalemate and any

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suggestion that we should proceed to unilateral disarmament. We have bought and paid for parity, and we must not lose it. So it will be as true in a future of stable balance as it has been in the past of presumed supremacy that the men who stand guard over our strategic forces are men who place us all in their debt.

But it is one thing for military men to maintain our deterrent force with vigilant skill, and it is quite another for anyone to assume that their necessary contingency plans have any serious interest for political leaders. The object of political men—quite rightly—is that these weapons should never be used. I have watched two Presidents working on strategic contingency plans, and what interested them most was simply to make sure that none of these awful events would occur. Political leaders, whether here or in Russia, are cut from a very different mold than strategic planners. They see cities and people as part of what they are trying to help—not as targets. They live with the daily struggle to make a little progress—to build things—to grow things—to lift the quality of life a little—and to win honor, and even popularity, by such achievements. The deterrent that might not please a planner is more than deterrent enough for them. And that is why the deterrent does work, even at a distance, as in Berlin. *Maybe* the American nuclear commitment is not as firm as it seems—but what sane Soviet leader wants to put the whole Soviet society in the scales to find out?

It is also important to distinguish the nuclear sufficiency of the superpowers from the very different level of deterrent strength which has been sought by such a leader as General de Gaulle. French theorists have sometimes argued as if a very small number of thermonuclear weapons would be a sure and permanent deterrent. Most American analysts, in my view correctly, have been skeptical of this thesis. The armaments of the middle-level nuclear powers are indeed vulnerable to an obliterating first strike, and that situation may not entirely disappear even if they shift to seaborne missiles. But several orders of magnitude, and as many orders of complexity, separate the difficulties of an attack on such a force from those of a preëmptive attack on either the Soviet Union or the United States. The nuclear sufficiency of the superpowers is as far removed from the deterrent capacity of the *force de frappe* as the Great Pyramid from a molehill.

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V

At this point in the analysis our effort to move from technology to politics may seem encouraging, but now we must take account of a much less cheerful aspect of the matter. The politics of the analysis so far is the politics of international relations—of what one state or another will actually do on the world stage. This analysis points plainly to the advantages of limiting the strategic arms race, since it tells us that the existing parity between the superpowers is all that they can hope to use internationally, and since no one in any society wants to pay tens of billions for nothing.

Unfortunately we have not exhausted the politics of strategic weapons. Along with this crude but powerful international politics of common sense goes the politics of consensus and consent within each superpower. Presidents and Politburos may know in their hearts that the only thing they want from strategic weapons is never to have to use them; in their public postures they have felt it necessary to claim more. They may not themselves be persuaded by the refined calculations of the nuclear gamesmen—but they do not find it prudent to expose them for the political irrelevance they are. The public in both countries has been allowed by its leaders to believe that somewhere in ever-growing strength there is safety, and that it still means something to be "ahead." The politics of internal decision-making has not been squared with the reality of international stalemate.

In consequence, the internal politics of the strategic arms race has remained the prisoner of its technology. The ABM debate showed a shift from an earlier emphasis on American "superiority" toward the question whether somehow now the Russians might move "ahead"—but there were only a few voices raised to support the notion that within very broad limits no one now can have a lead worth having. That may be the necessary premise of international political behavior; it is not yet the possible premise of national political debate. Internally, in both countries, the present premise of the debate leads remorselessly toward escalation. In both countries, moreover, this framework of argument is powerfully sustained by the force which Americans have been taught to call "the military-industrial complex." Since the opponents of escalation refuse to contest the basic political premise,

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they are driven back to technology; those who oppose the ABM tend to argue that it may not work technically—not that it is irrelevant politically. And while excellent answers were made to the Pentagon suggestion that the Russians might be "going for a first strike," there were few to suggest that the necessary assumption of any such scenario must be that the Soviet Government had gone suicidally mad.

What appears in our ABM debate appears also in Soviet behavior. The Russians continue to spend much too much money on large weapons which do them no good and whose only real effect is to frighten us into further efforts of our own. We can afford it better than they can, of course, and in terms of economic cold warfare there has always been a certain spurious attractiveness about trapping the Russians into a constantly accelerating competition. Fortunately, that particular brand of nonsense has never been anyone's official policy, and the tenor of the ABM debate suggests that it may be permanently out of fashion. But the fact that we are not trying to induce this sort of Soviet folly does not make it less real, or less foolish. In every international crisis of the last fifteen years Soviet leaders have shown their understanding that the strategic balance requires mutual restraint between the superpowers. But in their weapons decisions they have been as heedlessly and unproductively excessive as we.

There is a curious and distressing paradox in all this. The same political leaders who know these terrible weapons must never be used and who do not run the foolish risks of nuclear gamesmanship abroad still do not hesitate to authorize system after system. The usual resolution of the paradox is to describe the decision to build as an "insurance policy." But the argument is unsatisfying; the gap between what the political leader orders and what he can do with it is too great. I know of no escape from the conclusion that both in his sensible abhorrence of nuclear conflict and his persistent attachment to still more weapons systems the political leader is reflecting his constituency. The fault is less in our leaders than in ourselves.

VI

On the surface, this analysis suggests a dim future for the SALT talks. If our domestic debates are necessarily carried forward in terms of technological pros and cons, what chance is there that we can base an international negotiation on the cruder,

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simpler and less demanding realities of international political choice? If there is a real danger that this or that concession or limitation may affect the technological balance, if the technological balance has continuing importance in domestic political debate, and if suspicion and wariness on our side are easily outmatched on the other, then indeed the prospect seems unpromising.

But is the analysis complete? Not necessarily. The SALT talks carry with them not only the requirement of formal opening positions, but two much more promising and important opportunities. The first is the chance for all concerned to reaffirm the need of mankind for greater safety from the risk of nuclear disaster. The same American public opinion which gives general support to any responsible recommendation for a new weapons system has also steadily supported the struggle to stop the arms race. Some hard-boiled gamesmen have never liked the nuclear test ban treaty, but the American people have overruled them, and not one voice was heard in the recent Senate debate to reopen that national decision. So the SALT talks provide a major occasion for the mobilization of that part of our opinion which feels the essential futility of escalating the strategic arms race. And if, as is likely, many of us are divided against ourselves, believing things which do not really fit together, then the SALT talks and the discussion around them may help to clear our heads. What is true of Americans is likely to be true also of many in the Soviet Union. And what is still more plain is that a straightforward disbelief in the wisdom of the race in strategic weapons can be observed among those who are not Russians or Americans. I am not thinking here of those who have preached unilateral disarmament but rather of those who have always understood the need of each of the two great states for its own nuclear defense. The difference between one level of unspeakable disaster and another has never been interesting to sensible statesmen in third countries, and we may expect them to give persistent encouragement to those who may seek to move the SALT talks from technology to political reality.

A second opportunity of the SALT talks is the chance they should give for informal and often private communication. Each of the two great governments knows more about these matters than it has yet said in public statements. Each has an intense interest in learning more about the real thoughts of the other. If

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sophisticated understanding of the interlocking implications of weapons systems has come earlier and cut deeper in the United States, still there has been about the Soviet approach to these matters a certain rough realism which is not to be underrated. It seems at least possible that realism and sophistication could now converge toward the conclusion that enough is enough. As they explore each other's thoughts, moreover, the negotiators will have the chance to make it clear to one another that many forms of secrecy are self-defeating and, as the boxers get to know each other better, they may understand that all they can have is a draw, so that threats of a technical knockout are of no help to anyone. In any event, the presence in one place of American and Soviet officials in substantial numbers and interesting varieties should give an excellent opportunity for patient exploration of such possibilities. In this context there is a special reason for hope in the apparent present readiness of the Soviet Government for businesslike discussion of just such issues of mutual concern.

Neither public encouragement nor private conversation will produce agreement by themselves. Our analysis has already indicated what a long distance there is between the current posture of intense technological competition and the desired result of mutual recognition of a stable political reality. To put the proposition quite simply, each great power must move from a zealous concern for its own advantage to a sober acceptance of parity. Both the intellectual and the practical consequences of such movement are grave, and obviously there are interests and attitudes in both countries to which the shift will be unwelcome, at least at first. Moreover, a movement of this kind is not likely to come by negotiation and diplomatic agreement alone. Somewhere along the line—perhaps quite early—it will be important for one power and then for both to take practical steps in this same direction. In the much simpler case of the Test Ban Treaty, there was an informal moratorium, a temporary breach in the moratorium, and then a conclusion by both governments that a treaty should be signed. It is worth remembering that the Soviet Government had two sets of atmospheric tests after breaking the moratorium, against one for the United States. But what is most significant about that "imbalance" is that it was regarded as acceptable both by President Kennedy and by the Senate. It seems likely that major progress in the SALT talks will require

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a similar American broadmindedness at one point or another. We are still "ahead," and we may also be closer to a national recognition that such a lead means nothing. Our process of government does not impose a requirement of fear and suspicion that is remotely like that imposed by the Soviet party apparatus. We now have a fully developed public debate which will not die down, and since that debate is inevitable, prudent leadership will seek to take account of it. And finally, we can take the lead in practical steps for the simple and persuasive reason that even without agreement some such steps are in our own best interest.

Yet it would be a great mistake for Soviet negotiators to suppose that the Americans are likely to embark on a continuous course of unilateral strategic disarmament. Opinion in our country will never be separated from an observant concern with what the Soviet Union is doing, and neither international nor domestic political concerns could justify any American government in seeming to accept a wholly one-sided policy of limitation. I hope the logic of the argument I have put forward is strong, but logic alone will not permanently sustain a national policy of unilateral limitation. It will take two to cap the volcano of strategic competition.

Since it is evident that the negotiators will have much to do, we can take comfort in the fact that there is one major area in which there is no reason for them to have unmanageable problems—the area of their relations with their various allies. In the Soviet case the point is obvious: the Soviet Government has never shown any interest in sharing its nuclear responsibilities with other members of the Warsaw Pact, and the troubles of recent years make any such move less likely than ever. The situation in NATO is more complex, but its meaning for strategic arms talks is not different. While it is true that the presence of American men and nuclear weapons on the ground in Europe is still today a necessary element in the security of the West, it is also true that this decisive protection is unaffected one way or the other by the question of strategic arms control. The strength of the American guarantee will be neither increased nor decreased by acceptance of parity, and the level of American commitment in Europe is not a proper topic for bargaining in the SALT talks. It was never the American superiority in nuclear weapons that was decisive in protecting Europe; it was simply the high probability that any large-scale use of force against a NATO

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country would set loose a chain of events that could lead to nuclear war. For reasons we have already discussed, any war between serious nuclear powers would be as bad to "win" as to "lose," so that relative numbers of weapons have never been decisive in the credibility of the American deterrent in Europe. That deterrent has been made credible, ever since the first Soviet nuclear explosion, by two quite simple things: first, the American conviction, expressed again last winter by Mr. Nixon, that the safety of Europe runs with our own, and second, the confirmation of that conviction by the stationing of wholly persuasive numbers of American men and American nuclear weapons in Europe. Nothing in that conviction or its confirmation need be modified in the slightest by an agreement to keep the balance of strategic power both stable in shape and limited in size.

VII

One cannot end any discussion of this somber subject without thinking about the burden that it places on the President of the United States. The debate in the Senate has been healthy, and the prospect of more debate is encouraging, but in the end the President does have a special and personal responsibility here, and it may well be that the President's need for understanding support is greater now than at any time in the nuclear age. That seems a lot to say if we look back at the decisions that four Presidents have faced. But if our analysis is right, it has fallen to Mr. Nixon to come to terms with the politics of parity—and to do it in a time when angry men at both edges of the argument would like nothing better than to pick a fight right through him.

In this situation Mr. Nixon himself has in the main been careful. Like many of the rest of us, he has a past on this subject, and he has been trained by his particular experiences to give the benefit of the doubt to those who urge the need for action to sustain our strength. Yet his own arguments have been restrained, and according to informal but authoritative reports from Europe he has been eloquent in reminding friends abroad that strategic parity is now both inescapable and acceptable.

It seems at least possible, then, that if the President is hesitant about arms limitation, it is less because of any misplaced faith in the will-of-the-wisp of "superiority" than because he does not yet see any solid political base, here at home, for relatively low-

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keyed, low-cost parity. His majority for ABM was small—but should he trade it in for nothing? Those who wish he had decided the ABM question differently have an obligation to examine that question.

My own answer is that the President does indeed have a claim on the help of those who seek strategic arms limitation, just as they have a claim on him. He and he alone can manage the process of negotiation, and in the end any agreement he may reach will have to have the confident support of the American people. No one is going to help that kind of negotiation or increase the chance of that kind of agreement by assuming that the President should be pushed around by noisy public pressure. It has been entirely reasonable for believers in arms control to place themselves where their own best judgment led them in the debate on the ABM, but as the SALT talks begin the President has a necessary claim to trust.

This Presidential claim need not be extended to a blanket advance endorsement of any sentence that any American delegate may utter. The very primacy of the President himself in these matters requires a certain freedom to help him out by complaining of his subordinates. The long distance we have to go is not likely to be covered at one bound, or even in a straight line. There are men with strong opinions around Mr. Nixon; some of them have said arguable things on this subject already, and on the long journey from here to a sensible bargain there will be many occasions for objection. By the same token, the partisans of arms control will not all be right all the time. The position which they must avoid is that of a self-righteousness which offers the President only sermons and never support. Presidents, like other men, have a limited tolerance for counsel unaccompanied by help.

What one may hope for from the President, in return, is that he will indeed maintain the continuous review of our strategic position which he announced on March 14 along with his first ABM decision, and also that he may be willing to look again at the doctrine which found its way into his Colorado speech—a doctrine according to which arms races do not make conflict, but the other way around. That doctrine is not so much wrong as incomplete. It is quite true that the differences between nations are the ultimate source of their military arrangements, but it is also true that arms races can develop a life of their own, and that

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nuclear arms races have a menace of their own. The American and British navies were still in a foolish arms race with each other as late as 1930. The current race has become a wildly irrelevant technical competition which brings no help to statesmen, and sooner or later the true statesman must say so. Indeed the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union may well be unique in history and in politics, as it is certainly unique in technology. The notion that its escalation is politically dangerous is somehow plausible to nearly all of us, even when we choose to think it is all the other fellow's fault. It is well worth our while to consider the converse proposition: if we can slow it down, or perhaps even turn it back, will that not perhaps help us both—even help us *all*—politically?

As a nation we cannot afford a great division on these issues, and we must look especially to the President to hold us together. Throughout the nuclear age we have expected our Presidents to show not only prudent concern for defense, but also strong personal leadership on the hard road away from nuclear danger. Every President so far has found himself more and more caught up in the effort for arms control as he has lived with the nuclear realities. Mr. Nixon's chance comes early in his term, and his predecessors might well be envious if on this subject they had not all been forced to move far beyond personal pride.

I believe that the American people know in their bones that nuclear weapons are different, and I believe they will support the President in decisions based on that difference. In particular I believe he will find solid support for the kind of reassessment that could lead to a decision that the United States, on its own, will take a small step away from the nuclear arms race. That small step too could be a giant leap for mankind.

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JAPAN'S LEGACY AND DESTINY OF CHANGE

By Kiichi Aichi

FOR a nation whose founding is lost in the mists of antiquity, Japan is in many respects a very new country. Last year we celebrated the hundredth anniversary of the Meiji Restoration, which marked our entry into the modern world. This year the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which I am honored to head, observed its centennial. By contrast, the United States, which is in every respect a young nation, possesses a number of institutions that are far older than many of Japan's. The Department of State, for example, is only a dozen years short of its bicentennial, and Harvard University, with its 333-year old history, is more than three times the age of my own alma mater, Tokyo University, now in its ninety-second year.

This newness of modern Japan, which makes it unique among the "advanced" nations, is also an essential key to our view of the world. To understand Japan's outlook and its vision of the future, it is necessary first to comprehend our country's brief and turbulent history as a modern state, and the effects these compressed events have had on the Japanese mind.

Two sets of events in particular have been decisive in their impact: the developments leading to the Meiji Restoration, which forcibly integrated Japan into the nineteenth-century jungle of world diplomacy, and total defeat in the Second World War, which profoundly changed Japan's direction as a modern nation-state.

The first of these traumatic national experiences is so recent that, until a decade or so ago, there were people still living with personal memories of the feudal Tokugawa era. Indeed, Japan's "age of discontinuity," to borrow Professor Peter Drucker's apt phrase, began not with the contemporary technological explosion, but with the arrival in 1853 of America's "black ships," which came to open up Japan, and were met on the beach at Kurihama by the feudal levy armed with matchlocks and pikes, "as on Bosworth field."

From that moment to the present, the lot of our people has been forced change—rapid, relentless and often violent—and painful adaptation to change.

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At the moment of Japan's forced emergence from 250 years of peaceful seclusion, the world was indeed a jungle. Powerful, well-organized and ruthless Western states, armed with tools and weapons forged in the Industrial Revolution, were engaged either in imposing their will on the weaker lands of Asia and Africa or in reducing them outright to colonies and dependencies. Ailing China, long the cultural and political leader of Eastern Asia, was slowly being nibbled away by the Western powers. Korea, like Japan, lay dormant in seclusion, but vast areas of Southeast Asia were already under Western domination. Aggressive Tsarist Russia cast a long shadow over the Siberian wastes, touching the northern approaches of the Japanese islands. All-powerful Britain had recently thrashed the Chinese Empire in the Opium War (an event which deeply impressed our forefathers), and its fleets dominated the seas of Pacific Asia.

Japan itself had felt the bite of Western arms when warships from the West, in punitive action, reduced to ashes the ports of the recalcitrant Lords of Choshu and Satsuma, then the most powerful men in feudal Japan. Moreover, the civil war which preceded the restoration was marked by British and French intrigues. No wonder the Japanese people, sensing a threat to their very existence, began their long quest for military and diplomatic security.

The pattern this quest took, over the next 75 years, was largely determined by Japan's view of the world environment in which our country found itself. Clearly, isolation was no longer a realistic alternative; some form of participation in the outside world was required. In the eyes of the Japanese people this participation could be neither passive nor confined to a regional scale, in the shelter of some stable East Asian community of nations, capable together of keeping a regional balance of power while fending off alien intruders. No such community or capability existed. Finally, Japan's almost total lack of natural resources required for the building of a modern economy dictated active participation in world trade.

Thus our country felt it had no choice but to adapt aggressively to changed circumstances and, as a matter of survival, to embark on a perilous competition with the West in pursuit of ever-receding security frontiers.

During the first quarter-century of its modern history, Japan laid the foundations for future growth and security by selectively

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Westernizing the basic social, economic and political institutions, and by launching its own delayed industrial revolution. With the beginning of its second quarter-century, in the 1890s, those preparations bore fruit. In the environment of accelerated Western imperialism, our country developed into a strong military power, capable of defeating first the Chinese and then the Russians. Within 50 years of Commodore Perry's visit, Japan had attained membership in the world's Big Five. With these credentials, which involved transforming itself into the conquering image of the alien powers it once had feared, Japan plunged into its third quarter-century, which culminated in the holocaust of 1945.

The events of those first 75 years, which in retrospect unfolded with the inexorability of a Greek tragedy, exacted a great price in our nation's public spirit and personal sacrifice. For three-quarters of a century the state made enormous demands on the people, at the expense of social and political development, and the people responded faithfully. The slogan of the times, "Rich Country for Strong Arms," expressed the intensity of Japan's initial fear of the West, and symbolized the popular determination to overtake and surpass the West. Yet this single-minded course, whose supreme and final effort was the war in which Japanese arms were carried to far-flung reaches of Asia and the Pacific, ended in utter ruin in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It is my belief that the trauma of utter defeat in 1945, and the restructuring of the international environment which followed, produced changes in my country as momentous as those initiated by the coming of the black ships in 1853. For the second time the Japanese state, society and world view were fundamentally transformed. No doubt the reforms introduced by the seven-year-long American Occupation gave great impetus to these changes, but in my view it was our people, painfully adapting once more to drastically altered circumstances, who shaped contemporary Japan.

In defeat the Japanese people were drawn into themselves as never before. The nation had suffered grievously from the war, was utterly disillusioned with the past, and for the time being was consumed by the daily desperate struggle for a livelihood amid shortages and inflation. Even basic moral and social values had been shattered or discarded in the national catastrophe, and the

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pain was as much spiritual as physical. The earlier quest for security—and then for power and glory—held no meaning or attraction in the nuclear age. Stripped of the trappings of a major power, exhausted in the home islands under the forcible protection of victorious America, and confronted with the mammoth tasks of economic reconstruction, our people had no stomach for involvement in the troubles surrounding them.

Asia was in turmoil in the immediate postwar years. The sparks of Asian nationalism, fanned in part by Japan's wartime forays, suddenly burst into flame throughout South and Southeast Asia. China was in the birth throes of the Communist state, the dark clouds of the cold war were gathering rapidly, and the groundwork was being laid for today's three-way confrontation among the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and Communist China. Related problems of divided Korea, Viet Nam and China, and the gap (so wide in Asia) between North and South, rich and poor, had already been defined and needed but a little time to sharpen into major concerns of our age.

Yet our people felt insulated from all this by our own powerlessness and by the fact that our security was under the protection of the United States, which had entered the Asian vacuum left by Japan's defeat. The people felt incapable as well as disinclined either to act or react in the face of the momentous events on their doorstep. Their overriding concern was economic recovery and the watchword was "Increase Production." What they yearned for was the modest prosperity of a middle-class nation, quietly content in its home islands, shunning unnecessary foreign involvement and, above all, renouncing war.

The postwar "peace" Constitution, though espoused by the American Occupation, evoked a deep response in the innermost feelings of the Japanese people. Few welcomed defeat and foreign occupation, but still fewer thirsted for revenge or yearned for the lost days of greatness of empire. In addition, the new Constitution discarded the old controls designed to perpetuate an all-powerful state, and provided for individual freedom and civil liberties. Institutions were reformed or evolved anew in all fields, especially in education, labor-management relations and emphasis on mass consumption. All these innovations received wide popular support—among the older generations, who remembered the profitless restraints and sacrifices of the past, as

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well as among the younger generations, who now take for granted both their freedom and their progress toward prosperity.

The freedoms of the new open society well served the national quest for economic security. The energy which had gone into maintaining strong armaments was redirected into rebuilding and then expanding the industrial plant, and improving mass living standards. By dint of hard work, sound technology, efficient administration and prevailing social and political stability (despite occasional turmoil), the Japanese people made, in retrospect, their initial adjustment to the radically changed environment of the postwar world.

Moreover, the multilateral and increasingly free and open world economic system, built up by the West since the Second World War and buttressed by global and regional institutions for coöperation, has provided the ideal environment for Japan and other nations to pursue their national economic objectives. It is neither the jungle of the late nineteenth century nor the protectionist thicket of the 1930s. Since postwar recovery, the expanding world economic system, secured from all-out war by the relatively stable superpower balance, has favored economic-minded countries, and Japan among them has prospered.

Japan's postwar recovery was speeded by early U.S. material assistance and, indirectly, by international developments such as the courageous United Nations defense of the Republic of Korea. By 1952, which also marked the end of the American Occupation, the rebuilt Japanese economy was beginning again to compete successfully in world markets. In subsequent years, Japan joined all the major international institutions—the United Nations and its agencies, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund and others.

Beginning in the mid-1950s, Japan set consistent records in rates of economic growth, progressing from bare subsistence to today's modest prosperity, in which its gross national product surpasses all but the United States in the free world. The goal of affluence, however, remains distant, since Japan's 1968 per capita income of $1,110 ranks but twentieth in the world, a lag reflected in the low incomes of the smaller-scale manufacturing and agricultural enterprises, and in such unmet social-capital needs as roads, sewers, housing, parks and other public amenities that Western Europe and North America take for granted.

This concentration of the Japanese people, first on recovery

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and then on building the bases for their economic security, has produced gratifying results. The economy continues to grow at one of the highest rates in the world; long-standing weaknesses in the traditional sectors of the economy are gradually being ameliorated; and future growth targets have been set high. In international trade the dynamic Japanese economy has long since outgrown the conceptual confines of a regional autarkic unit, implied in the defunct concept of a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." Although through trade, investment and economic assistance Japan is a major factor in the economic development of free Asia, the Japanese economy is effectively integrated into the global economic system, trading with the remotest corners of the world. (The United States is, of course, the leading partner, accounting for roughly one-third of Japan's two-way trade.)

A quarter-century after Hiroshima and the arrival of General Douglas MacArthur, Japan has established a strong base for future economic and social development, has earned membership among the world's leading industrial powers and finds itself accused, from time to time, of being an "economic animal."

II

The postwar quest for economic security has been that of an inward-looking people, forced for lack of resources to seek its livelihood in the outside world. Propelled by circumstances into external trade, the Japanese people have none the less remained politically aloof, apprehensive of any strife near their shores, and fearful lest they become involved in a conflict not of their own making. The public conviction has been that the main stress in Japan's foreign relations should be on what came to be known as "economic diplomacy," at least while affluence is yet to be attained at home. The Economic Affairs Bureau has long been regarded as the principal department in the Foreign Ministry. Nowhere in the popular psychology has there been an appetite for active political leadership in international affairs.

To be sure, the desire to remain aloof from political involvement has not meant lack of interest in the rest of the world. Our people have avidly absorbed foreign (mainly Western) trends and achievements in the cultural and recreational fields, as well as the economic, scientific and technological. Foreign travel has increased by leaps and bounds, in keeping with the

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improvement in living standards. International contacts and interchanges, both private and official, have been growing at an extraordinary rate, and public interest in world affairs (reported voluminously by the influential Japanese mass media) must be considered at least as great as in any other nation in the world. Reëstablishment of the worldwide diplomatic network as soon as the Peace Treaty came into effect, and subsequent affiliation with all the major international organizations, were accepted as a matter of course, largely because this degree of involvement appeared directly related to national prosperity.

Apparently the concept of an inward-looking "little Japan," free of unnecessary foreign entanglement, has seemed preferable to the instinctively feared and discredited alternative of foreign adventurism. This may also explain the public attitude which accepted as necessary the vital and mutually beneficial Security Treaty with the United States, while at the same time displaying great uneasiness over any incident involving American bases and forces. Even those who have rejected the little-Japan concept speak in terms of an influential Japan, "great without armaments."

However, to dismiss this inward-lookingness as a temporary phenomenon due to horror at defeat and devastation, or to treat it as a form of naïveté that can be dispelled by governmental public relations, is to disregard the role this popular psychology has played in sustaining Japan's successful adaptation over the past 24 years.

A quarter-century in the short history of modern Japan is not an inconsiderable span. After all, it corresponds to one-third of the time elapsed between the Meiji Restoration and Hiroshima. A more realistic reading would be to assume that the inward-looking mentality has deep roots in the new Japan, especially when crowned with the aura of success. Japan has not only achieved reasonable prosperity, but has also enjoyed unbroken peace for the longest period since the Tokugawa era. During this time the people have not only rebuilt their economy, but have also busied themselves in the arts, in literature and other vital areas of civilized life, enriching their great heritage.

There has been a revival of interest in traditional things which antedated the Meiji Restoration. The amazing interest in archaeology has pushed back the frontiers of Japan's national origins, and together with the renewed enthusiasm for Japanese history,

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especially pre-Meiji, there is a strong concentration on things Japanese. Inward-lookingness is apparently satisfying a deep-seated need in the Japanese people to find themselves and to reëstablish their identity. In this sense it may have something in common with the fierce Meiji determination to keep Japan free from foreign domination.

Another remarkable result of Japan's postwar adaptation is the transformation apparent in the national personality as manifested in politics, in business, in labor relations and in the daily intercourse of all Japanese, regardless of station. The democratization of Japanese society is especially evident in politics, since even the most conservative bureaucrat now knows that the public cannot be "guided," but must be "persuaded" or "sold." He also knows that sales resistance on the part of the public is high, especially on outward-looking subjects such as military security and Japan's political role in the world. Governmental efforts at public relations have yet to produce a clear consensus on matters of foreign policy, although it must also be acknowledged that there are political forces in Japan that thrive on the lack of consensus.

Interestingly, the now well-established habit of free speech has opened up for discussion such dreaded and once-taboo subjects as nuclear weapons, especially in connection with the Non-proliferation Treaty, now under close study. There is evidence that serious discussion of "outward-looking" subjects has begun, although not yet on a widely popular basis. Indications are that the Japanese people are slowly becoming aware of further changes in their circumstances, at home and abroad, and are groping toward new forms of adaptation. Some people describe this trend as a revival of nationalism, although whether this assessment is accurate remains to be seen.

Japan is being challenged anew, domestically and internationally, and may be on the threshold of a new era of change and adaptation. If so, this period of change may well coincide with a generational change, brought about by the passage of time, in all areas of Japanese leadership.

Domestically Japan faces two great problems, both of which have become increasingly visible with the growth in prosperity. These are public hazards, which are the by-products of industrialization; and the lack of social capital, which is a legacy of prewar sacrifices followed by postwar concentration on produc-

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tion. Intense industrialization brought with it pollution and other blights that constitute a growing threat to the public safety. Industrialization also accelerated the urbanization of Japan, spawning huge and sprawling megalopolises while nearly emptying centuries-old villages. Urbanization, in turn, highlighted the inadequacy of public services and amenities during a time when the public was becoming more vocal about its right to enjoy life, and was insistently asking when it might live like the citizens of the second-greatest economy in the free world. In some cases, such as the lack of good access roads, the problem has threatened to become a bottleneck to the expansion of production.

Thus it is now acknowledged throughout Japan that the next stage in the quest for economic security must be to improve the physical environment. The next decade, it is widely agreed, should be devoted not simply to the expansion of production, but also to the creation of more social capital and the solution of the problems that prosperity has brought. The press is busy pointing out the shortcomings of our living conditions, while scholars and experts are full of suggestions on how best to solve these problems. Political circles sensitive to the trend espouse the people's demands and the Government is under daily pressure.

In short, the whole issue has more and more assumed the character of a national challenge, a fit subject to absorb the greater part of our ever-expanding energies for the immediate future. It may also be presumed that concentration on these problems will strengthen, rather than weaken, the inward-looking tendencies of the Japanese people.

III

On the international front, Japan's adaptability is now being challenged by three striking developments. One is the greatly heightened impact of the Japanese economy on the rest of the world. Another is the changing role of the United States in Pacific Asia. The third is the growth among Asian nations of confidence in their own development efforts, coupled with a growing sense of regionalism. Together these trends highlight Japan's unique position in Asia, and call for considered Japanese responses.

Our economy, because of its sheer size and strength (by 1975 the gross national product is expected to be more than four times that of 1960, at constant prices), has become an international

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factor formidable in its own right. Whatever the subjective wishes of inward-lookingness, Japan's economic influence could hardly be felt with greater intensity by her partners, principally the United States and most of the nations of Asia and the Pacific. Even the Soviet Union can no longer ignore Japan, especially in the light of the shift in Sino-Soviet relations.

Influence is but another name for responsibility, and the Japanese people are beginning to focus attention on how the nation will fulfill its new role in the company of such industrial powers as France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Clearly Japan can no longer be a passive agent in international affairs, particularly since economic power has become, in the eyes of the world, political power. The United States, for example, which objects to what it considers continuing restrictions on foreign access to Japanese markets, has raised this matter to the proportions of a major political issue.

It is unthinkable that Japan will not respond, in the spirit of give and take, to its international responsibilities in the economic field. To fail to do so would not only be damaging to the coöperative framework of the world economic system, but would also ultimately be contrary to our best interests, since our economic viability depends on the harmonious functioning of the multilateral coöperative system. Unwillingness to accommodate our interests to those of our partners—such as an overly cautious attitude in lowering barriers to foreign trade and investment—if pushed to an extreme, could result in isolation and alienation similar to that which Japan experienced in the bitter 1930s.

It is more profitable in the long run to defend our interests within the framework of the world system than outside it, and toward that end we should do our part in strengthening the system. Not all the demands of our trading partners are just and equitable, all the time, and each issue should be dealt with firmly on its merits, but only within the framework of the system.

Japan's second important challenge in external affairs is presented by the advent of what is called multipolarity in international relations, and the attendant changes in the relations of each of the two superpowers with its less powerful allies. This trend has not altered the fundamental structure of the U.S.-Soviet global equilibrium of force, but it has led the United States, after deep soul-searching in regard to the burdens it has carried in Viet Nam, to reëxamine its role in the maintenance of interna-

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tional peace and stability, especially in Asia. As President Nixon has made clear, the United States, while intending to fulfill its treaty commitments, at the same time expects the nations of Asia to assume increasing responsibility for their own internal and external security, apart from cases involving the threat of nuclear weapons.

In this context, Japan seems now to have become highly visible to Americans as an Asian power with the potential for contributing to the security of the region. Obviously a simple transfer of peacekeeping responsibilities in Asia from the United States to Japan is out of the question because of Japan's constitutional limitation and the great disparity in both actual and potential military power between our two countries. Japanese public opinion is simply not prepared for such an undertaking; nor, I believe, would the other free nations of Asia welcome it. Responsible Americans will understand, I am sure, that any ill-conceived Japanese military contribution to Asian stability would accomplish little except to squander Japan's security capabilities, and our painstakingly built-up good will in Asian countries, as well as domestic support for the Self-Defense Forces.

In practical terms, moreover, it is reasonable to assume that for some time to come there will be no substitute for the continuing presence of American deterrent power to counter effectively any designs for large-scale military adventures in the area.

What is feasible, as President Nixon has suggested, is for the nations of Asia to enhance their ability to shoulder their own security responsibilities. Japan's Self-Defense Forces are now making an important contribution to the keeping of the peace in East Asia because of the vital role they play in guaranteeing the primary defense of Japan. As a result, the American military presence is able to devote itself to the ultimate mission which it alone is equipped to perform: the deterrence of major war. This same division of labor will be applicable to Okinawa, after reversion, when Japan will be prepared to assume full responsibility for local security against aggression. I wish also to stress that American forces should remain on Okinawa to keep the peace in the region.

Japan's self-defense capability is considerable. Although Japanese defense forces may not constitutionally be deployed abroad, they constitute a very effective homeland defense—285,000 strong—with conventional firepower greater than that of the Imperial

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forces at their wartime peak. Our defense expenditures, $1,340,000,000 in the current fiscal year, are increasing annually at a rate of 14–15 percent, which corresponds to the growth of our gross national product. According to some private projections, this implies that in about ten years Japan's defense budget might roughly correspond to Communist China's today, including Chinese outlays both for conventional armaments and for the back-breakingly expensive nuclear-weapons development program. In short, we can now rely substantially on our own means for our national security, apart, of course, from total war, whether conventional or nuclear. This, in the framework of our treaty relations with the United States, is, I believe, a vital contribution to the peace and stability of our region.

In this connection there is what is known as the "problem of 1970," when Opposition forces plan an all-out effort, accompanied by mass movements, to press the Government to abrogate the Security Treaty, which after June of next year can be terminated on one year's notice by either Japan or the United States. Needless to say, our Government has no intention of doing so.

I am also convinced that Japan is performing another vital role in furthering Asian stability. This is in the form of our support to Asian nations in their efforts to achieve a viable national existence in economic and social fields. Their success in these areas is not only essential to their internal stability, but can also ensure, in the long run, their capacity to assume greater responsibility for their own security.

The nations of Asia, from Korea to the vast Indian subcontinent, have been struggling since the end of World War II to establish viable states. Despite great obstacles, they have made progress, chiefly through their own efforts, but also with varying degrees of external aid. In many cases their progress has been possible because of the stability resulting from the American presence in Asia. There has been no real movement, during this same period, toward any lasting form of regional grouping that might one day lead to a community of nations such as has developed in Europe. This is understandable for historical reasons, and because of the great cultural, religious, ethnic and other differences which characterize Asia.

Nevertheless, successes in internal development of these nations have now led them to a stage where they are showing active interest in effective regional coöperation. Some countries in the

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area have been asking questions about the ability of Japan, as the region's leading economic power, to expand its assistance to nation-building efforts.

One of our responses to this fresh development was to set up the Ministerial Conference for the Development of Southeast Asia, which held its first meeting in 1966. That same year Japan made a decisive contribution to the capital of the Asian Development Bank, ensuring its early operation. At about the same time Japan lent its coöperation to the establishment of the Asian and Pacific Council, which held its fourth ministerial meeting in Japan earlier this year. These initiatives, combined with Japan's long-standing activities as a leading member of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (where plans for the Asian Development Bank originated), have been accepted by our public as forms of constructive economic coöperation, and as manifestations of our willingness to play a useful role in promoting wider regional coöperation.

This is a cause in which I believe Japan can perform most effectively. To fail to respond to the expectations of our Asian neighbors would retard the development of a viable Asian community with Japan as an active and coöperating member. In the absence of such a community Japan would be excessively dependent on the United States to maintain the stability of its security frontiers. While the little-Japan mood takes the U.S. presence for granted and treats it as a substitute for regional cohesion, it would be dangerous to count on this substitution as permanent. The sensible alternative is for our country to shoulder its external responsibilities in the framework of expanding regional coöperation.

An important element in this coöperation is Japanese economic and technical aid. Assistance, both private and governmental, to Asian countries reached the level of $559,000,000 last year, and the government budget for aid to these countries in the current fiscal year has increased 42 percent to $452,300,000. As I informed the assembled Southeast Asian Development Ministers in Bangkok last April, and as my distinguished colleague Finance Minister Takeo Fukuda made clear to the Second Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Sydney that same month, we are prepared to increase our economic aid substantially. A Japanese Cabinet Ministers' conference in July confirmed our intention to promote actively Asian development

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in the coming decade. It is hoped that our present levels of aid to Asia will be doubled within five years.

Economic assistance, however, is only part of the task. What is also needed is a larger objective toward which all our diverse coöperative efforts may be directed. I personally believe, on the basis of our own historical experience and our view of the future, that no objective is more important than the construction in East Asia of a viable community of nations, embodying "unity in diversity." I believe we should help the nations of Asia to develop, aiming toward the attainment of a harmonious and stable whole, and in this context we should put at the disposal of other Asian countries our own experience at adaptation.

Japan's role should be one of service to each country in the region that is willing to accept it, and to the region as a whole. Needless to say, this is a role we can perform only with the agreement of our partners. A long series of talks, both bilateral and multilateral, must precede and accompany this undertaking so there will be no doubts about the intentions of all concerned. This is a task that will take a very long time, and will involve great numbers of people, Japanese and others. It will certainly cost money and energy, and will no doubt produce much criticism and little praise. Careful planning will be required; plans and priorities will have to be geared to each country's particular conditions and, of course, to our capabilities. It will be a vast and demanding enterprise, but it is in our own interest to take vigorous part in it.

Comparing the domestic and external challenges Japan now faces, it is apparent that the two sets of problems are in competition with each other for the allocation of available resources and energies, and in capturing the interest and loyalties of the Japanese public. It would not be much of an exaggeration to speculate that, if nature were to take its course, the average Japanese would be far more interested in solving the knotty and multitudinous problems at home than in making the painful switchover to an outward-looking frame of mind, in order to reach a consensus on Japan's role in the outside world. However, the Japanese mind is characterized by resilience and shrewdness, and has proved it is capable of adapting. Furthermore, as I have already observed, the recognition is steadily spreading that our external circumstances are changing.

It is becoming clearer that Japan must deal with *both* its

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external responsibilities and its domestic challenges. We must act domestically if we are going to prevent our home environment from becoming unfit for life, and we must act internationally to ensure that our external environment will be viable. Successful adaptation to these changing conditions requires a skillful blending of both responses. Obviously the domestic challenges will cost vastly more than the external. The problem of resource allocation can be solved, therefore, by working out a rational set of priorities to meet external requirements, leaving ample flexibility to cope with unforeseen problems in such a long-term undertaking.

So far I have barely touched on the most important problem: how to secure the support of the Japanese people. Certainly it is not enough to harangue the people on the need to divest themselves of inward-looking attitudes. Resistance to this approach is strong. In my view the only course is to appeal to the innate good sense of the Japanese people, nurturing carefully the tender shoots of dialogue that are already emerging in public discussion. Our Government owes our people a full explanation of the national interests involved in these endeavors. The public's voluntary support should be solicited. Leadership should be patient in explaining to the people, both through the Diet and directly, bearing in mind Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's recent observations to the Tokyo Foreign Correspondents' Club: "It is clear that the [Japanese] people are no longer satisfied with a merely negative pacifism aiming only at the country's safety. However, at the same time, national objectives which are not in harmony with the way individual citizens view the world in today's modern society are not viable."

Since these are very long-range undertakings, it is both possible and desirable to devote considerable time and energy to encouraging public interest in outward-looking ideas, gradually weaning the public away from little-Japanism. At the same time, various aspects of the external program can be initiated through practical measures, where the Government has the authority, and where it does not, Diet approval can be sought. I am confident that the cumulative effects of both action and explanation will bring favorable public response.

IV

Finally, I should like to touch briefly on the future environ-

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ment with which we must learn to deal anew. In carrying out the endeavors I have proposed it is obvious that Japan must be extremely sensitive to the requirements of the Asian countries with which we will be working. It is equally obvious that we should give careful thought to two of the three great entities of our region: Communist China and the United States. If the undertakings I have suggested get under way, we may expect that Pacific Asia in the 1970s will display increasingly complex relationships among the two superpowers, and Communist China and Japan.

The Chinese Communists at this moment show no predictability as to the future direction of their policies, internal or external, so I cannot foresee with confidence what their reaction will be. They must realize by now that none of the countries from the Japan Sea to the Indian Ocean, including the communist régimes, would welcome the establishment of a Chinese sphere of influence in this area. Whether China will interpret our intentions in hostile or indifferent terms remains to be seen. It seems safe to predict, however, that the Communist Chinese will have to take more notice of Japan as our national influence, in keeping with our responses to new challenges, continues to rise.

For our part, we will continue our present policies of maintaining diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and nongovernmental economic and cultural contacts with Peking, and, as long as there is any danger that the Republic of China may be evicted from the United Nations, of avoiding such an eventuality.

At the same time I am aware that, according to some, perpetuating the isolation of Peking is conducive neither to stability nor to peaceful development in Asia, and I am of the opinion that in coming years serious attention should be given to this problem. I privately think that the question of attaining a viable equilibrium in relations between nuclear-equipped Peking and ourselves will take at least another decade for a full answer. Suffice it to say that the Communist Chinese question is a fundamental one and, as such, figures in our domestic political life, where many elements are attempting to prove that we are being forced by the United States to follow its lead. It is hardly necessary for me to deny this allegation.

As I have already implied, the regional military balance in East Asia is essentially that between the United States, our ally,

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and Communist China. In the context of the U.S. deterrent, I am sure the United States will welcome my proposals to help the countries of the region with their nation-building, which after all is the foundation for their security and stability. In the case of certain countries, this might mean that when necessary they would be ready to take over with their own troops any part of the visible American presence which Washington, under its modified strategy, may transfer elsewhere.

Turning to current bilateral issues between Japan and the United States, strong public attention has been focused on the problems of the reversion of Okinawa and of economic relations between the two countries.

The problem of the return of Okinawa, which has been the subject of exchange visits to our respective countries by Secretary of State William P. Rogers and myself, will hopefully be resolved later this year when Prime Minister Sato plans to visit President Nixon. Resolution of this issue will be significant, not only in the obvious sense that a long-separated part of our people will return to the fold, and that this will have been accomplished through peaceful and friendly talks between our two Governments; it will be significant also in the sense that the return of Okinawa will lift the last excuse in our public mind for clinging to our inward-lookingness. With Okinawa—so long a symbol of our defeat and impotence—back in our midst, our strength will have been made whole again, and we will be ready for our responsibilities. Here lies the importance of Okinawa to history.

In this connection, I should note that we are also actively trying to solve another important territorial problem—namely, that of our Northern Islands under Soviet occupation.

As for the very complicated economic problems, I have already touched briefly on some of their aspects, pointing out that Japan is prepared to play its part in maintaining and developing the world economic system, and that it is actively pursuing the liberalization of trade and capital investment, at the maximum speed consistent with domestic economic considerations. It is also self-evident that the difficult problems facing the multilateral economic system, both in monetary and trade fields, can be overcome only through the closest international coöperation, and with effective leadership from such economic giants as the United States and the European Economic Community. I should like to add that economic relations between the United States

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and Japan have proved by their nature to be mutually profitable over the long run. We need each other. Thus there should be no issue between us that cannot be settled by honest and well-thought-out give and take.

Unique among the world's advanced nations, Japan has been obliged to make extraordinary adjustments and adaptations in the short span of a century. Though our national psyche may bear some scars, we have been resilient as a people, and, so far, successful. Now we must respond to new problems, because if we fail to do so we may not be prepared when the next major challenge confronts us.

I, for one, am an optimist, and one of my favorite sayings is: "Listen to the call of the twenty-first century." It is my hope that with hard and sometimes painful work, my people by that time will have transcended the discontinuities of their past, and will be vital participants in the affairs of both the Asian and the world communities.

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REALISM IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

By Edward Heath

LOOKING back at the foreign policies of Britain and the United States since 1800 one sees two strands woven closely together—the strands of idealism and realism. In both countries, governments, parliaments and peoples have been happiest when these two elements have been brought together in apparent harmony. Take for example two quotations from nineteenth-century England:

> We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow. . . . With every British Minister the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy.

And then again:

> I hold that the real policy of England is to be the champion of justice and right: pursuing that course with moderation and prudence, not becoming the Quixote of the world, but giving her moral sanction and support wherever she thinks justice is, and whenever she thinks that wrong has been done.

The point of interest in these quotations is that they were spoken by the same man in the same speech without any sense of contradiction. They were the words of Palmerston in the House of Commons in 1848; but I am sure that both quotations could be matched by almost any Foreign Secretary or Secretary of State between that time and now.

Over much of this period it has in fact been possible for idealism and realism to run fairly well together. For example, in Palmerston's time the interests of England, as well as its liberal conscience, dictated that England should support those liberal and national movements which created the nation-states of Europe as we see them today. At the turn of the century, for a comparatively brief period, idealistic belief in Britain's mission overseas combined with a keen sense of political and commercial opportunity to create a positive imperial policy. After the Second World War a different brand of idealism combined with a realistic sense of the change in Britain's power to produce the peaceful transfer from a colonial empire to the independent association of the Commonwealth.

But at other times there has been an obvious and inevitable tension between the claims of idealism and of realism. When

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this tension has occurred it has been the instinct of the British to plump for realism, to a degree which until recently has tended to shock observers on the American side of the Atlantic. It is the first and not the second of the quotations set out above which has served as a text down the years for the instruction of new entrants into the British Foreign Service. If one looks in this century at the occasional clashes between British and American policy, between Wilson and Lloyd George at the Peace Conference of 1919, between Churchill and Roosevelt in the closing years of the Second World War, between Dulles and Anthony Eden over Indochina in 1954, one sees at each point a British preference for realism resisted by American statesmen, who preferred to look for some master principle which they could put forward as a universal ideal. To the British observer one of the remarkable shifts of American policy during the last decade has been precisely a movement toward a more realistic analysis of issues of foreign policy and a partial abandonment of the search for a master principle. I do not myself find this disturbing. For the interests of Britain and the United States in the present stage of their historical development clearly require stability and prosperity not only at home, but throughout the world. This means that we are once again in a period where the interests of our two countries coincide with any reasonable definition of the common good.

But it is clearly not enough to define these interests in such general terms. The realist has to look more closely into ways and means. It is at this point that there has been in recent years a certain question mark over British foreign policy. We have shown some reluctance to define our course, and to hold to that course steadily in the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs. We have tended to become preoccupied with day-to-day difficulties, and so to miss the tide of events. We have suffered from a degree of diffidence and uncertainty which has obscured our vision of reality.

II

An obvious example has been the British attitude toward the movement for unity in Europe. Ever since Winston Churchill made his great postwar speeches at Zurich and The Hague, far-sighted Englishmen have seen that the movement for European unity holds enormous benefits for Britain. It promises an end to

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those conflicts between European powers from which the European countries, including Britain, have been the chief sufferers. It promises a voice for Europe in world affairs which individual European countries cannot hope to achieve by themselves. It promises in the long run a single market in Europe to provide a foundation from which European industry and European science can grow to match the achievements of the United States and the Soviet Union.

This elementary analysis is now overwhelmingly accepted as valid, in Britain as elsewhere in Western Europe. Yet the sad fact is that each British attempt to associate Britain with the movement for European unity has failed, and that each attempt has taken place in less favorable circumstances than its predecessor. When I made my first speech in the House of Commons in 1950 I urged that Britain should join the European Coal and Steel Community. At that time, and for a few years afterwards, Britain had the opportunity to join the European communities at their birth, and so to have a decisive say in European institutions and the way in which they were run. But by the time Mr. Macmillan's government decided in 1961 to apply for membership in the European Economic Community, our task was already more difficult. During the negotiations which I conducted in 1961 and 1962 we had to reckon with a Community whose institutions and policies were already partly formed without taking account of the needs and interests of Britain. During these negotiations we came a long way to finding solutions to the practical problems resulting from that situation; but we were frustrated in January 1963 by the abrupt decision of the President of France.

By the time that the Labor government was converted to the European idea and made its own attempt to join the Community in 1967, the policies of the Community had taken even more definite shape. In particular the Community had, since the earlier negotiations, adopted in detail a Common Agricultural Policy which Britain would clearly have to accept as a condition of membership. The second attempt failed without negotiations having started at all because the French President refused to alter his well-known stand. It is too early to be sure how far the basic French objection to British membership in the EEC has now changed. But it is certain that Britain is now less able than she was in 1961–62, or even in 1967, to assume without special

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arrangements the obligations of full membership. The increase in Britain's international indebtedness and the underlying weakness of her balance of payments make more formidable the heavy short-term burden which a Common Market and the Common Agricultural Policy as it now stands would inevitably impose.

The setbacks which we have suffered in Europe have also raised in some minds a doubt as to whether we are on the right path to European unity. It has been suggested that we ought to break away from the wearisome attempt to enter the Communities and to find a short cut by means of some dramatic political initiative aimed at finding a new formula. Recipes for this formula have varied, but I believe that they all miss the basic fact about the way in which European unity can be constructed.

In my judgment the unity of Europe will in the end be achieved by European governments forming the habit of working together. Public and parliamentary opinion works upon governments, but in the end it is governments, elected ministers and their officials, who take the decisions. Confidence between governments is the only lasting cement for the unity of Europe. The underlying analysis of M. Monnet and the other founding fathers of the Communities was that the governments of the Six would begin by working together for the abolition of tariffs and the creation of a common market. Under the stimulus of the European Commission they would then move on, as confidence in the joint taking of decisions increased, to create an economic union. They would gradually extend the range of their coöperation until it passed beyond purely economic matters into foreign policy and defense. At the same time, as confidence grew, governments would be more ready to pool their powers in strictly European institutions.

I am sure that this still remains the only realistic approach to European unity, and that short cuts can only lead to a further round of disappointments which neither Britain nor Europe can afford. Of course the process has been slower than the signatories of the Treaty of Rome had hoped. There have been delays and setbacks; in an enterprise of this magnitude these were to be expected. But the Communities and their institutions have survived and proved their worth. It is inconceivable to me that the unity of Europe could now be established on any other basis.

In the next year or two there may be another opportunity for Britain to join in this process. If this effort is to succeed it must

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be most carefully prepared, for public opinion in Britain could not tolerate a third failure. There has understandably been some falling-off of British enthusiasm in recent years. The cause of European unity has suffered from far too high a ratio of words to action. It would be a serious miscalculation to suppose that enthusiasm could be rekindled by a new round of conferences or declarations of intent; this would merely aggravate the sense of frustration. But once there was a prospect of practical and acceptable answers being found to the real problems which now bar the way, then I believe that public interest would quickly revive and the strength of the underlying argument in favor of European unity would prevail.

Britain's application to join the EEC remains on the table with those of the other applicant countries. The next step so far as Britain is concerned must be for the Six to signify that they are all ready to begin negotiations on our application. Then before negotiations between Britain and the Six as a whole can begin there must be thorough bilateral discussions between Britain and each of the Six, as well as with the European Commission if they so wish. These discussions are needed to ensure, before negotiations start, that enough common ground exists for their success. They will naturally cover the whole field of the Treaty of Rome. Many of the results which we achieved in the negotiations of 1961–62 are still valid and will provide a foundation for eventual British membership. Other difficulties were not resolved in the earlier negotiations and still exist today, though in the case of New Zealand, for example, it was accepted in principle by the Community that a solution was essential for a successful negotiation. It is not realistic to suppose that these difficulties can be brushed aside as of no importance. But given the political will to succeed, these problems are not of a magnitude to frustrate a final agreement.

But preparation must in my judgment go well beyond the scope of the Treaty of Rome. We shall not succeed unless we can work out with our future partners guidelines for the other problems which confront Europe today. We shall not achieve final solutions at this preliminary stage; as I have already said, I believe that these final solutions will grow out of the confidence formed by the habit of working together. But the British Government needs to show from the beginning that it favors a common approach to these further problems, and that it has ideas on

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what this approach should be. The further problems fall broadly under three heads: monetary coöperation, political coöperation and defense.

III

The monetary predicament of the Western world looms larger today than it did in 1961–62 or even in 1967. It is, of course, a problem with many facets. In 1967 a principal cause for concern was the weakness of sterling and the instability of the sterling balances. The former led to devaluation; but devaluation, in its turn, gave a shock to the sterling system which aggravated the problem of the sterling balances. In effect, a European solution had then to be found for this problem. The Basle agreements contained arrangements which could well have been a part of such a European solution.

At the same time, a general uncertainty persists—a result of the continued increase in Britain's indebtedness, the continued U.S. deficit, the weakness and sudden devaluation of the franc and the accumulated surpluses in Germany—which impedes the economic policy of each of these countries and many others besides. Obviously, there could be no purely European solution to these problems, but equally it has become clear that Europe cannot proceed much further toward economic union without a more fundamental consensus on monetary matters than is contained in the Treaty of Rome or the practice of the EEC to date.

Two related issues in particular dominate the present international monetary scene. The first has worldwide ramifications; the second, in practice, is more directly the concern of the European Communities.

On the wider issue, the Bretton Woods system (not as originally envisaged, but as it has developed in practice) has for some time been showing acute signs of strain. On the one hand, there is a continuing need for increased international liquidity to satisfy the reserve requirements of various countries without precipitating the international transmission of deflation and a return to the beggar-my-neighbor policies of the interwar years. On the other hand, this need has been met by persistent imbalance—on the part of the Americans—creating a flow of dollars into Europe. This has eased the liquidity problem at the expense of growing doubts about the value of the dollar. While these doubts have not been resolved, the pressures to which they could have

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given rise have largely been neutralized by German reluctance to convert dollars into gold.

The creation of liquidity in this way has had certain unplanned and unforeseen consequences. First, the gold-exchange system envisaged at Bretton Woods has effectively been put into suspense and replaced by a dollar system. Secondly, the surplus of dollar balances, instead of accumulating in official hands, has contributed to the development of the Eurodollar market to supply the need for a European capital market.

These developments have both good and bad features. On the positive side, the supply of liquidity necessary for the continued growth of world trade has been maintained; the Eurodollar market now performs an invaluable role as a flexible international money market, and America has been able to continue exporting scientific know-how and managerial skill to Europe.

On the negative side, the system depends upon a continued U.S. deficit which in turn means a flow of real resources to the richest country in the world; the Eurodollar market is also a potential source of instability, lacking as it does any overt control or "lender of the last resort;" and under the dollar system the world is forced to march in step with the United States, which effectively determines the ebb and flow of activity throughout the rest of the world.

Europe must decide whether it really does want America to eliminate its deficit or whether to accept a world dollar system. Can the European countries agree on a viable alternative to American domination of the international monetary system?

The related, but narrower, European problem is how individual members of the Common Market can adjust imbalances between themselves. It can be argued that once the Community is fully developed, scope for imbalance will be strictly limited. The ties between members of the Community will then be so close that the development of inflationary or deflationary pressures in one country will immediately be transmitted to its partners before any serious balance-of-payments difficulties arise.

But this does not alter the fact that a real disequilibrium at present exists between Germany on the one hand and France on the other. The problem is that there is a conflict between measures to eliminate a disequilibrium—such as exchange-rate changes—and other aspects of the Community, in particular the common agricultural policy. Under this policy, agricultural

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prices were set in terms of units of gold which reflect the present value of the dollar. Any member which changes its exchange rate would have to accept, under the rules, related changes in food prices and farm subsidies, which may be undesirable. Members of the Community have therefore to come to terms with this problem, either by taking a giant stride toward integration of monetary and fiscal policies or by finding some way of permitting adjustment between members which does not undermine the existing framework of the Community. It may well be that the special but temporary adjustments to common agricultural policy made by the EEC Council of Ministers in order to assist France after the devaluation of the franc will pave the way for more far-reaching reforms.

As regards political coöperation, the first step must be an effective system of harmonizing foreign policy within the Council of Ministers of the EEC. It is a paradox that while the EEC itself has failed to establish any such pattern of consultation, the Council of the Western European Union (the Six plus Britain) had quietly and undramatically achieved a form where the seven governments regularly exchanged views on foreign policy matters. That is one reason why I was opposed to the attempt to make WEU part of the means of outflanking the French veto on British entry into the EEC. The only practical result has been to cause France to exclude herself from meetings of WEU which she had previously attended. It is ludicrous that countries of Western Europe are now without a means of concerting their policies on matters of such vital concern to Europe as, say, the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East.

In the field of defense there has already in recent years been a movement toward creating a European voice within NATO. This tendency will inevitably increase if it becomes apparent that, despite the lesson of Czechoslovakia, the United States is determined to reduce the size of the forces which up to now she has been ready to station in Europe.

The chief difficulty in the way of this coming together of European countries on defense has been that France has so far been excluded as a result of President de Gaulle's withdrawal from effective coöperation with NATO. The immediate aim of European countries should be to devise a way to end this unnatural separation. It is now three years since I proposed the idea of a joint Anglo-French Nuclear Deterrent which could be held

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in trust for Europe. I have been glad to notice that similar suggestions have now been made by Herr Strauss and hinted at by the new French Government. My conception has been that the non-nuclear countries of Europe could join with Britain and France in a Consultative Committee which would have exactly the same relationship to the joint Anglo-French deterrent as the so-called McNamara Committee has to the U.S. deterrent. There would thus be no question of infringing upon the Nonproliferation Treaty, or giving non-nuclear countries an unacceptable measure of control, commonly described as a finger on the trigger. A scheme of this kind would not in any sense be anti-American; indeed, because of the provisions of the various British agreements with the United States in this field, it could not be implemented without American support. I believe that this support would be compatible with the general principles of American policy toward Europe in recent years. The United States under different administrations has shown remarkable farsightedness in being willing to make concessions of its immediate interests in order to further the creation of a European unity.

IV

In Britain in recent years, our role outside Europe has been the subject of lively discussion which has run somewhat parallel to the discussion in the United States, although the circumstances and issues are widely different. There is little dispute in Britain about the part which Britain should play in the various international enterprises in which she is a partner. It is widely accepted in Britain that the peacekeeping and peacemaking functions of the United Nations should be supported and strengthened, and that this can be done without acknowledging that every resolution passed by the General Assembly, or its Committees, enjoys some sacred infallibility. The United Nations has shown that, in the right place and under the right conditions, it can provide a useful addition to the traditional techniques of diplomacy which no country genuinely interested in international stability can afford to neglect.

Similar considerations apply to the Commonwealth, an organization which may be on the verge of a new usefulness as the prejudices of the past evaporate. During its early years the Commonwealth suffered from the suspicion of some of its members that Britain was using the organization to perpetuate under

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a new name some of the privileges of empire. Latterly it has suffered from the suspicion in Britain that other Commonwealth countries were interested in the association primarily as a means of extracting help from Britain, and as an opportunity of reading Britain lectures on British policy of a kind which would be bitterly resented if addressed to any other country. This suspicion gained ground as a result of the preoccupation of the Commonwealth with the Rhodesian question. But after the last Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, which achieved a greater success than was recognized by some at the time, it seems at least possible that suspicions are fading. New possibilities of coöperation within the Commonwealth are opening up, based primarily on the dense network of connections between Commonwealth countries in almost every field of human activity, a network which has largely survived the vagaries of politics.

Equally there is little argument in Britain about British membership in the alliances to which she now belongs, and in particular of the importance of the connection with the United States. Here again much of the rhetoric of the past has vanished, leaving behind a realization that a special relationship does not mean special privileges. It means a recognition that the two countries still hold interests in common across the world to an extent which goes well beyond the normal dealings between friendly states and peoples. This relationship will continue to the extent, and only to the extent, that each country contributes effectively to the furthering of those common interests.

Much of the argument in Britain has concentrated not on Britain's part in these common enterprises but on the individual role of Britain in helping to keep the peace in certain well-defined areas.

In our recent history there have always been those in Britain who have opposed spending what is necessary on defense to safeguard the security of the country and protect its interests overseas. Now this group has been joined by those who divide the world up into isolated compartments and argue that the British defense effort must henceforward be confined to our own islands and the continent of Europe.

The arguments used in defense of this thesis do not in my view stand up to serious examination. We would all prefer to see a world order in which stability was achieved by some accepted

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system of international enforcement. But failing such a system, there is no political law of harmony in operation which ensures that the sovereign states in any given area of the world will settle down automatically into a state of peaceful coexistence. There will be circumstances in the future, as in the past, when independent nations which believe themselves to be threatened will appeal to their friends elsewhere in the world for help. It would be as foolish to claim that such appeals should always be refused as to pretend that they should always be accepted.

There have been instances since World War II of British military power failing to achieve the purpose for which it was deployed. But there have also been instances where British power has been strikingly successful in averting a threat not only to British interests but to the stability of the area involved. The arrival of British forces in Kuwait in 1961 ruled out the possibility of an Iraqi take-over. British military action in East Africa in 1964 prevented the overthrow of three Commonwealth East African governments by armed mutiny. The major British military effort in Eastern Malaysia from 1964 until the change of régime in Indonesia not only maintained the integrity of Malaysia but also averted a serious threat to the stability of Southeast Asia. The lesson to be drawn from both the failures and successes during this period is that a British military presence can be effective if the political context is right. This should, I am sure, be the test for our future policy. It happens that in the Gulf and in Singapore/Malaysia the political context has been right for the successful deployment of limited British forces. These forces have, politically speaking, been part of the landscape, and their presence has been welcomed by our friends in the area. British forces have not physically protected British investments and installations, but they have helped to ensure the stability without which such British interests cannot flourish.

This analysis, rather than any nostalgia for imperial grandeur, has led the British Conservative Party to the firm conclusion that if a Conservative government is returned to power it will consult with our friends to see, in the conditions then obtaining, what kind of British effort is required. In Southeast Asia we have put forward a scheme for a joint five-power Commonwealth force including contingents from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia. We have been greatly encouraged by the fact that since I first advanced this proposal in

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Canberra last August, the governments of Australia and New Zealand have made known in cogent statements of policy the decision of these two countries to keep troops in Singapore and Malaysia after the end of 1971. It is noticeable that informed opinion in Britain is increasingly coming round to accept our analysis. It is more and more recognized that the economies promised as a result of the policy of withdrawal are false in the sense that they expose British interests and the future of our friends to unacceptable risk.

It is sometimes said that foreign affairs are of no real interest to a democratic electorate, and that politicians should concern themselves with bread-and-butter issues. In my experience this is a considerable oversimplification. Certainly, so far as Britain is concerned, I find that even those who have no detailed knowledge of the particular issues of foreign affairs are nevertheless anxious that their country should not retreat into the shadows. They are quick to resent any suggestion that Britain should contract out of any interest in what happens beyond her shores or the continent of Europe.

The pattern of future British policy which I have outlined is, I believe, based on a realistic assessment of British interests. But it also offers scope for idealism—in building the unity of Europe, in helping forward the prosperity and security of the Commonwealth and in increasing Britain's share in all those international enterprises, small and great, which are gradually edging us toward a better world.

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CAN MILITARY SPENDING BE CONTROLLED?

By Jonathan B. Bingham

NINETEEN sixty-nine may be remembered as the year Americans woke up to the importance of an issue that was to be a dominant one in the 1970s. The question of Viet Nam still had the emotional clout. The great ABM debate still captured most of the headlines. But more and more people were beginning to see that bigger and more permanent than both of these was the question of whether America's military spending could be brought under more rational control. In the winter of 1969 it became increasingly clear that we had to find a way to reorient our national priorities so that imperative human needs on the home front were not always being shunted aside because of the claims of "national security." No longer could it be successfully argued that we could afford the needed amounts of "guns *and* butter." A difficult choice—or at least choices—had to be made, and would have to be made repeatedly, for many years to come.

The issue of military spending is more than just newly discerned; it is in fact new in its dimensions. For the first time in history, each of two great antagonists has the power to destroy the other and security depends almost entirely on the gruesome theory of "mutually assured destruction." At the same time, the satisfaction of basic human needs has become more of an imperative than ever before if we are to survive as a society, because today for the first time those needs *can* be met and the people, including the poor, know it.

I

Until World War II Americans generally had been suspicious of "standing armies" and had been inclined to keep the armed forces on meager rations, except in time of actual war. Even the experience of World War II itself did not change this feeling. Right after V-J Day the cry was "Bring the boys home!" and, with a sigh of relief, America demobilized. But, only two years later, with the growing threat from the Soviet Union becoming apparent, with Britain's withdrawal from Greece and the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the tide of military spending

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turned and has been flooding ever since. It surged during the Korean War, subsided briefly, and then continued to mount.

The figures tell a vivid story: in 1948 the defense budget was $11.8 billion; for 1969–70 the budget submitted to Congress was about $80 billion, representing an increase of 680 percent. Allowing for inflation, the increase in constant dollars is 345 percent. This is more than twice the percentage rise in the GNP.

Since 1961, it is true, federal spending for domestic needs has increased faster than defense spending. Programs inaugurated in the progressive 89th Congress, including medicare and medicaid, aid to education and the expanded war on poverty, have made heavy demands on the federal treasury. And, for the years 1963, 1964 and 1965 and again for 1969 and 1970 (estimated) the percentage growth in military spending was actually fractionally smaller than the growth in GNP.

As we look ahead, however, the picture is bleak. Not only are the pressures for a steeper rate of increase in the defense budget intense, but also we are beginning to have a new and clearer conception of the dimensions of our home-front needs. The Kerner Commission report was an electric shock to the conscience of America. By any standard, the amounts required for substantial improvements in our social programs are large: for example, a 35 percent increase in Social Security benefits would cost about $13 billion. An educational assistance program to equalize per-pupil expenditures in all states at the level of New York would cost $19 billion per year. A mass transit improvement program equivalent to half the federal highway aid program would run about $2 billion annually. Everyone wants to move away from the present welfare system, but any move in the direction of a guaranteed minimum income, or negative income tax, is bound to be expensive: for a reasonably comprehensive program, the net cost would be at least $20 billion a year. A federal housing program geared to meet the country's needs is bound to run well into the billions. And so it goes.

For a while it was hoped that, if only the Viet Nam war could be ended, enough resources could be made available to ease the strain. But Charles Schultze, former Budget Director, and others have exploded that myth. Proceeding on the assumption that an end to the Viet Nam war might produce savings of about $20 billion annually after two years, these experts point out that within two to three years after that these savings would be more

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than wiped out by normal increases in the defense budget, including pay increases and spending on weapons systems already approved. Assuming continued economic growth produces annual increases in federal revenues of $15 billion, Schultze estimates that about half of this will be drained off by built-in increases on the civilian side, so that five years from now we can expect to have only about a $7–$8 billion a year increment to meet the competing demands for (*a*) the kind of massive domestic programs the Kerner Commission called for, (*b*) stepped-up demands for military spending, (*c*) tax relief. Schultze's figures were based on the admittedly arbitrary assumption that tax levels, aside from the surcharge, would remain the same. But the demand for tax relief is intense, as Congressional action this past summer clearly showed. If tax levels are in fact reduced, and if the factors making for military spending are not brought under better control than they have been in the past, the entire "fiscal dividend" could be drained off without leaving any room at all for home-front programs.

II

The pressures from within the Pentagon for increased expenditures are enormous. They stem in part from traditional and still acute competition among the military services. In part, they are the natural result of increasing technologies; each new generation of weapons means greater complexity and sophistication, and the expense seems to rise by geometric rather than arithmetic progression. Thus, during the Korean War the standard fighter plane, the F86, cost about $300,000; today the standard Navy F4 costs about $3 million, and the Navy wants to move to the F14, estimated to cost some $14 million. The existence of a new technology seems to compel a new weapons system based on that technology; some of my ablest colleagues in the Congress believe that this process is inevitable with respect to MIRV, for example, and cannot be arrested by arms-limitation agreements or in any other way.

To the experts in the Pentagon, the fear of what the other side may be doing is ever present. It is natural for the military man to try to achieve absolute security against any contingency that may arise, even though intellectually he may recognize that absolute security is unattainable. He is trained and paid to think this way. Thus the military services will always and inevitably

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want more than they have. Their appetites are insatiable. And the industrial concerns that are ready and eager to undertake the required contracts will encourage them. In upstate New York, for example, one hears that anybody connected with General Electric is "of course" for the ABM. The effect of all this may be sinister, but the motives are not.

The real trouble comes when those civilians in government who are supposed to see to it that the military's appetite is restrained are not capable of performing that function because they have come to share the military point of view. Although the top civilians in the Pentagon are most exposed to the generals and admirals, it is by no means inevitable that they should be dominated by them. In Robert McNamara the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a tough boss who exercised a great deal of independent judgment, based on extensive and intensive review and analysis carried out by civilians under his control. Secretary Laird, too, has insisted on cutbacks.

Above the Secretary of Defense, the next level of review is that of the President. To exercise this responsibility he must of necessity rely on the Bureau of the Budget. But for years the BOB review of defense requests has not been nearly as tough or effective as it should have been. For one thing, the Bureau has had too few examiners. For another, with regard to the Pentagon, the BOB has not had the authority, as it does in the case of all other departments, to decide on the dollar amounts of the requests going to Congress, subject to an appeal to the President by the department head. For the Department of Defense, the reverse has been true: the Secretary has had the authority to decide on the requests, subject to an appeal to the President by the Budget Director (and McNamara once boasted that he never lost such an argument).

A third limitation on the Budget Bureau, according to former director Schultze, has been that it was too much concerned with details; it did not get into the Pentagon's planning process early enough to raise questions about the fundamental assumptions and strategy which determined the order of magnitude of defense spending. Thus, according to Schultze, there was never sufficient attention or debate within the Executive Branch about the so-called "2½ war" concept underlying U.S. planning, *i.e.* the assumption that the United States had to be prepared to carry on simultaneously a land war in Europe, a land war in Asia (pre-

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sumably against Communist China) and a brushfire war elsewhere.

In the past the influence of the BOB, so great in other areas, has been overshadowed in the military area by the Pentagon on the one hand and the Congress on the other. The present Budget Director, Robert P. Mayo, has indicated an inclination to change this. He says, for example, that from now on the appeal procedure will be the same for all departments. And the President has said that he will back Mayo against Laird, if disagreements arise. But it is yet too early to tell how Mayo will fare. Even if he has the full backing of the President, he may run into trouble on Capitol Hill.

All too often, the dominant members of the Congressional committees having responsibility in this area—the Armed Services Committees and Appropriations subcommittees having jurisdiction over defense and "military construction"—come to share the point of view of the military. Chairman Mendel Rivers of the House Armed Services Committee is a conspicuous example. So many defense installations have been located in his district that fears have been expressed that the city of Charleston might sink under their weight. His belief in military solutions to international problems has been well illustrated by his unleash-the-military position on Viet Nam. A sizable majority of his committee tends to share the Chairman's point of view. Civilian DOD officials associated with McNamara and Clifford report that, in hearings before the Rivers committee, they were vigorously challenged to defend, not the size of DOD requests, but the reductions they had made in the requests of the Joint Chiefs. For FY 1967 and 1968, the Committee actually increased the Pentagon's requests for procurement and RDT&E (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation) by a total of $1,325,200,000. At the same time, Rivers and a majority of his associates are conservative and intensely economy-minded when it comes to social problems on the home front.

The makeup of the defense appropriations subcommittees is similar. In both the Senate and the House, the top four Democratic members of the appropriations subcommittees on defense are southern conservatives. Until his appointment as Secretary of Defense, Mr. Laird was a prominent member of the House subcommittee. The Chairman of the House subcommittee on military construction, Mr. Sikes of Florida, was until

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last year a Major-General in the Reserves and a board member of the National Rifle Association.

Although these committees have held extensive hearings on the Pentagon's requests for authorizations and appropriations, the chairmen typically exercise tight control. Usually the only witnesses called, except for fellow members of Congress, have been from the Pentagon. (In the recent ABM hearings, adverse witnesses were heard at the insistence of anti-ABM committee members, but this was unusual.) Those members of the committees who have chosen to challenge Pentagon requests have had to rely on their own resources to pursue their inquiries effectively. They are not considered a "minority" in the traditional sense (this term applies only to the minority party) and no committee staff is assigned to them.

Once brought before the membership of the Senate or the House, the committee recommendations used to sail through, until 1969, with a minimum of meaningful discussion. The proposals for defense authorizations or appropriations were invariably presented as "essential," never as "desirable," much less as "of marginal value." The committee reports were full of military jargon and rarely related the specific requests to particular policy objectives. As for the hearing records, they were technical, voluminous and suffered from extensive deletions of testimony for reasons of security.

Typically, those few members who sought to raise questions or objections were treated either with scorn as uninformed, or with anger as unpatriotic. There was no debate about the fundamental assumptions underlying the military requests (such as the "2½ war" concept, the existence of which was unknown to most Congressmen until this year) and very little discussion of the pros and cons of proposed force levels or weapons systems. What talk did take place was replete with such clichés as "better too much than too little," "you can't measure lives with dollars," etc.

At no point in the Congressional process was there an opportunity for comparing the domestic needs of the nation with its external needs. Priority for the requirements of national security was assumed, not debated. A double standard was consistently applied: what was said to be needed for survival against dangers from abroad, we would do; what was said to be needed for survival against dangers from within, we would consider.

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III

In spite of the enormous influence of what one liberal Congressman has called the "military-industrial-Congressional complex," we as a nation have the tools to solve the problem of military spending, if we can find the will to use them.

First of all, and fundamentally, the structure of civilian control in the federal establishment was solidly built by the Founding Fathers and stands intact today; the dangers of a military takeover seem remote. Even freshmen Congressmen who cut little swath in the Capitol are sometimes surprised by the deference with which they are treated by bemedaled officers. The deference may be wholly superficial, but it represents a sturdy tradition.

Second, the climate for action to give reality to the principles of civilian supremacy is at least temporarily favorable. The myth of the military's infallibility in matters supposedly within its competence has been thoroughly exploded in Viet Nam, in terms both of consistent over-optimism and of obvious over-reliance on what military power could do. The military have been further embarrassed by the poor planning evident in the *Pueblo* case, the lack of discretion or foresight, or both, in having nerve gas stored all over the lot, and the just plain bungling displayed in the sinking of a submarine at its dock. Another factor has been the revelation of fantastic overruns in anticipated contract costs, as in the case of the C5A.

The increasing skepticism toward the peremptory demands of the military has been accompanied by a growing realization of the size and urgency of our domestic needs and by a widespread awareness that some hard choices would have to be made. Stimulated by the ABM debates, a number of private organizations have started to focus public attention on the overall problem of military vs. domestic spending. For example, a group of businessmen have formed a Fund for New Priorities in America which sponsored two well-publicized conferences on the subject in Washington, with members of Congress, scientists, economists and others taking part.

Similarly, on Capitol Hill more and more members have been getting educated on the issue of priorities. The Democratic Study Group, comprising the liberal majority of the Democratic House membership, has organized a task force to look simultaneously at foreign policy and defense policy issues, and has

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arranged seminars and circulated fact sheets on various aspects of the subject. Another informal organization, in this case bipartisan and bicameral, known as Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, has also in 1969 focused for the first time on the military-spending problem: under Senator Hatfield's chairmanship, a subcommittee of the organization has produced and released a series of responsible recommendations for cutbacks in procurement authorizations totaling some $3.1 billion. Even within the Armed Services Committees themselves, substantial minorities are beginning to challenge the military's recommendations on a number of programs.

The close votes on Safeguard in the Senate on August 6 were significant less for the result than for the narrowness of the Administration's victory. The precedent that major new military programs will not go unchallenged was firmly established. Shortly after the ABM vote, Secretary Laird was compelled to accept a restrictive amendment on CBW (Chemical and Biological Warfare) funds, and an amendment authorizing General Accounting Office audit of major Pentagon contracts was also adopted. All concerned were agreed that a kind of uprising was on against the military.

The Pentagon has obviously not been insensitive to these developments. Under pressure from Congressional critics, and influenced also by the need for containing inflationary trends, the Nixon Administration has announced various cutbacks. Some of these represent deferrals of expenditure, but a pet project of the Air Force, the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, long considered by skeptics to be an unnecessary duplication of NASA activities, was cancelled altogether by the Nixon Administration. The controversial Cheyenne helicopter was also dropped.

In August, Secretary Laird announced further economy measures, mostly involving conventional forces. These cuts would reduce spending in FY 1970 by $1.5 billion, over and above the reductions of $1.1 billion announced earlier; and he said an additional cutback of $1.5 billion was on the way. He grumbled at the Congress and warned that the cuts would weaken our "defense readiness," but it was the action that was important.

So the tide that has been flooding so long is at last showing signs of being contained. But sporadic, impetuous and grudging measures will not be enough. An effective and durable flood-control system will be required.

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IV

Like others who have addressed this topic, I have often stressed the urgent need for "new priorities." The expression is perhaps acceptable as a shorthand way of saying that in the future we must be less generous toward the military than we have been and less stingy about meeting our home-front needs. But the word "priorities" can be misleading if it implies a system of making budgetary decisions on the basis of constant comparisons between national security needs and domestic needs. Such comparisons must indeed be made, but this can be done only at certain points in the review process and by a few people. Obviously, for example, Defense Department officials cannot be expected to be familiar with specific domestic needs, yet the task of bringing military spending under responsible civilian control must begin in the Pentagon.

What can and should be required of the civilians in the Pentagon is a tough, "show me" attitude toward the requests of the brass, an attitude based on awareness that total security is unattainable but will always be sought by the military, and that federal spending for military purposes must be severely limited in the light of other acute needs. The civilian heads of the DOD should make sure that they are provided with the arguments against military spending proposals, as well as the arguments for.

Secretary McNamara did set up, through an Office of Systems Analysis and extensive use of bright, aggressive civilians, a method of providing for himself an independent, hard-boiled review of the Joint Chiefs' requests. The brass resented the "whiz kids" and reportedly has brought intense pressure on Secretary Laird to rely more on the judgment of the military and to weaken the process of civilian review. The indications are that Laird is giving way to this pressure, both by reducing the authority of civilian offices and by appointing to some key posts men who are even more military-minded than the generals and admirals. (Reflecting the changes in the Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs, or "little State Department," a current Washington *bon mot* reports the following exchange: First liberal: "The influence of Pentagon civilians on arms-control decisions has been reduced." Second liberal: "Thank God!")

In recent months a number of former Pentagon officials have expressed their concern about the present trend, drawing upon

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their experience to illustrate the need for subjecting the requests of the military to searching analysis by truly civilian minds. An illustrative case was the following: in a presentation with regard to relative Soviet and U.S. strength in submarines, the Navy deducted from effective U.S. strength x percent for those vessels that would have to be in home port at any given time. When asked by one of the "whiz kids" what percentage had been deducted from the Soviet strength figure for the same reason, the answer was that no deduction had been made; the incredible excuse was that "we don't know what their lay-up percentage is."

An even more vital reason for civilian analysis, starting within the Pentagon, is that non-military judgments are needed with regard to the probabilities of enemy action, or, to use a controversial word, with regard to the probable *intentions* of a potential enemy. According to standard military doctrine, the safest course is to assess only the capabilities, not the intentions, of the enemy. Yet the doctrine is not in fact, and cannot be, strictly applied. The whole theory of mutual deterrence rests on the conclusion that the other side's capabilities will not be used if destruction is sure to follow. The degree to which nation A responds to nation B as a threat depends very heavily on A's assessment of B's intentions. For example, not even the most chauvinistic nationalist will argue that the United States should be prepared to cope militarily with a combined attack upon the United States by all the other nations of the world; and Canadian defense planners are hardly likely to look solely at U.S. capabilities in judging whether Canada is safe from a U.S. attack.

In spite of all their stress on capabilities, the generals and the admirals are clearly very much influenced by what they regard as the Soviets' aggressive intentions. But any consideration of Soviet intentions must involve a host of factors—political, psychological, historical, geopolitical, etc.—with respect to which the military may well be less expert than well-trained civilians.

Two major cases in point are the controversies about Safeguard and the MIRV. In these areas, questions such as the following are obviously pertinent: What will be the effect of U.S. decisions on Soviet attitudes toward the SALT talks, and on the likelihood of success of these talks? Is it reasonable to suppose the Soviets want to achieve a first-strike capability against us, or to appear to want to do so (in the light of our probable response)? Obviously, to answer questions such as these, the

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military have no exclusive expertise, if indeed they have any expertise at all. Hence, they must accept the fact that their civilian boss, the Secretary of Defense, must have the benefit of civilian analysts and advisers.

Before the DOD's requests are submitted to the Congress, the President must also scrutinize the specifics. He, as well as the Congress, should be furnished, not only with the figures, but with full information about underlying assumptions and rationale. The detailed posture statement issued annually by the DOD since McNamara's day is essential for this purpose, and requested expenditures should be precisely related to it. A comparable annual posture statement by the State Department, reviewing U.S. commitments and policies, would be an invaluable supplement. In addition, the President, and eventually the Congress, should be provided with the future financial implications of proposed expenditures. Innocuous research and development acorns have a tendency to grow into giant oaks of weapons systems.

In rendering judgments on all this material, the President, of course, has to rely heavily on his staff. Obviously his adviser on national security affairs can touch only the major problems, such as force levels for the Army, the size of the Navy and strategic-weapons questions. This puts a heavy burden on the Budget Director and his staff; they cannot be restricted to the traditional question of whether X dollars is too much to spend on Y purpose, but must also be concerned with whether Y is needed at all or whether the job could not be done effectively and at less expense with Z. The Budget Bureau should be instructed to be just as tough in reviewing DOD requests as in the case of all other departments and should be in a position to see that the President does not have to say yes or no to a particular proposal but is presented with alternatives. The President also has available to him, and should use, the National Security Council and its staff. This is another way that expert civilian judgments can be brought to bear.

When the Executive Branch requests finally go to Capitol Hill, they will continue to be examined in the first instance by the Armed Services Committees and Appropriations subcommittees. Ideally, the makeup and the power structure of these committees should be drastically changed so as to make them more representative of, and responsive to, the Congress as a

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whole. The chairmen should be legislators who are in accord with the main thrust of their party's policies, at home and abroad, as set forth, for example, in the party platform. The membership should reflect, more or less, the same urban-rural and North-South ratios as the House or Senate as a whole. At least a few representatives of ghetto areas should be included. To my mind, the most constructive change of all would be to limit the terms of members on these committees to four or six years, thus avoiding the buddy-buddy relationship toward the military that too often builds up over time.

While admittedly such drastic changes as these are not precisely imminent, they are perfectly feasible. On the House side, for example, the Democratic members, acting in caucus, by majority vote, have ample authority to accomplish these changes with respect to the present chairmen and the Democratic members of the committees. No concurrence by the Senate or by the Republican members of the House would be required. All that is needed is for the majority of the House Democrats to have the will to do what is needed. And if their constituents got angry enough to demand a modification of the strict seniority rule, they would find the will.

Failing such a fundamental revamping, a minimum change—one for which there really should be no opposition—would be to afford basic privileges to the minority voices on these committees, those members who are increasingly demonstrating a healthy skepticism toward the demands of the military. These members need expert staffs if they are to do the kind of probing questioning of DOD witnesses that is required. They also should have the right to arrange for their own witnesses to appear before the committees, thus assuring that points of view other than the Pentagon's are heard. Under most committee rules, such protections as these are usually afforded the members of the minority party. But most Republicans on the defense committees are at least as military-minded as the senior Democrats. Hence, if these committees are to have the benefit of an effective "loyal opposition," party lines must be disregarded.

There is another whole area of activity where the Congress has a major role to play in controlling military spending. This year's revelations of sloppy and wasteful procurement methods by the Pentagon, coupled with attempted concealment of the facts, call for strengthened and systematized Congressional oversight. In-

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dividuals like Senator William Proxmire and Congressman William Moorhead have performed yeoman and courageous service, but one gets the feeling that only the top of the iceberg has been revealed. In addition to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, the two Government Operations Committees have a major role to play here, and a subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee has also made a contribution. Highly trained staff is available in the Government Accounting Office, if only the Congress would make more use of them. Too often the redoubtable GAO has been put on the trail only of the relatively piddling over-spending of departments and agencies less powerful than the Pentagon.

V

The task of assuring a hard-boiled review of military spending requests is a relatively simple one if we have the will to undertake it. The problem of setting up a system of national priorities as between military and home-front requirements is much more difficult, both conceptually and organizationally.

Conceptually, the difficulty stems from the absence of a common standard for measuring relative urgencies. It's a case of apples and oranges. Subjectively, I have no difficulty in concluding that we ought to spend $2 billion in building two hundred community colleges rather than one additional nuclear carrier with appropriate escort vessels. But how does one compare the needs analytically?

Organizationally, the problem of making specific decisions on particular military requests in the light of specific needs in our cities, suburbs or countryside seems insoluble. For one thing the competing demands are virtually unlimited: in deciding whether the defense establishment should not be trimmed of X billion dollars worth of bureaucratic fat (some expert observers regard this as the number one problem), which home-front shortage do you look at—housing, day-care centers, hospitals, subways? For another, most decision-makers, whether in the Executive Branch or the Congress, simply cannot have the expertise in all fields that would permit such multi-faceted judgments to be made.

The best that can be done, I believe, is to compare overall expenditures and to arrive at a reasonable allocation of federal revenues as between military and domestic needs. Although the judgment will necessarily be largely subjective, it should not be

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made in an arbitrary *a priori* way; it can be made intelligently only with a basic knowledge of the specific components that make up the request totals on each side of the ledger.

On the Executive Branch side this is clearly a job which only the President, with the assistance of his immediate staff, including the Budget Director, can do. He can turn to his Council of Economic Advisers, particularly with regard to total federal expenditures; he can invite his Cabinet to debate the urgency of competing demands. Some have suggested that he ought to have a special advisery group, possibly a Council on National Priorities, to assist him, but ultimately the decision will be his.

On Capitol Hill, there is today no machinery for reviewing the President's proposed allocation of resources as between defense and home-front needs. Theoretically, the Appropriations Committees could do so, but they function almost entirely through subcommittees with special interests. I believe the best solution would be for the Congress to establish a special joint committee to review, in the first instance, the President's spending requests in terms of the broad allocations to various national purposes. This committee should include members from the various committees concerned so that the competing demands could be intelligently debated. Broad allocations confirming or modifying the President's recommendations would then be communicated to the Members of Congress and the substantive committees. These would not be inflexible but would serve as guidelines, subject to later adjustment. Failing the establishment of a new joint committee for this purpose, the present Joint Economic Committee could undertake the task. That committee, which has an exceptionally able membership and a fine staff, has already been doing extremely useful work in the field of military spending.

To facilitate this kind of Congressional review of overall allocations—or priorities—the President could usefully divide his budget into two parts. One would cover home-front needs. The other would include, not just military expenditures, but also other programs concerned with the nation's responsibilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world—support of the United Nations, foreign aid, the Peace Corps and other international activities. These activities could then be judged in a truer perspective than they are now. Foreign-aid programs, for example, should not have to compete for funds with domestic programs. (One liberal

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Member of Congress has been saying, understandably: "Not one dime for foreign aid until we start doing what we ought to be doing in the ghettos.") They should rather be judged as against other "external" needs. By a curious twist, the power of the Pentagon could be mobilized in this way for the benefit of international activities that are less popular than straight-out defense programs but are equally essential for national security and the preservation of world peace.

Obviously, there would be problems of classification involved in breaking down the budget into "external" and "internal" sectors, but these would be relatively minor. And the gain in terms of clarity of thinking—seeing the problems in perspective—would be considerable.

VI

What would be a reasonable target for reductions in the FY 1970 and future defense budgets?

Without specifying where the cuts should be made, various groups, such as Walter Reuther's UAW, have suggested $10 billion. Though this is not likely to be achieved, it is not a "way-out" figure. One former Pentagon official, Robert S. Benson, has proposed a number of cuts totaling $9 billion, and a former colleague of his has estimated that $7 billion a year could be saved through improved procurement practices alone. *Fortune* magazine has listed possible savings amounting to $17 billion by 1972, even assuming deployment of Safeguard and MIRV. Although the cutbacks in procurement proposed by the Hatfield subcommittee of the Peace Through Law group amount to only $3.1 billion, some of them might save very large sums if carried through into later years. For example, indefinite deferral of AMSA (Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft) would save only $80 million this year, but the eventual saving might well be $10 billion. Similarly, a decision not to deploy Safeguard would have saved about $700 million this year, but the ultimate saving might amount to tens of billions, especially if one assumes that deployment of Safeguard may well lead to larger, more elaborate ABM systems later on.

Other areas which call out for cuts include CBW (Chemical and Biological Warfare) preparations; the beginning of a sophisticated new antiaircraft system, complete with "look-down" radar, designed to cope with a Soviet bomber threat

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which does not yet exist; development of new aircraft types; and the so-called FDL (fast-deployment logistic ship), which many regard as intended for future Dominican Republic-type incidents. A minimum immediate target, especially in view of Laird's announcement, would be to keep non-Viet Nam expenditures from growing (apart from pay increases and other built-in factors).

For the longer run, achievement of really big savings will require basic decisions involving substantial cutbacks in conventional forces. A reduction of one million, or less than a third, in the number of Americans in uniform would save on the order of $10 billion a year. A decision to abandon the notion that we have to be prepared to fight an extended war at sea with the Soviet Union could save a good part of a projected $30 billion for fleet modernization, plus billions of dollars annually in naval operations and maintenance costs.

It is, in my judgment, literally impossible to overstate the importance of the SALT talks. If restrictions on the deployment of ABM and MIRV can be agreed upon, not only will tens of billions be saved eventually in the construction, procurement and operation of these systems, but the indirect effect is likely to be such a lessening of tensions as to make possible major reductions in conventional forces. If the talks fail, the opposite will be true, and America will continue to be deprived of the better life for all that is now within reach.

Neither in the Executive Branch nor in the Congress does there yet appear to be the sense of overwhelming urgency about the SALT talks that there ought to be. Too often the emphasis is on the difficulties and the risks of arms-limitation agreements, with little or no mention of the calamitous consequences and danger of allowing a new arms race and tension to escalate together.

Until recently Americans generally have been content to let their officials carry the awesome responsibility for making decisions in these areas. Where national security is concerned, John Q. Citizen has tended to say, "Poppa knows best." But there are growing numbers of people, especially among the young and the disadvantaged, who insist on making known their feelings about the road the United States should take. Hopefully, this tendency will spread.

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COMMUNICATIONS BY SATELLITE

By Sig Mickelson

IT is hard to remember now how much excitement was generated seven years ago by the first live transatlantic television broadcast. The facilities in July 1962 were primitive. The signal held up for only twenty-two minutes and then died as the Telstar satellite which relayed the picture passed out of range of the earth stations at Andover, Maine, and Pleumeur Boudeau, France, both of which sent signals to Telstar and received from it. It was something less than a "smash hit," but it ushered in a new era in international communications.

Only seven years later, nearly half the land mass of the world was interlaced with communications facilities that made it possible for virtually all television viewers everywhere to watch live pictures from the surface of the moon. We have progressed to the point where a worldwide communications system is in full operation, based upon three satellites in synchronous orbit and a network of earth stations.

It is hardly necessary to belabor the benefits to mankind which will result from a sure, efficient, inexpensive and flexible worldwide communications system free of government restraints and capable of delivering sound, pictures, words and data by telephone, telex, radio, television and through data transmissions, from computer to computer. The implications may be especially profound for those sections of the world which for reasons of topography or poverty have so far been able to develop only the most rudimentary communications systems.

It is the instantaneous transmission of news and such events as the moon walk, the investiture of the Prince of Wales and the like that has so far constituted the most glamorous of the satellite's functions. By cable we have long been able to move written messages, voice and, in recent years, still pictures; the capacity to transmit moving pictures over great distances is new. But like the iceberg, the television coverage which has attracted the most attention is only a small part of the capability of the communications satellite system operated by the International Telecommunications Satellite consortium. Only about 2 percent of the revenues of the United States' Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat) derives from television usage. The re-

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mainder comes largely from telephone traffic. In the future, however, there is every reason to think that the satellite may become a device for relaying a great variety of information, including data, facsimile reproductions, medical information and even business and personal letters.

The implications of this new technology in terms of international relationships are immense. The worldwide delivery of vast quantities of news, information, data, instructional material, books, magazines and television programs at reasonable cost to developed and developing countries alike will soon become a reality. The generation of satellites now in use carries more than 50 percent more signal space than the most sophisticated transoceanic cables. The generation to be in service by about 1972 will have almost ten times the capacity of the most recently laid cables. Within another five years it is quite possible that the ratio will have increased to more than twenty times.

A vast new capacity to communicate will be available but its performance may be inhibited unless the nations of the world are somehow able to coöperate in an effort to write rules or procedures to avoid technological and political conflict and permit the new art to develop in an orderly way. The growth of electronic communications in the last century has required a certain amount of international coöperation but it represents only a fraction of that which will be necessary to encourage and protect the growth of worldwide space communications.

The International Telecommunications Union was founded as the International Telegraph Union in 1865 to regulate telegraphic communications in Europe. The ITU has since expanded its sphere to include telephones, cables, radio and television. In the 1920s it set up an adjunct called the International Frequency Registration Board to assist in preventing chaotic use of the frequencies available in the radio spectrum. Individual nations, including the United States through its Federal Radio Act of 1927 and its Federal Communications Act of 1934, were able to achieve relatively efficient spectrum management within individual countries.

Communications satellites produce an entirely new set of problems which may turn out to be beyond the regulatory capabilities of the existing agencies. Among the problems urgently requiring solution are the following:

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Spectrum management to avoid frequency overlap and constant interference;

Political problems relating to international signals crossing national borderlines;

The rewriting of copyright conventions to make them applicable to an entirely new technology;

The establishment of rates which will guarantee a reasonable return on investment but at the same time encourage development of traffic and protect the user;

Writing an international convention which will guarantee equal access to the new facilities.

II

While the method by which a satellite functions may be incomprehensible to the layman, there is no mystery about its purpose. In a sense its function is similar to a microwave relay system which receives a signal from a sending point and relays it on to the next link in the chain, but there are two essential differences. The satellite operates at a far higher altitude and broadcasts its signals rather than confining them to a point-to-point beam.

Microwave towers on average terrain are generally placed 50 to 60 miles apart, or even closer. Three satellites positioned at a point 22,300 miles above the equator and adequately spaced cover, by line of sight, virtually the entire land mass of the globe.

The reason for the 22,300 miles is that at that altitude the satellite is in orbit around the earth at the exact rotational speed of the point on the earth directly under it. It is thus in effect stationary or "synchronous." All of the satellites now in use except those covering the Soviet Union are of the synchronous type. The Soviet Union still uses a system of satellites in oval orbit at a relatively low altitude. Contact with these Molniya satellites can be maintained for about four hours as the vehicle moves from the vicinity of Moscow to within range of the Vladivostok earth station, while the synchronous satellite furnishes 24-hours-a-day service to the larger area within its range.

The satellite experts generally talk in terms of three types of vehicles defined by their functions.

The "communications" satellite is relatively low-powered and its signal is beamed by its sending antenna so it will reach all land areas within its line of sight, thus making it possible for only

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three vehicles to provide service for the whole world. Earth stations are costly because they must greatly amplify signals both for sending to the satellite and for receiving. These stations cost about $2.2 to $2.5 million.

"Distribution" satellites are designed to cover considerably smaller areas. One Comsat proposal suggests launching two distribution satellites to serve the continental United States. Power output would be somewhat greater and the antenna beam considerably narrower, thus concentrating more power in a smaller area, much as a magnifying glass will concentrate the sun's rays. Ground stations as a result can be smaller and less costly. Comsat estimates that 80 percent of the population of the United States could receive satellite television service through 36 ground stations costing $200,000 each, provided generous use is made of local terrestrial facilities.

The third of the satellites is the "broadcast" type, which has not yet been developed. Its purpose would be to put a television signal directly into a home receiver or a master antenna of a housing development or a low-cost receiving station for a small village. To be feasible, power levels would have to be much higher than for distribution satellites; otherwise home receivers would be excessively bulky and expensive. It is now believed that such a system would be technically possible as early as 1975, but there is little confidence that society will be ready then in terms of economics, government regulation or international agreement. A target year of 1985 seems more likely, but only if the necessary national and international regulatory decisions can be made within the intervening time.

A new approach to spectrum management is vital to the efficient functioning of satellite communications if serious interference is to be avoided. Demands of the present communications satellites are not worrisome but distribution satellites, and ultimately broadcast satellites if they are ever to function, will pose much greater problems, particularly in high traffic density areas such as the northeast quadrant of the United States and to a lesser extent Western Europe, where much of the available spectrum space is already taken up. Some new regulatory procedures also seem essential to insure maximum usage with minimum restrictions and to keep rates equitable. Achieving these objectives will involve a long, difficult period of international wrangling. But the stakes are high. The new channels of international commu-

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nications enormously greater in number, scope and capability offer the possibility of achieving new levels of international understanding affecting personal, business and educational relationships as well as relationships among governments.

Engineers are confident they can find answers to the spectrum management problem, but only if international political arrangements can be made to untangle the traffic maze and open up previously unused portions of the spectrum.[1] The International Telecommunications Union has recently begun to take an active interest in the question of space communications but it is still questionable whether the ITU has the courage and the muscle to exercise any real control.

If signals could be confined within national boundaries, national regulatory bodies could cope with the problem. But the satellite signal, while it can be directed to some extent by the positioning of its antenna, still cannot be made with certainty to stay within a single nation, particularly where nations are small and irregular in shape. Very few form circles as does the satellite beam as it reaches earth. More important, the signals could overlap and cause interference with adjacent signals.

For the immediate future the problems of the direct broadcast satellite are likely to remain difficult of solution and it is possible that international rivalries coupled with the self-interests of current owners and operators of communications services may permanently inhibit its use. Distribution satellites, however, appear inevitable.

UNESCO, for example, has been concerned for several years with the serious problem of education in India. The shortage of teachers and school facilities is so enormous that only some nationwide instructional communications system seems likely to make even a start in eradicating illiteracy and training a sufficient number of teachers to have any significant impact. Working with NASA, UNESCO has come up with a plan for a distribution satellite which would put a sufficiently powerful television signal into the Indian subcontinent so that relatively inexpensive earth stations could receive and display instructional programming for a high proportion of the population. The pro-

[1] Curiously, satellite parking may become a problem. Scientists have not determined as yet how closely the satellites might be stationed together at the 22,300-mile altitude without interfering with each other's signals. Until such scientific measurements are made, some control will have to be exercised over launching and parking so as to maintain some reasonable separation.

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grams would originate in one central city; thus only one earth station of any substantial cost would be required. Only a satellite can perform this role because of the enormous cost of building land lines or microwave facilities to cover the country. Nevertheless, it is a curious fact that the largest part of the cost of establishing a satellite system of the kind described will be the earth-bound equipment rather than the satellite.

Indonesia and Brazil are faced with similar problems—Brazil because of its vast interior through which it would be physically impossible to contruct land lines or microwave circuits, and Indonesia because of the enormous expanses of ocean separating its hundreds of islands. Africa poses similar problems but adds complications resulting from the small size of individual countries and the variety of languages and dialects.

Various European organizations, including most notably the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), have been toying with the notion of launching a vehicle which would tie together the nations of Western Europe and parts of North Africa and the Middle East. The purpose would be to maintain permanent circuits for the relaying of EBU programs and messages among the Union's members. Similarly, Japan is making plans for a satellite which would furnish communications links tying together all of Japan and, if there is sufficient interest, some of the countries of Southeast Asia and Oceania as well.

There have been several proposals in addition to Comsat's to set up a distribution satellite system for the United States which would supplement existing microwave facilities and furnish a cheaper and more efficient system for television network relays plus an expected vast increase in telephonic and other information communications. The Ford Foundation made a dramatic proposal in 1966 for a satellite system designed to accommodate network television signals, with the profits going to public television. AT&T has also registered a satellite plan with the FCC. A decision by the Commission concerning the ownership and operation of such a system is expected at any moment.

There is no real concern that development of future satellite facilities will create excess capacity. As communications become more reliable and less costly, the volume of traffic has been building at a rate to utilize virtually all facilities available. Long-lines telephone traffic in the United States, for example, has been doubling every four years.

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III

All of the world's present space communications except those of the Soviet Union are being transmitted through the facilities of the International Telecommunications Satellite consortium. The majority owner and manager is Comsat, which owns 53 percent of Intelsat's stock. Intelsat's growth in the few years of its existence has been phenomenal but its future is somewhat clouded by pressures from the non-U.S. members to reduce American influence. The two sticking points revolve around Comsat's position as manager and majority shareholder and the consortium's method of decision-making.

A conference of the 68 nations who are members of Intelsat met in Washington during February and early March of 1969 to discuss the consortium's future and recessed without arriving at any decisions. It is hoped that the conference will be reconvened in November—although some observers think February 1970 is a more likely time—to see if its internal problems can be resolved.

Because of Comsat's curious composition as a quasi-public corporation and an instrument of U.S. national communications policy, the Government of the United States, principally through the Department of State, has played a significant role in the Intelsat negotiations. The chief American delegate, former Governor William Scranton of Pennsylvania, is a nominee of the President as was his predecessor, Leonard Marks, who left the directorship of USIA to assume the role of ambassador and chairman of the U.S. delegation to Intelsat.

The dominating role being played by the United States has led to a strong campaign by dissidents to govern Intelsat on a one-nation, one-vote basis. Comsat is willing to permit the dilution of its equity well below the majority it now holds but is adamant in its desire to continue its management role. Its executives believe that a single worldwide system efficiently managed and not subject to the vagaries of votes by an international debating society will permit far more orderly and rapid development than would occur if responsibilities were diffused and basic decisions depended upon international conferences. They also point out that Comsat has the experience, management know-how and technical background to continue performing at a high level of efficiency.

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A third cause of some friction results from the desires of such agencies as the EBU and the Japanese Government to launch regional satellites covering their own areas. Comsat is not unalterably opposed, but believes that the interests of the world public will be best served if such communications systems are fully compatible with Intelsat and route interregional traffic through Intelsat facilities. They are also concerned that a proliferation of such regional systems might weaken Intelsat's economic base and thus reduce its capacity for orderly expansion.

Several alternate systems have been proposed to break the impasse. One of them would call for governing Intelsat by a two-chamber house, the lower house representing all member nations, each with one vote, and an upper composed of a relatively small group which would exercise the principal legislative power and appoint management. The United States continues to hold that a weakening of the present executive and management structure would lead to chaotic conditions, damage the economic viability of the system and inhibit reasonable progress.

The position of the Soviet Union is an enigma. The Soviet Orbita system has been in operation for a number of years and is furnishing a service from Moscow across Siberia to Vladivostok. There is some hope that the Soviet Union may abandon its objective of creating the Intersputnik system, conceived as a worldwide competitor of Intelsat and proposed at a U.N. conference on space communications held in Vienna in October 1968. Soviet observers attended the Intelsat conference in Washington in February and it is possible the Russians may join the organization.

Even if Intelsat should prevail and achieve its objectives of maintaining a worldwide monopoly and bringing regional satellites loosely within the Intelsat orbit, there are still international differences that will arise.

The most economical use of a regional satellite system would involve separating its signals by means of accurately beamed antennas so that two or more national systems could be served by one satellite. In order to achieve these efficiencies, nations involved would have to suppress natural jealousies and negotiate bilateral or multilateral agreements to permit such coöperation. They would also have to understand that space communications cannot be wholly confined within national boundaries.

Solutions might easily be reached if there were an interna-

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tional agency with sufficient power and precedent for action. The United Nations has been interested and has set up committees on space communications. A number of the specialized agencies of the U.N. in addition to the ITU have concerned themselves with the problem, but so far there has been a noticeable lack of results and considerable pessimism among observers that the United Nations will have the power or the will to act. What would seem to be called for is an international agency comparable to the Federal Communications Commission—an unlikely prospect at present.

The problems of international coöperation or lack of coöperation will be magnified when and if the direct broadcast satellite comes into general usage. It seems unlikely that those countries which maintain tight control over internal communications would show any enthusiasm for the importation of a television signal from the sky.

IV

The political problems standing in the way of full utilization of modern space technology are only part of the story. The economic questions are equally puzzling and may be equally difficult to solve. Telephone service is scheduled interchangeably with cable transmission and is on the same tariff basis. Current rates for television transmission by satellite, however, are a curious hodgepodge. For example, the cost of ten minutes of television transmission between the United States and any given point in Western Europe amounts to $3,290. Of this sum $2,400 carries the signal between the European earth station and the satellite; the remaining $890 carries it between the satellite and the point of origin or termination in the United States. This wide discrepancy in pricing results from the fact that Comsat is apparently more interested in generating space-communications business than are the Europeans. So far the largely government-owned systems of Europe have been vastly more concerned with preserving the economic viability of their own land lines. The trend has been to establish rates based on comparable earth-bound facilities (where cost is related to distance) rather than on the actual costs of a satellite system. Yet in space, there is no relationship between the distance a signal travels and the cost of transporting it.

Another major consideration that has governed pricing has

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been the desire to generate traffic in the developing world, where communications systems are an essential element in national development. Consequently, those parts of the world with high traffic density are penalized to some extent by the effort to subsidize the lower-density areas.

Steps are being taken by a number of interested organizations including the European Broadcasting Union, the Asian Broadcasting Union, the International Press Telecommunications Union, the International Broadcast Institute and the three national commercial networks of the United States to encourage rate reduction. So far they have had noticeable success with Comsat, but their pleas to European post, telephone and telegraph systems have largely fallen on deaf ears.

The arguments of the interested agencies have revolved around the assumption that reduced rates will result in increased volume, and the evidence so far amply supports that assumption. It is also argued that declining costs which result from rapidly increasing capacity should be passed on to consumers. The investment required to keep one voice circuit in operation for one year of the now inoperative Intelsat II's expectable lifetime amounted to $15,300. This figure in the current Intelsat III series has been reduced to $1,450 and when the Intelsat IV series comes along within the next two or three years, the figure will drop to approximately $500 or about one-thirtieth of the cost of Intelsat II. The generation to come after the Intelsat IV will increase the satellite's capacity by a multiple of four and its design life by about three years, from seven years to ten. It is obvious that rates for the space portion of the communications transmission can be reduced to a fraction of their present level. Furthermore, more powerful satellites, narrower beams and technological modifications will make it possible to effect substantial reductions in the cost of earth stations, thus contributing to the likelihood that further rate reductions will be possible.

It is difficult to conceive of an international rate-making body which would serve to regulate space traffic as the ICC regulates railroads or as the FCC sets communications rates in the United States. At the same time it is evident that some international body will have to concern itself with pricing, at least in an advisory role, if space communications are to serve to the extent of their capabilities.

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V

A third major problem which faces users of space communications is that of copyrights and protection of ownership of materials. The European Broadcasting Union feels a major concern about this matter. The first commercial satellites were capable of moving a signal from a sending earth station to a single receiving earth station with virtually pinpoint accuracy. As the satellites have grown more sophisticated, an increasing number of earth stations can receive the same signal. At the same time the number of earth stations in operation is multiplying in geometric ratio. Thus pirating is a potential problem. It is not yet serious because the number of facilities in use makes policing relatively simple, but as the versatility of satellites increases, as more earth stations are able to receive and as the costs of earth stations continue to decline, it is going to be easier for unauthorized users to pluck signals out of space and use them to their own advantage.

International copyright conventions which now prevail, those of Berne and Rome, were written before space communications were conceived. Attempts to modify or amend these conventions have been undertaken in recent years but so far with a notable lack of success, largely because the parties have generally looked at the copyright problem from narrow areas of self-interest and tradition rather than on a basis which conforms to the rapidly changing conditions brought about by the new technology. The weakness of present copyright enforcement results from overlapping and confusion, difficulty of interpretation, delays in enforcement and lack of adaptability to present conditions.

Broadcasters are more selfishly concerned about the fact that the only safe way to acquire rights to cover a limited segment of the world is to buy full worldwide rights. This applies to drama, music, sports events, news, live coverage of special events, and all those other program components which require permission to broadcast. Purveyors of rights have frequently taken the position that once a program is distributed by satellite, copyright protection is lost; hence they demand special compensation. This, broadcasters argue, is pricing many worthwhile performances out of the market.

Comsat officials are not quite as concerned as the EBU, at least not as long as it is necessary for signals to go through large and costly earth stations. The earth stations, they feel, constitute

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a sufficient control point for unscrambling traffic and sending it only to authorized users. They admit, however, that there have been problems, particularly with sports events. Concern will increase when the low-cost earth station falls within the means of individuals or small television stations.

VI

A final concern relates to the freedom of access to space facilities. The tools are swiftly becoming available for a genuinely international system of communications for all. The increase in the number of voice circuits is creating a capacity consistent with need, and there is no reason why supply should not keep up with demand. This will permit international communications on a scale and of a scope significantly greater than had been considered possible until very recently.

The question remains, however, whether it will be possible to avoid censorship or unduly restrictive regulation, to maintain free access through land lines, earth stations and to satellites for the transmission of all kinds of information. General de Gaulle gave the European nations and the United States a severe jolt in 1963 when he refused permission for the earth station at Pleumeur Boudeau to carry a CBS News program that included Jean Monnet as one of its participants. In order to retain Monnet on the program and achieve European distribution, CBS was forced to make some quick readjustments. At this period of satellite communications development, the French facility at Pleumeur Boudeau and the British station at Goonhilly Downs were the only functioning European earth stations. The two were alternating on a daily basis as the European terminus for transatlantic signals. The day in question unfortunately was Pleumeur Boudeau's turn to perform. By some quick manipulation CBS executives were able to arrange for Goonhilly Downs to step in out of turn, receive the program and relay it to the United Kingdom and through EBU leased terrestrial lines to the remainder of Europe with the exception of France. Meanwhile, M. Monnet had been flown to Brussels, whence his portion of the program originated.

Freedom of the press has been a difficult concept to define and interpret. There are so many widely divergent attitudes toward the meaning of a free press that it is difficult for interested persons from different countries and cultures to speak in a common

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language. Freedom of access to communications facilities, however, provides a common denominator. If communications are able to move across international borders without restraint, the journalist, whether he works in print or on the air, has a free and untampered source of information and a yardstick against which to measure developments in his own country. By law, regulation or custom, he may still be restricted as to what he may print or say or show on the air, but at least his raw material arrives at his desk without restraint or control. Most important, this is a more attainable objective than the amendment of national law or regulatory practice.

These are matters of broad international concern. Solutions will have to be found through bilateral or multilateral negotiations and through some enlargement of the regulatory powers of the United Nations, related international agencies or new agencies. An indicator of how important these matters are is the tremendous interest the Government of the United States, notably the Department of State, has taken in the Intelsat negotiations. But their real significance relates not so much to the need for international agreements to facilitate space communications as to the ability of the new technology to deliver ideas, information, education and cultural riches on a worldwide basis to the developed and developing nations alike. The scientists and engineers have created devices with a vast capacity to inform and to educate. It is for the non-scientists and the non-engineers to create the legal, political, economic and social environment in which the devices can flourish.

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WHAT FORCES FOR NATO? AND FROM WHOM?

By Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith

IT is time to make a fundamental review of our NATO policy. For regardless of what we might prefer and despite assurances to the contrary, several factors are going to force some important changes in our relation to NATO over the next few years. The basic choice is whether we are going to recognize these facts of life early enough to plan and implement effective solutions, or whether we are going to try to hold onto the status quo in all respects. If we choose the latter, we choose an inevitable deterioration in the Alliance and in European security in general.

One of the most important pressures is the growing contribution to our balance-of-payments deficit caused by the presence of some 300,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe. There are two underlying trends that will continue to make this problem get worse, not better. One is the increase resulting from normal military and civilian pay increases; our military expenditures in Europe go up almost directly with pay increases. If the recent rate of pay increases continues and if the United States maintains its current force levels in Europe, our overall military expenditures will go up about 50 percent in the next ten years. At the same time, European purchases of U.S. military equipment, the traditional means of offsetting the effects of our military expenditures abroad on our balance of payments, have leveled off as the German armed forces have completed their initial equipping, and as European production of military equipment has begun to supply a greater proportion of needs. Taken together, these two trends have already created a net military deficit in Europe of over $1 billion per year (if the temporary expedient of bond purchases is excluded). Even allowing for indirect effects, this is no longer a minor element in the overall U.S. balance of payments.

Severe budgetary pressures provide a second major force for change in the present U.S.-NATO relationship. Even if the Viet Nam war ends soon, the Defense budget is likely to remain surprisingly high if all currently approved programs are retained, to say nothing of major new programs, such as the Safeguard system, a new bomber and nuclear-powered surface ships. A good

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bet is that it will stabilize at somewhere over $70 billion after the Viet Nam war unless permanent force levels are reduced. We can also be sure that the pressure to divert some of this money to pressing domestic problems will remain high. Past experience suggests that much of this pressure will focus on our NATO-related expenditures. U.S. forces for NATO are not minor items in the Defense budget. The total annual cost of our NATO-oriented forces is over $12 billion.

In addition, for reasons closely related to the budgetary and balance-of-payments problems, the Congress will undoubtedly revive the very serious pressure for major troop withdrawals that existed prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968. In the two years preceding the invasion, over 30 Senators had gone on record as favoring major withdrawals of U.S. forces from Europe. And one, Senator Symington, had prepared a resolution which called for stationing only 50,000 American military personnel in Europe compared to the 300,000 there now. He and other Senators have said it would almost certainly have passed the Senate in some form if not for the Czech invasion. Senator Mansfield has pointedly noted that these Congressional pressures were only temporarily abated by the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

II

With these points in mind, it is well to start off a review of U.S. policy toward NATO with an analysis of the real functions of our NATO forces, both those in Europe and those kept in the United States.

The most obvious functions of these forces are symbolic. They are a living reminder of America's continuing commitment to European security and the nuclear guarantee that this commitment includes. They also help to maintain U.S. political influence in Europe and act as a restraint on Soviet and West European fears of a rearmed Germany. These are vital functions, but they are inadequate to justify the presence of 300,000 men, equipped with expensive aircraft and tanks, supported by a large fleet of ships, supplied with large stocks of ordnance and ammunition, sustained by a huge logistic and maintenance infrastructure, and backed up by the additional divisions, air wings and naval forces in the United States. Senator Mansfield and his colleagues are right in arguing that if hostages and symbols are all

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we need in Europe, one or two U.S. divisions (plus the more than 7,000 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe) would do the job just as well and at far less cost.

Another function of the U.S. forces, and one that makes more sense to some people (and less to others), is to provide the ability to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe, using tactical nuclear weapons. The idea here is that, although NATO forces are alleged to be much smaller than those of the Warsaw Pact, these differences would be offset by the early use of nuclear weapons by NATO. NATO would thus maintain the ability to defend its interests in a crisis or to stave off a massive conventional attack, without immediately engaging U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces and without necessarily escalating the war to attacks on cities, either European or American. The trouble with this concept is that it rests on faulty assumptions (for example, that civilian casualties and collateral damage can be kept to low levels); it ignores a basic lesson that the leaders of the U.S. Government in all cold-war crises have learned—that when faced with the decision to start a nuclear war, almost any other alternative looks better; and it is too risky to serve as the foundation for a preferred strategy. To a great extent it is a carryover in thinking from the days when only the United States had large numbers of nuclear weapons; now the Soviets have them too.

Since both sides now have more than enough nuclear weapons to destroy the other side's forces, there is no reason to believe that they provide any particular advantage to NATO. In fact, if the Soviets really had far larger numbers of troops for conventional reinforcement—as is often claimed—they would hold an even bigger advantage after nuclear weapons had destroyed the front-line forces of each side.

Furthermore, from the European standpoint, there is likely to be little difference between a so-called "tactical" nuclear war and a strategic war. The civilian casualties and property damage from such a war would be enormous, as many studies have shown. In addition, there would be great pressure to escalate the war by attacking fixed targets such as airfields, logistic installations, lines of communications and rear areas where enemy nuclear delivery systems would be located.

Soviet planners seem to have recognized these problems in the design of their tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Rather than building large numbers of short-range, low-yield

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missiles, which would be very vulnerable and useful only for killing discrete, well-located targets, the Soviets have emphasized higher yield, mobile tactical missiles, primarily useful for terrain or blanketing fire, or for strikes against fixed logistic installations and airfields. Equally important, most of the Soviet's nuclear delivery capability in Europe is based inside the Soviet Union. In short, the Soviets have neither the organization nor the force structure for a limited tactical nuclear war fought exclusively against military targets in an engaged battle zone.

Even if one discards all these considerations, the concept of limited nuclear war in Europe is still not a persuasive rationale for the large and expensive land, sea and air forces now stationed in Europe. If it *were* a valid concept, large forces on the NATO side—unless backed by reinforcements very much larger than those on the Warsaw Pact side—would not be needed because they would have little effect on the outcome of a "tactical" nuclear war. Enough tactical nuclear weapons exist on each side to neutralize any plausible number of ready forces. Rather than adopt such a weak and yet expensive concept as the basis for our strategy, we would be better advised to recognize that we are really banking on the belief that a war in Europe will never actually occur (either because of the fear of nuclear escalation or for other reasons), and maintain only a symbolic conventional force at a fraction of the current cost.

This does not mean, of course, that nuclear weapons no longer have an important role in NATO. They do. But the point is that this role is (and will remain) intrinsically a limited one. Nuclear weapons enhance the deterrent against all forms of attack. But they are not a substitute for conventional forces. They are usable only under the most extreme circumstances. In all cases less than the most extreme, they are not likely to be used. Thus, without a strong conventional capability, NATO would be weak in a variety of possible crises, and few observers are willing to predict that there will not be such crises in years ahead.

III

If neither symbolic functions nor the concept of tactical nuclear warfare hold up as justifications for our maintaining large conventional forces in Europe, then the only potentially realistic justification for them is that they provide significant capabilities for conventional war.

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The value and cost of a conventional option for NATO has been debated at great length and with great intensity for many years. The official change in NATO strategy in May 1967 indicates general acceptance within NATO of the value of maintaining conventional forces to provide more credible and usable military power.

Strong conventional forces are needed in Europe because there are many likely situations in which the use of nuclear weapons would be inappropriate. For the same reasons that dynamite does not make a good substitute for a fly swatter, nuclear weapons (even "tactical" nuclear weapons) are not a good substitute for conventional forces against a wide range of likely military threats. An alliance (or a nation) which maintains a strong nuclear but weak conventional posture puts itself at a great disadvantage in a confrontation with another power that has both strong nuclear and strong conventional forces. The side with inadequate conventional forces has no means for effective military resistance in such a confrontation. The side with strong conventional forces can make its aggression piecemeal in the confidence that it will be able to have its way in all but life-and-death matters. Or—without overt aggression—it can mount political pressures which will seem irresistible.

Without strong conventional forces, NATO would, in a crisis, have a choice only between holocaust or humiliation, suicide or surrender. With strong conventional forces, NATO has more desirable alternatives. In fact, because of the great political and military limitations of nuclear weapons, the only military options immediately usable and upon which governments could quickly agree seem to be those requiring conventional forces.

But while recognition of the worth of conventional forces has grown, the key question has always been and remains whether or not a NATO conventional defense is feasible at acceptable costs—in view of the alleged size of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces. As it now stands, many military and civilian experts believe that a conventional defense is not possible without major and politically unacceptable budget increases, and some political leaders seem to accept this point of view. We believe, however, that a strong conventional capability is feasible within current force and budget levels.

This conclusion is critical because different views on the feasibility of a major conventional capability in NATO lead down

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widely different paths in search of solutions to the financial pressures mentioned earlier. If, for whatever reason, one accepts the conclusion that a major NATO conventional capability is infeasible, the justification for keeping large U.S. forces in NATO becomes quite vague, as a substantial part of the Congress and a large segment of the public seem to have concluded. Moreover, given this view, the issues involved are simple and the solution to the financial pressures quite obvious: we should reduce our NATO conventional forces since they are expensive and would do little good anyway. On the other hand, if one believes a major conventional option is feasible, as the writers do, the justification for keeping large NATO forces is quite clear: we should keep them because they provide a usable form of military power with a minimal risk of self-destruction. They allow us to oppose nonnuclear aggression without the need to use nuclear weapons, and to oppose political aggression based on the threatened use of military power without having to face the "suicide or surrender" dilemma. At the same time, however, such a view means the issues involved become much more complex and the solutions to our financial woes become much more difficult to find.

The case that a major NATO conventional option is infeasible rests mainly on the alleged size of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces. We believe the size of these forces, particularly Pact land forces, has been greatly overestimated. This overestimation stems primarily from: (1) a continued preoccupation with planning against the "worst case" (*i.e.* a deliberate concealed mobilization followed by a maximum-scale attack); (2) a continued belief that the best way to get more forces and larger budgets is by exaggerating the size of the threat; and (3) a continuing tendency to rely on traditional measures of military power such as numbers of divisions and aircraft without looking further into actual effectiveness.

The traditional military preoccupation with planning for the "worst case" has led to an excessive focus on a massive surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact. In such a scenario—which assumes among other things complete coöperation of the Pact allies, complete surprise, near-perfect preparations, untrained Pact reservists equal to regular NATO troops, and no credibility of the NATO nuclear deterrent even though a direct threat to NATO's most vital interests is clearly present—the Warsaw Pact easily overwhelms NATO's conventional forces. Identifying the con-

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cept and value of a conventional option with such a highly unlikely and politically senseless scenario has not only discredited such an option, but has made the requirement for active forces appear beyond reach.

The recent invasion of Czechoslovakia is a much more likely scenario against which to design NATO's conventional forces. Over a period of several months, political tension built up, leading to a series of ultimatums. At the same time, the Soviets increased the readiness of their own military forces, deployed units along the Czech border and finally invaded. If the Soviets should act this way against one of our allies, NATO should have the capability to respond militarily by building up its own conventional forces and defending itself if necessary. Such an objective does not require us to be prepared to defend against any scale of conventional attack in any kind of situation that the Warsaw Pact is conceivably capable of creating. However, it does require sufficient forces in place to deal with the Pact's immediately available forces and sufficient capabilities for mobilization and reinforcement to respond to a Pact build-up. An approximate balance of conventional capabilities, both before and after mobilization, should enable us to meet such an objective.

The continued exaggeration of Warsaw Pact forces also stems from the widely held and long cherished belief among the military that, when in doubt, the safe thing to do is to overstate the enemy's strength; supposedly this will frighten the political leaders into providing larger budgets and more forces. This belief has not only been proven wrong; it often backfires. It can be just as dangerous to overestimate the enemy as to underestimate him. Overstatement of the Pact threat has led to strategies of desperation (the prompt use of nuclear weapons), to a feeling that NATO's conventional forces are irrelevant and to a failure to take many necessary actions to improve the readiness and effectiveness of existing forces. Far from eliciting larger budgets and more forces, exaggerated estimates of Pact forces have made it extremely difficult to justify maintaining NATO's present force levels.

Press stories often compare some 175 Warsaw Pact divisions with about 25 NATO divisions without making clear that the Pact total includes many cadre and "paper" divisions, that the NATO total excludes many divisions that would be available for reinforcement, and that a typical NATO "division force" (the

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division plus its service and combat-support units) is almost twice as large as its Pact counterpart, and a U.S. division force is three times as large. Similarly, comparisons of tactical air forces are frequently based on a count of deployed aircraft, or aircraft "assigned" to NATO without adequate consideration of the important and costly qualitative advantages of NATO aircraft or of NATO's larger reinforcement capability. Very different conclusions emerge if one uses the same rules and assumptions to evaluate Pact and NATO forces and does not stop at a count of divisions and aircraft, but rather considers real elements of military power, such as soldiers, guns, vehicles, training, logistic support, etc.

The essential facts regarding conventional military forces in the critical Center Region of Europe (as of mid-1968) are as follows:[1] While the Pact outnumbers NATO in divisions 46 to 28-2/3, NATO has as many men in these divisions as the Pact, and more men (677,000 to 619,000) in the division forces. Even at the rifle platoon level, NATO has as many men immediately available as the Pact.

That manpower on both sides is roughly equal is particularly significant. A soldier, unlike a division, is a relatively equivalent unit on either side, if he is similarly trained and equipped. Also, manpower is by far the largest cost item—about 80 percent—of a Western army. Thus, since the number of soldiers in the Center Region is about equal, we are in fact already paying most of the cost of maintaining an equal conventional capability.

No less important, NATO can maintain this rough equality during a build-up of forces on both sides. While the Pact has certain advantages in reinforcing the Center Region during a mobilization, these are not large enough to attain a decisive force ratio. This is more understandable in light of the facts that: (1) worldwide, the NATO countries have 30 percent more men under arms (and even slightly more men in land forces) than the Warsaw Pact, excluding U.S. increases for Viet Nam; and (2) NATO consistently has a larger defense budget than the Pact—50 percent greater in 1968 for example—measuring both in terms of U.S. prices and excluding U.S. expenditures for Viet Nam.

In addition, NATO forces are superior both qualitatively and quantitatively in such important areas as logistic support, ammu-

[1] For a fuller discussion, see Alain C. Enthoven, "Arms and Men: The Military Balance in Europe," *Interplay*, May 1969, p. 11–14.

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nition, weapons, vehicles, artillery and engineers. Only in numbers of tanks does the Pact have an edge and the main reason for this is that NATO armies have chosen to place less emphasis on tanks than do the Soviets. NATO also has a significant advantage in offensive tactical air power. While NATO has about one-fourth fewer aircraft immediately available in the Center Region, it has consistently more aircraft in its worldwide inventory and thus a much greater reinforcement capability. More significant, NATO aircraft are far better qualitatively by almost every measure of relative capability and far better suited for conventional operations than Pact aircraft. This advantage in tactical air power adds to the confidence that NATO's land forces could not be readily overwhelmed in a conventional attack.

In sum, NATO's conventional forces are not grossly inferior to those of the Pact. This is not to say that NATO could now defeat the Pact or that there are no serious problems. Basically, we are not getting all we are paying for because we are not providing many of the "horseshoe nails" needed to realize the full potential of NATO's existing conventional forces. The major missing "horseshoe nails" include aircraft shelters, modern air ordnance, allied ground ammunition, and a greater capability for allied mobilization. Improvements are also needed in troop deployments, allied pilot training, and allied manning and training levels. NATO could greatly increase the effectiveness of its conventional forces without big increases in cost if adequate attention were paid to these important qualitative factors. But to do so requires concentrating our efforts on solving the real problems of military readiness and effectiveness against realistic threats.

IV

By correcting these deficiencies to realize the full potential of what we already have, NATO should be able to maintain a conventional balance without major increases in overall manpower and budgets. But how shall we achieve even this?

In view of the importance of European security, it might seem that the only wise course would be to try to adhere as closely as possible to the status quo in NATO, finding whatever "band-aids" we can to patch up the balance-of-payments problem, resisting to the maximum Congressional and budgetary pressures for force reductions and, when force reductions can no longer

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be avoided, making sure that support and overhead personnel are withdrawn before the combat forces. Aside from the fact that neither the balance-of-payments problem nor the other pressures are likely to go away by themselves, however, there is a fundamental weakness in trying to retain the status quo. And this weakness is in many ways at the root of all the other pressures and problems. The weakness is that the relationship between the United States and its European allies in NATO is no longer satisfactory. Even an explicit recognition that a military balance now exists between NATO and the Pact does not change the fact that the U.S. contribution to maintaining this balance is far above that of its allies. Recognition of the balance might make our sacrifice seem more worthwhile, but it does not change the basic inequity of the sacrifice.

The Europeans are not contributing to the Alliance what their prosperous economies would easily allow them to do. Even the conventional forces they do maintain are often poorly equipped, trained and supported. And despite U.S. efforts, the Europeans have done little to improve these forces. Their reluctance rests in part on the continued myth of overwhelming Pact superiority, which makes small improvements in NATO's forces seem rather useless; and in part on the belief that any war in Europe would inevitably escalate to the nuclear level, which makes conventional forces themselves seem rather pointless. The answer to these views is that analysis does not support the first and the history of warfare since 1945 does not support the second.

Another reason for the Europeans' reluctance to improve their conventional forces is the widely held belief that a war in Europe is unlikely. This view is understandable. The Soviets probably have little interest in invading and conquering Western Europe; at the same time, however, they most assuredly would like to make a Finland out of it. Thus, we would argue, the need for strong conventional forces is not based primarily on the danger of a premeditated, all-out conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. Although such an event is conceivable, the threat it would pose to our most vital interests and the risks of a nuclear response make it extremely improbable. Rather, the need is to prevent political aggression based on one kind of military superiority, to add to NATO's overall deterrent and to reduce the likelihood that NATO would be forced to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

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For these reasons, the United States continues to try to fill the gap of conventional forces by providing large land, sea and air forces for the Alliance besides maintaining the huge nuclear and naval forces which guarantee the security of Europe as well as that of the United States. Economically, this situation has the triple disadvantages of: (1) being very inefficient, since the Europeans could replace all of the U.S. forces at roughly half the cost to the United States; (2) requiring the United States to devote a much larger share of its gross national product (GNP) to defense than the allies, at a time of a major conflict in Southeast Asia and grave domestic needs for funds; and (3) contributing substantially to a serious and growing balance-of-payments problem. In this situation it is difficult to argue effectively against Congressional demands for troop reductions. It is not easy to answer when Congressmen ask, in effect: "Why is the United States more interested in European security than the Europeans?"

The facts about NATO's burden-sharing are quite straightforward. The Europeans are spending a much smaller fraction of their GNP on defense than is the United States and this fraction continues to grow smaller. In 1968, our Center Region allies spent less than 4.5 percent of their GNP on defense; the United States spent nearly 10 percent. Even excluding the Viet Nam war (assuming that this involves an incremental cost of $20 billion per year), we still spent well over 7 percent of our GNP on defense. In terms of defense spending per capita, the United States in 1968 spent roughly six times as much as Belgium, four times as much as the Netherlands and three times as much as Great Britain and Germany, again excluding Viet Nam expenditures. In addition, the allies are maintaining a much smaller proportion of their population under arms. In 1968, the Center Region allies had about 8 men under arms per 1000 population; the United States had over 13, not counting the additions for Viet Nam—over 17 if Viet Nam is included.

If the United States were to reduce its non-Viet Nam defense expenditures and military manpower to the average level of its NATO Center Region allies (which we do not recommend), it could reduce defense spending by over $25 billion per year and could demobilize over a million men. Conversely, the Germans alone, for example, could replace half of our divisions in Europe and half of our air wings besides and still keep their defense

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expenditures under 6 percent of their GNP, less than the percentage they were spending in 1963, and still less than the percentage we are spending now.

The unsatisfactory economic sharing of the Alliance's burdens stems in part from our unsatisfactory political relationship to NATO and the psychology it fosters. All too often this relationship seems to be based on the assumption that the responsibility for European security is more American than it is European. De Gaulle had some factual grounds for criticizing the over-Americanization of NATO. In the day-to-day affairs of the Alliance, the United States clearly dominates the scene. The most obvious indication is that the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) has always been and continues to be an American. In addition, we hold most of the subordinate NATO commands. All told, seven U.S. officers in Europe hold four-star NATO jobs; no other country holds more than two. Americans predominate on the NATO staffs and we even go so far as to "support" certain NATO headquarters unilaterally by operating airfields, signal equipment and other facilities.

Equally important is the tendency for all initiatives aimed at strengthening the Alliance to come from the United States. Even in the case of the Czech invasion, where the increased threat was clear, it was the United States that urged and pushed the Alliance on. An outside observer might well assume that NATO was an entirely American organization in which we tried to keep the price of the stock up by badgering the European stockholders not to sell. Continued assumption of this role—20 years later—cannot help but make out periodic pleas for greater European contributions seem like little more than the routine scoldings of a benevolent father, and likely to pass with little more result.

There is an analogy to Viet Nam here. In both cases, many American officials have lost sight of the original purpose of the U.S. effort, which was to help our allies defend themselves. In their eagerness to build effective defenses, they have, in effect, redefined the basic goal to be U.S. defense of our allies with allied help. Both in Europe and in South Viet Nam, the situation has been over-Americanized, fostering a psychology in which our allies can pressure us into doing more under the threat of "collapsing" if we don't. American actions have encouraged our allies to believe that their security is our responsibility, not theirs.

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V

This unsatisfactory and increasingly unstable U.S.-European relationship in NATO, and the financial and political pressures it causes, mean that, in the long run, we cannot successfully defend the status quo. What, then, are the alternatives? Some have suggested a negotiated mutual force reduction between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Desirable as such an agreement might be, its chances seem remote. Too many countries are involved with too many conflicting interests. More serious, the problems of definition, identification and verification seem to be too intractable to permit a treaty that has a realistic chance of being accepted. (We have not been able to resolve the first two even among the NATO allies as yet.) These factors would make such a treaty far more complex and difficult to achieve, for example, than a U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic nuclear arms limitation agreement—and that seems difficult enough. In any event, such an agreement would not be incompatible with the main suggestions we have to make. More important, a necessary condition for successful negotiations is that we have a satisfactory alternative in case the negotiations fail.

The alternative suggested here also has risks and difficulties. It requires the kind of hard, long-term decisions that governments find very difficult to make. The alternative is to confront the Europeans boldly and soon with the unsatisfactory nature of the current burden-sharing, explain the necessity for their taking a new view of the European security problem, and offer a plan to carry out some basic changes in the Alliance. Greater European economic contributions and greater political leadership by the Europeans would of course be necessary, but equally important would be a change in basic attitudes—a recognition and acceptance by both sides that European security is primarily a European responsibility.

There are four guiding principles which should be followed in working out the details of such a plan:

The first basic principle is that NATO must maintain a rough balance of conventional forces with the Warsaw Pact. In its negotiations with the allies, the United States would have to be clear that there is no way of rationalizing reduced NATO conventional forces by returning to a nuclear "trip wire" strategy. The nuclear tranquilizer has been used too often in such situa-

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tions in the past. It does not solve the problem. It is not cheap if one considers risk. Nuclear weapons have not been, are not and cannot be a substitute for conventional forces.

A rough equality in the size of conventional forces has much to recommend it as a peacetime goal. Given such a balance, the Soviets would be strongly deterred from conventional aggression because they could have no confidence of success unless they planned an attack so massive that NATO's most vital interests were clearly threatened. Approximate equality is also a condition that both sides can accept politically. If the forces on the two sides are equal and generally known to be so, neither side need feel threatened; the relationship can be stable. A matching posture would not create the arms-race problems likely to arise if NATO attempted to exceed substantially the Warsaw Pact's conventional strength. And it is a goal whose reasonableness, realism and simplicity would recommend it for public support—if the publics in the NATO countries were given the facts.

The second basic principle is that there must be greater equity in sharing the Alliance's economic and manpower burdens. The relative contributions within NATO today are clearly unfair. The changes proposed here would simply shift the relative contributions to the Alliance; they would not alter basic strategy. Any U.S. force reductions should be offset by the allies. In this effort, we would have to assume that the allies will not react by reëmphasizing an independent European nuclear deterrent. The danger of falling between a nuclear and a conventional stool, and having neither posture adequate, is even greater now than before. The increased European understanding in recent years of the problems, costs and limitations of nuclear weapons—partly as a result of discussions in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group—make these assumptions much more reasonable now than they would have been five to eight years ago.

Whatever balance of allied contributions to NATO is agreed upon, it is important that it be stable over a fairly long period. Leaving aside the question of associated naval forces, an example of a sensible U.S. contribution might be three divisions with supporting units plus four air wings (as opposed to the four and one-third divisions plus seven air wings in Europe now) with active reinforcements of a comparable size kept in the United States for rapid deployment. Such a force would reduce our military personnel in Europe by almost one-third and reduce

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our military balance-of-payments deficit by about $250 million annually. (The balance-of-payments reduction could be four times as much if the allies agreed to pay for the support costs of the remaining forces.) Budgetary savings would result only if the forces withdrawn from Europe were disbanded. If this occurred, as it ought, the savings would be about $2 billion.

At the same time, a major streamlining of headquarters and support personnel in Europe should also be implemented. Much of this streamlining is possible independently of force reductions or negotiations with the allies, and should be undertaken regardless of any overall policy decision. This can make a large contribution but cannot by itself close the balance-of-payments gap.

The timing of a force reduction would be important in two respects: first, to make it entirely clear to the Europeans that we were seriously planning a significant change and not just bargaining for a bigger "offset" payment, we would need to explain the entire plan in detail at the beginning; and second, to give the Europeans time to react and to build up their own forces, the actual reductions would have to be phased over a considerable period of time, say five years.

The third basic principle is that there must be greater equality in the policy-making affairs of the Alliance. This means a greater degree of European political leadership in the Alliance, and a corresponding reduction in U.S. domination of NATO command jobs and staffs. It would be particularly important symbolically and practically to give the job of SACEUR to a European.

The solution to this problem ties in with another possible objective—namely, an attempt to bring France back into more active participation in planning European security. If NATO were restructured and U.S. dominance reduced, it is possible that France might now be willing to accept a position of leadership. The prestige of the SACEUR job might be one inducement. If the French were unwilling to accept the SACEUR post, with all that would imply, an alternative solution would be to give the post to one of the smaller countries, implicitly making it more of a technical post than the traditional "father figure" role of the past. An American deputy could be retained for handling problems of liaison concerning nuclear weapons.

The fourth basic principle of any such plan is that there must

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be more than a token U.S. contribution to NATO. It is one thing to argue that the United States should not dominate the Alliance, but it is quite another to argue that we should essentially withdraw from it. A token contribution, such as the 50,000 proposed in the Symington resolution, would undoubtedly drive the Europeans to a reliance on nuclear forces or an accommodation with the Soviet Union or both. It would also destroy any chance of a mutually negotiated reduction of forces in Central Europe. Without a substantial American contribution, the Europeans are even less likely to believe that maintaining a conventional military option is feasible, much less make the necessary increased effort to achieve this goal. And these considerations aside, are American interests in the whole of Europe less than those in South Korea, where we have over 50,000 men?

A substantial U.S. contribution to NATO is necessary and important. Despite the prolonged emphasis on Asia, we believe the United States' most vital interests are still in Europe. For reasons discussed earlier, we need the alternatives offered by strong conventional forces to protect these interests. We will lose these alternatives if U.S. forces are unilaterally reduced to 50,000. It is just as unreasonable to expect the allies to make up this kind of deficit as it is for the allies to expect the United States to maintain indefinitely its present contribution.

The American force suggested here is considerably more than token. It would consist of over 200,000 men and over 300 fighter/attack aircraft in Europe plus associated naval, air and land reinforcements in the United States. This may or may not be the "best" or "optimum" contribution to NATO, but it is a "not clearly unfair" contribution. It is large enough to make a substantial contribution to European security and to demonstrate our continuing commitment. It goes a long way toward offsetting the Soviet contribution to the Warsaw Pact. The suggested reductions would also be large enough to convince our allies that we are trying to end the unplanned nibbling away and establish a force level that we can maintain over the long run. (In the view of many of our European allies, more important than U.S. force levels is the certainty regarding them.) At the same time, the suggested reductions are not so large that, with reasonable increases by the allies, the goal of maintaining a rough conventional balance with the Pact is beyond realistic reach. Finally, by reducing annual defense spending and balance-of-payments

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costs by some $2 billion and $250 million respectively, the reductions are large enough to attack directly some of our fundamental economic problems.

The risk of proceeding with a plan for restructuring our relationship to NATO—even a plan based on the four principles outlined above—is that instead of causing a positive and constructive response it might so frighten the Europeans that NATO and collective security in Europe would be dealt a death blow. Or, somewhat more probable and still serious, the conventional forces of the Alliance could end up greatly reduced, leaving the Alliance heavily dependent on the early use of nuclear weapons in a crisis. An evaluation of these risks depends on several considerations. One is the estimate of our ability to communicate in a clear and straightforward way the facts of the present balance, the feasibility and importance of maintaining such a balance, and the need to change the relative contributions necessary to maintain this balance—as well as an assessment of the European reaction to what we are saying. The official adoption of the "flexible response" strategy by the NATO Defense Ministers in May 1967, the increased interest in keeping strong NATO forces as a result of the Czech crisis, and the growing prosperity of the allies, suggest that the prospects for accomplishing this are better now than they have been at any time since the Korean War.

A final consideration is the prospect for a gradual but almost certain deterioration in the Alliance that will result from a continuing series of unplanned responses to the financial and domestic political pressures described above. The risks here are quite high. Public and Congressional sentiment—to the effect that we are "overcommitted" and that others are not doing enough for themselves—is strong. And when and if the reductions now being considered are carried out, the United States will have run out of measures to cut our military expenditures in Europe without significantly reducing our combat capability.

Regardless of what course one believes should eventually be followed, it is clear the United States needs to face up to this problem as a high-priority matter. Simply to delay serious study and decision is almost to guarantee more trouble later, when fewer options may be available. Common sense—both political and economic—strongly suggests that the present situation cannot endure much longer.

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AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA

By Frances M. Foland

JUST a decade ago, "agrarian reform" was anathema throughout most of the Western hemisphere. Only visionaries, revolutionaries and a few staff members of international agencies paid it any heed. Latin American governments spurned it, and the U.S. Government ignored or disapproved of it. In the two countries where it had taken place, Mexico and Bolivia, it was the product of violent revolution.

In 1960 a government of the democratic Left in Venezuela fulfilled a long-standing campaign pledge by pushing through an agrarian reform law and pressing its application. From Cuba, Fidel Castro, professing his to be a peasant movement, called upon the other hemispheric societies to follow his revolutionary lead. The United States moved to counteract his disrupting impact throughout the two continents and, at a plenipotentiary conference in 1960, the Act of Bogotá was constituted, incorporating the call for reform and the promise of U.S. funds.

Agrarian reform achieved full respectability at Punta del Este in August 1961. The delegates, many reluctantly, signed the declaration, which included a commitment "to encourage . . . programs of comprehensive agrarian reform leading to the effective transformation, where required, of unjust structures and systems of land tenure . . ."

To comply with the urgings of the United States and the letter of the Alliance for Progress—and to qualify for aid—almost all the Latin American legislatures spun out protracted and high-sounding laws. It seemed that an outmoded, tradition-bound system, unique in the world, was about to be restructured.

Callow reform enthusiasts were to learn, however, the nice difference between legal action and real action. With a plethora of new laws on the books across the hemisphere, only Venezuela pursued its resolve in a purposeful way. In Chile, a progressive government gained power in 1964 and with difficulty succeeded in replacing a flimsy 1963 law with a legal instrument adequate to effect agrarian reform. In the other countries, politically dominant elements were indifferent if not opposed to altering the tenure structure. Action was limited to tokenism, such as the distribution of peripheral public lands, or to technical and finan-

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cial measures, such as increased machinery imports and price supports. Occasionally some progress was made in cadastral surveys and land-tax systems.

Arguments against agrarian reform are similar throughout the nations of the hemisphere. The two prime defenses of the status quo are the sanctity of private property and the efficiency of larger units. Real or imagined flaws in extant reforms lead to the additional criticisms that decreased production results when peasants replace the traditional owners and that the government falls into a paternalistic role as implementor of the program.

The conservative rationale regarding the inviolability of private property is based on the theory that the right is God-given, resting on natural law and preceding the State itself; therefore, the State has no jurisdiction in the matter. In the mid-twentieth century, however, this line of thinking has become anachronistic. One Latin American nation after another has incorporated in its laws the concept of "the social function of property" either in tandem with or as successor to "the inviolability of property."

Latin Americans are particularly fond of pointing to the high efficiency of large farm units in the United States and, therefore, of belaboring land parceling as contrary to rational agricultural development. The comparison is, first of all, erroneous because in the United States family-sized units still do dominate. In any case, to suggest that size alone is the key to production is simplistic; if this were true, Latin America would be world leader instead of laggard in crop yields. In fact, an antiquated latifundia system can more reasonably be condemned than defended in the light of experience on large modern farms.

The U.S. model is perhaps most inappropriate for Latin America because of the difference in the rural populations. Whereas in the United States industrialization and urbanization have, since 1920, reduced the number of people on the land, Latin America's rural population expands at about 1.6 percent annually, and in most of the countries composes half or more of the total population. In Mexico, for instance, the peasant population has doubled in the last 40 years. Though production of more food is badly needed, the long-neglected and excessive rural population adds a critical element to the complex problem of the countryside. Rather than adopt labor-expelling measures such as mechanization, the necessity is to find labor-intensive solutions which simultaneously increase production.

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In some instances, of course, there are grounds for criticizing a particular agrarian reform for creating dwarf units which defy agricultural improvement. There are areas in both Mexico and Bolivia where the number of peasants receiving or taking land far exceeds what the land should support. Profiting from these earlier mistakes, the current programs in Chile and Venezuela are attempting to avoid the minifundia pitfall.

Mexico and Bolivia are also cited by opponents of agrarian reform as proof that agricultural production falls after land distribution. In both cases preliminary evaluations reported declines, in Mexico in the 1920s and '30s and in Bolivia through the 1950s. However, subsequent studies pointed out that, although less food reached the urban centers, more was being consumed in the countryside by peasants who had previously been coerced into turning the produce over to the *patron*. In addition, when the landowning class which controlled the marketing channels was ousted, other trade patterns developed which were different from the flow measured by economists. It is now concluded, therefore, that production was maintained or increased. Likewise, post-reform studies in Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, Taiwan and Japan show not only increased productivity on smaller units but also more intensive employment of the rural labor force.

In most Latin American countries, the issue of agricultural production is undoubtedly critical, for burgeoning populations require spiraling food imports. Ambitious to industrialize, businessmen and policy-makers are reluctant to risk any measure which might necessitate the use of foreign exchange for wheat or beans instead of capital goods. Opponents of agrarian reform, therefore, exploit this anxiety by centering their attack on the production front, where studies and experience are not sufficiently conclusive to refute the charge. In addition, they disparage the social aspect of agrarian reform by claiming that peasant status after reform is unaltered; the State merely replaces the former landowner as *patron,* imposing its will upon a sector which continues dependent and submissive.

Reform personnel have difficulty countering these two attacks simultaneously; experience so far suggests that they must choose to develop either the land or the man. Since economic considerations tend to dominate, emphasis is generally on the land. From the moment of its inception a reform is under obligation

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to produce as much or more than the system it replaces. Hard-pressed by their opposition, government bureaucrats and technicians hover nervously over their land-reform charges to ensure that they do not make a mistake which would impair the crop.

The ideal would be a moratorium on passing judgments, so that at least as much attention could be given to developing human capacity as to plant yield. The level of tempers, interests and politics is too high, however, to allow such a luxury.

In Mexico the Ejidal Bank has become the institutional *patron,* and most of the recipients of land, the *ejidatarios,* are completely dependent upon it for credit, for decisions on crop allocation and for the distribution of profits. Absorbed by administrative tasks, the Bank has little time, staff or responsibility for training the peasants who, with only a minor decision-making role, seldom develop as entrepreneurs. Of course, being a mature program, the Mexican example encompasses great diversity, and there are innumerable exceptions to Bank paternalism.

This pitfall, evident in the pioneer program, will perhaps serve as warning for the new program in Chile, where the Agrarian Reform Corporation could easily follow the same route. As set forth by the Chilean law, expropriation is to be followed by two to five years of close government tutelage to train the beneficiaries in modern agricultural methods, provide them with the essential infrastructure and establish their credit. Concomitantly, leadership and community-development specialists are to groom the peasants to become decision-making operators. In this, Chile has vastly improved upon the early course of Mexico's agrarian reform when peasants were largely left to fend for themselves.

Although close surveillance is perhaps warranted during this preliminary training stage, the danger is that it will become habit. Titles to the land are now being granted to the peasants, however, and it can be hoped that, with greater independence and diminishing attacks from the opposition, the Chilean *asentados* will become self-reliant farmers.

II

Supporters of agrarian reform, likewise, amass social and economic evidence to argue the case for structural change in rural areas. Agriculture is failing to produce enough food to meet the needs of population growth. It does not fulfill its potential in producing export crops which could provide important earnings

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to finance imports. And, not only has it failed to better the substandard conditions of rural inhabitants but, in fact, poverty, misery and discontent are increasing in the countryside.

The agrarian structure in Latin America consists of four types of holdings, essentially: plantations, family-sized and owner-operated farms, latifundia and minifundia.

The plantation system concentrates on extensive export crops —coffee, sugar, cacao, bananas. Commercially minded of necessity, it is generally modern in the sense of utilizing land, capital and labor sufficiently well to meet competition. It is the lifeblood of the region's balance of payments; 52 percent of total international earnings in the 1960s have come from agricultural exports.

The family-sized farms are so minimal in number and acreage as to have little consequence in the agricultural economy of the continent. They cluster in such areas as southern Chile, the State of São Paulo in Brazil, the Japanese colonies in Amazônia, the fringes of the Calí Valley of Colombia and the Costa Rican highland.

It is chiefly upon the latifundia-minifundia complex that reformists focus their ire. Social considerations aside, the charge is that the former underutilize both land and labor, and that the latter exhaust the soil by overcropping and underfertilizing; moreover, the uneconomic size of the small plots does not absorb efficiently the manpower of the minifundistas. This traditional structure of landholdings commonly misuses both soil and terrain. The more desirable valleys and plains are usually held in large tracts and devoted to extensive crops or cattle-raising; characteristically, production is stunted by absentee ownership, antiquated methods and equipment, and minimum capital investments. On the surrounding slopes and mountainsides are the lots planted in cereals and legumes—erosion and negligible inputs depleting the soil's fertility.

Tax rates on land have been insignificant and delinquency in payment has been high. Labor has been the cheapest of commodities, to be had for little more than a stipend in kind and the use of a small plot of land. There has been, therefore, no financial burden in owning land and no need to make it pay its way. But land with its resident laborers has, since the coming of the Spaniards, endowed its owners with social prestige. More recently it has served as a hedge against inflation. In countries where, even today, investment alternatives are few, land has been

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considered the most desirable, even by townspeople who have no knowledge of agriculture. Land value has derived more from these intangible attributes than from its real or potential level of production. Profits have been derived more from the over-exploitation of the peasant than from the cultivation of the soil.

The result of this misappropriation of the land is the irony that, while Latin America's major source of export earnings is the agricultural cash crop, the area is increasingly unable to feed itself. Agricultural imports, mainly foodstuffs, rose to 20 percent of the area's total purchases abroad by 1965, while vagaries in weather, transport and marketing caused periodic shortages, high prices and inflationary pressures in the domestic market.

Looking to the misuse of both man and land in this agrarian structure, advocates of change base their arguments on two major principles—social justice and economic development. The original motivation for land distribution in the early reforms of Mexico and Bolivia was almost purely social justice. The Mexican Revolution's clarion call for "Land and Liberty" and a Zapata riding forth on a white horse would no longer win the day, however, barring violent outbreaks. Although the humane concern to better the peasants' life continues, economic development is more likely to be the prime objective; the argument for agrarian reform is now made with charts and graphs projecting international receipts and payments, five-year plans, the consumer price index and the gross national product. Scratch the surface of such a polemicist and one may find a visionary dreaming of social justice, but he has learned that economics, not idealism, wins the support of the industrialists and urban middle class who are essential to forge a coalition to counterbalance the bloc of large landowners.

President Eduardo Frei of Chile is an example of the amalgam of humanitarian idealism and practical economics. Bringing the rural sector into the mainstream of society was a major issue of his 1964 campaign, but he also appealed to the urban vote by arguing that agrarian reform would bring more and cheaper food into city markets. Lamenting the drain of agricultural imports on Chile's economy, equivalent to 25 percent of its total export earnings, President Frei in his first State of the Nation message (1965) said: "It is an undebatable fact that the most critical issue in our economic development resides fundamentally in the backwardness of our agrarian sector."

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The potential role of a modernized agricultural sector in revitalizing industrialization has also become a key argument of developmentalists. They insist that rural progress would significantly expand the domestic market. The mood of countries such as Brazil, after a decade of euphoria buoyed by rapid industrialization, changed in the 1960s to one of pessimism. In the postwar boom import substitution and the construction of light industries were emphasized; these have now reached a plateau with plants operating below capacity, producing high-cost units, often of inferior quality. To avoid stagnation, sales must be multiplied by means of a significant increase in the consumer market.

In Brazil, 54 percent of the labor force is occupied in agriculture but contributes only 28 percent to the gross domestic product. That labor force is largely illiterate, is therefore denied the vote and is condemned generally to a subsistence living on the fringes of the national economy. This is the potential market that technocrats, planners and industrialists want to tap.

Tangible proof that agrarian reform contributes to the purchasing power of the peasant is found from one end of Latin America to the other. In the Yaquí Valley of northwest Mexico the beneficiaries of President Cardenas' land distribution in the 1930s live in multi-roomed homes with TV sets, major appliances, built-in kitchen cabinets and modern bathrooms. The coöperative society owns a fleet of tractors, plows and combines. After the Bolivian peasants seized the land in 1952–53, numerous local markets sprang up in the villages. Whereas pre-reform trade was based largely on barter, cash began to flow into the rural area, and solvent peasants participated in the money economy for the first time. Purchases of shoes, bicycles, radios, factory-made clothing and tractors are now common.

In the valley surrounding Santiago, Chile, a peasant leader on a recently expropriated farm said: "It is very easy to criticize and oppose the agrarian reform while sitting in Santiago, but I personally feel the real significance of this new situation when I know that now I can have shoes not only for my children, but even for my wife—new shoes, shoes bought with my own money and not used shoes which the *patroncita* gives me as a present when they are already worn out."

Another source of impetus for agrarian reform arises from a recognition that bad rural conditions progressively threaten and inconvenience other sectors of the society.

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Latin America's cities are increasing faster than those anywhere else in the world, and the bulk of that growth is in the shantytowns, which are expanding at four to five times the rate of the core cities. Since the land cannot support them, peasants migrate in search of jobs. An unemployment rate of 30 percent in the slums is not uncommon, and many of the so-called employed are merely bootblacks or junk collectors.

Brazil's situation is typical. In one decade, 1950–60, Curitiba, capital of the State of Paraná, doubled in population, and São Paulo increased by 74 percent. Traffic is jammed and streets are in ill-repair. There are electricity and water stoppages, and even local telephone calls can result in inordinate delays. Suffering serious deficiencies in services and amenities, the middle class is increasingly disturbed and has come to see improved rural conditions as a means to keep the would-be migrant on the farm.

A recent report on Latin American urbanization by the Food and Agriculture Organization found that Mexico suffers less from the problem. This is accredited to "large numbers of moderately populated agricultural villages [which] provide an alternative to urban migration . . . The program of agrarian reform has probably contributed to this staying power."

City-dwellers have also been made aware of rural conditions by the several significant outbreaks of peasant violence in the last decade. Because these posed serious threats to the society, agrarian reform was deemed advisable in order to ensure political stability. For those few years, starting in the late 1950s and into the 1960s, peasants were viewed as possible explosive elements, to be feared, appeased and, if necessary, quelled. Then came the rash of evangelists who sought to transform the quiescent *campesino* into a militant rebel. In almost all cases of overt peasant dissent, leadership was from the middle class and the assumption was that the abuses suffered had spawned a suppressed anger, which, if released, would contribute to the restructuring of society. Protagonists were Hugo Blanco in Andean Peru, Francisco Julião in Northeast Brazil, Camilo Torres in Colombia and, ultimately, Che Guevara in Bolivia.

However, this apparently promising matrix for revolution—or at least for forcing basic structural change—proved sterile. Just as Guevara was later to lament the passivity of the peasant, Julião in 1962 said that the *campesino* did not "act like a human being, but a vegetable. The great task which we undertake is to

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make him live like a human being." The classic statement of his activist days was: "to agitate is beautiful, but to organize is difficult."

Heir to Julião's abortive attempt to mobilize the Brazilian peasants is the Catholic Church, which stresses education, not agitation. The priests devoted to this work assume a long and tedious task just to prepare the downtrodden rural sector to articulate its own demands. Chile's very real agrarian reform, promulgated in July 1967, was the product not of peasant pressure or rural-based power but of the foresight of middle-class intellectuals and the pioneering effort of the Church.

In some few cases, peasant activism brought results. Until the new agrarian reform law of this year, Peru's program consisted largely of granting titles to Andean Indians who, as groups, have invaded large holdings and seized the land. In general, however, the result for the protestors has been intensified suppression and deeper disillusionment. Peasant violence seems to have subsided, at least for the time being, and middle-class revolutionaries look more to urban guerrilla activity to vent their dissatisfaction.

III

As a result of these pressures for rural change, real agrarian reforms have been achieved in a few Latin American nations: some forged by revolution and some shaped by legislative process; some executed and some stillborn; some under close government tutelage and some on a laissez-faire course. The range is represented by Bolivia, Mexico, Chile, Venezuela and Brazil.

The first two were products of revolution but differ somewhat in their origin and course. Bolivia's 1952 revolution was an emotional refutation of the exploitation of man and resources by a small oligarchy of nationals and foreigners. Peasants demanded land and, when the new government tarried, took it for themselves. Destitute and disorganized, the Bolivian Government has never quite caught up with the de facto reform. After almost two decades, nearly half of the peasants have not received titles, and much less than half have received technical or financial aid. In the beginning there was a kind of blind faith that social and economic advances would automatically accompany the simple act of land redistribution. Now it is recognized that major inputs of capital and know-how are necessary to achieve significant prog-

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ress, but in Bolivia the will and the resources have not yet been focused on the need.

Mexico's was, likewise, the product of revolution, characterized by peasant participation and the cry for social justice, particularly for land. The Government, however, maintained control, legitimizing agrarian reform first by decree in 1915 and then by the Constitution of 1917. Though distribution was slow until the 1930s, the peasants on the whole kept faith, and the distribution was carried out under official auspices. As in Bolivia, it was assumed that putting peasant and land together sufficed, and little attention was given to assisting the *ejidatarios*. But, unlike Bolivia, Mexico came to realize the need to stimulate agricultural production and, since the thirties, has increasingly rendered services to the agrarian sector: credit, research, marketing controls, seed improvement, irrigation systems and farm insurance. Mexico, being wealthier than Bolivia, has been able to benefit certain areas, such as the Northwest, sufficiently to make a dramatic impact.

Mexico's agrarian reform is an irregular program with significant successes to show in some geographic regions and abject failures in others; with ultramodern agricultural techniques on some farms juxtaposed with oxen and wooden plows on others; with the idealized *ejido* (communal) system disintegrating into individual plots, yet instilling the *ejidatarios* with prestige and a sense of dignity; with spurts of governmental enthusiasm followed by conscious attempts to suppress the whole concept.

Among the agrarian reforms of nonrevolutionary origin, Chile's strikes hardest at the traditional institutional structure. After a feeble start in 1963, under the reform law of 1967 private lands in excess of 200 irrigated acres are being expropriated, even in the valuable agricultural heartland of the central zone. Compensation is based upon tax-assessed value, which is based upon productive capacity rather than the inflated market value. With a low cash indemnification, 1 to 10 percent, and long-term bonds only partially adjustable to inflation, an owner may recover as little as 30 percent of the pre-reform value of his land. Naturally, the landowners and their allies fought vigorously to defeat the measure.

Avid supporters of agrarian reform have been disappointed with the pace of Chile's expropriation and distribution. Feeling that Frei's popularity, a strong law and the urgency of the prob-

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lem warranted and facilitated vigorous implementation, they have been disgruntled by the President's concessions to temporizers. In fact, the Government's restraint reflects the political reality of Chile as well as that of other Latin American countries. No president and no government is assured of fulfilling its mandate. Even in democratic Chile, where coups d'état have been rare, rumors of impending *golpes* are spread from time to time as a subtle way of reining in the speed and direction of executive action. Even the canard can be an effective political weapon. President Frei, like most Latin American leaders, including military strongmen, must tailor his program to a volatile balance of power, and a misjudgment entails not just a fall in the popularity polls but very real jeopardy for the whole administration.

Compared to Mexico's mature program, Chile's is still embryonic, benefiting approximately 15,000 families to date. It is estimated that the reform, as it is now being executed, will stabilize at 35,000 to 40,000 families. After thirty-five years of land distribution, Mexico had benefited 2.3 million families, representing 54 percent of all landholders and possessing 45 percent of all cropland. The difference in scope and vigor in the two programs can be assigned not so much to duration as to origin.

Mexico's agrarian reform was the prime objective of a revolution and is endowed with a sanctity which ensures its survival. The Mexican program was formed in a new and sympathetic political matrix. As the historian Daniel Cosío Villegas described the effects of his country's revolution:

> . . . it totally swept away not only the political régime of Porfirio Diaz but all of the Porfirian society, that is, the social classes or groups together with their ideas, tastes and manners. Not only the commanders-in-chief of the army but their officers and all the soldiers disappeared without exception. Landowners, urban and especially agricultural, were almost entirely replaced by new ones. Not one of the great newspapers survived. Only two out of about fifty banks continued into the new régime. Official bureaucracy—federal, state and municipal—was wholly reformed.

In Chile there is no suggestion that the old guard has been destroyed. Typical of Latin American solutions, compromise rather than confrontation has been its hallmark. Unlike Mexico's, the reform does not result from the demands of the society as a whole but of one party, the Christian Democrats, whose popular vote has steadily declined. Having won a majority in the presidential election of 1964, its support fell to less than a third

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in the congressional elections early this year. In the 1969 elections the party of the Right made a comeback, and its stalwarts now look to the resuscitation of ex-President Jorge Alessandri as its candidate in the 1970 presidential race. Should a conservative triumph, he would be unwise to halt the reform but could slow its pace decisively in the name of "consolidation." On the other hand, a victory of the parties to the Left of the Christian Democrats would obviously take the program on another course.

Like Chile's, Venezuela's agrarian program was hammered out by parliamentary procedure, but it has not tested the temper of the society to the degree that Chile's has. Venezuela's reformists have not had to collide head-on with the traditional structure and the vested interests because an abundance of public land and government funds made circumvention possible. Coming to power after a self-serving dictator and his avaricious friends, President Rómulo Betancourt and the Acción Democrática party could, without compunction or condemnation, restore to the State their predecessors' huge holdings representing some of the richest and best-located lands in the country. Also, Venezuela's small population of approximately nine million left vast areas uninhabited, ready for development with the proper investment. The Government undertook major expenditures to finance colonization projects, irrigation systems, extension services, rural housing, malaria eradication and the purchase of private property at market prices with cash payment. Outlays of such scope, impossible for impecunious Chile, have expedited the reform program of oil-rich Venezuela.

Venezuela is perhaps the only Latin American nation where colonization has been carried out with considerable success. Generally, it has been conjured up as surrogate for real agrarian reform. In a surge of enthusiasm, peasants from overpopulated core areas have been carried off to disease-ridden hinterlands, given a token advance and left to forage on their own. To be effective, colonization demands major investments in roads, land clearance, health programs, school construction, agricultural training and ecological research; only Venezuela has been willing and able to tackle such an immense undertaking in the way it should be done. On the whole, colonization—long used as a gambit to avoid real agrarian reform—has been discredited as the prime remedy for curing the social and economic malaise of the Latin American countryside.

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Beyond the practical considerations of capital and land supply, Venezuela's course was smoothed by a consistent adherence to the concept of private property. Whereas the Mexican *ejido* is still suspect as being a would-be *kolkhoz* and the Chilean *asentamiento* is constantly, though falsely, labeled "communist," Venezuelan parcels were distributed with titles, making the peasant an overnight capitalist. The opposition was thus deprived of one of its most emotional rallying cries.

The Venezuelan reform, which has benefited 100,000 families since 1960, is considered practically complete. Yet, a significant share of the country is still held in latifundia, and a limitation on the size of holdings has never been imposed by law or court. Nor has the whole peasant sector benefited from the reform. Dissatisfaction exists among some who have not received land grants and among others who hold title to parcels which continue unproductive because they never received the necessary improvements. The program, however, has made a significant contribution to the country's agricultural development.

As in many Latin American countries, Brazil's governments during recent decades have produced a multitude of bills, directives, studies, plans, projects and programs concerned with the agrarian situation. Most of them emphasized colonization, and the one pioneering draft which proposed the distribution and utilization of land for social purposes was shunted aside before reaching Congress.

Brazil needs agrarian reform as much as any other Latin American country. Its tenure structure is badly balanced: 81.3 percent of the non-public land is held by 12.6 percent of the landowners in latifundia of 1000 to 100,000 hectares. Dwarf units fragment the other 18.7 percent of the territory among 87.4 percent of the owners. Crop yields in Brazil are inferior to those in Argentina, Chile and Mexico and are not experiencing the improvements of the other three nations. A cash-crop psychosis dominates, concentrating on coffee and sugar, both of which suffer from overproduction and world market fluctuations. Meanwhile, regional and periodic food shortages and rising prices for such staples as bread, dried meat and beans inconvenience the upper classes and subject the poor to inadequate diets.

But unlike Chile and Venezuela no government has come to power in Brazil which has been dedicated to the cause of agrar-

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ian reform. Legal instruments have gradually evolved which make possible a program of expropriation and distribution, and sufficient basic data has been gathered to facilitate rational action. So far, however, performance has been limited to little more than small-scale projects and demagogic half-measures.

In Brazil as in the other Latin American countries where agrarian reform is still more a matter of word than of deed, there are certain key situations which reveal the true intent of those who determine the program's fate. One of the most obvious of these is the budget granted to the executing agency. The Brazilian Institute for Agrarian Reform (IBRA) was created by the Land Statute of 1964. During its first two years, when it was largely involved in planning and in conducting a nationwide cadastral survey, its fairly modest budget requests were met by government appropriations. However, in 1967 and 1968, when the agency was ready to initiate reform projects, it was granted 34.9 percent and 21.5 percent, respectively, of its proposed budget. An IBRA report stated frankly that "the lack of resources is the principal reason for the delay in carrying out the agrarian reform."

Another failing typical of timid programs is excessive expenditures for small-scale projects. At one such showplace in Northeast Brazil precious IBRA funds went to construct a social center, a church, an administration building and recreation facilities. Eighty-seven beneficiaries of the project were presented with finished houses, a warehouse, chicken house, stable and corrals. But they received parcels too small for subsistence; the cost of the land represented only 3.17 percent of the total investment. Such costly projects provide arguments to reform opponents who proclaim that the country cannot afford such expenditures on a nationwide scale.

Still another barrier placed before effective reform is organizational complexity. In the continuing revision of the administrative structure concerned with executing a reform, President Costa e Silva recently issued a decree-law redefining the responsible agencies and their relationships. Whereas IBRA was formerly linked directly to the Ministry of Agriculture, a new intermediary body has been created, the Executive Group of Agrarian Reform (GERA). Time may prove otherwise, but GERA's composition seems unwieldy: 11 members including representatives of six ministries, the central bank, the landowners

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association, plus IBRA and a related agency of agricultural development (INDA).

If the pattern of the past continues, there will be more work groups and committees set up to study what previous agencies and groups have already evaluated and on which they have made recommendations. On the basis of past preparations, Brazil is ready to start an agrarian reform of significance. A major encumbrance in the 1946 Constitution was eliminated in the 1967 Constitution: full indemnification in cash prior to expropriation is no longer required. Such a stipulation made agrarian reform economically impossible. Constitutional clauses calling for full prepayment in cash were common in most Latin American charters until recently and have been a major barrier to effecting reforms. Brazil can now finance the reform with long-term bonds.

The concept of "social function" has, likewise, altered the bases of the tenure structure. The 9th Institutional Act of April 1969 says specifically that "The President of the Republic may [approve] the expropriation of rural property for reasons of social interest . . ."

Because of a nationwide land registry in 1965, the Brazilian Government for the first time in history has sufficient data on the pattern of ownership and has also succeeded in implementing a progressive land tax which encourages productivity. It has, therefore, been able to designate five priority areas for reform, chosen according to the following criteria: the existence of public development projects such as irrigation and rural electrification, the existence of latifundia, manifest social tension, concentration of minifundia, high incidence of landless farmers, and badly utilized land near urban centers.

If the Costa e Silva government wants to repair the agrarian situation, it has the power and information to do so, and potentially it has the support.

IV

Brazil's is typical of the situation in most Latin American nations. An anachronistic tenure structure is holding back production in both the industrial and agricultural sectors. Internal and external pressures for change have, in recent years, forced certain adjustments in legal instruments and government organization which now make reform possible. The landowners and

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their conservative supporters still retain enough power, however, to bar effective measures, and they have exerted their traditional authority to quell peasant protest and its progressive leadership. Arguments for agrarian reform are increasingly voiced by the modern urban sector, which realizes that the agrarian structure is retarding economic development.

If these urban elements exercise their potential economic and political power, realizing that their interests are contrary to the traditional landowners', they may gain control of the government or exert pressure on military régimes so as to stimulate action. This has been the case in Chile; in Venezuela the peasant sector was sufficiently politicized and organized to give strong support to the city leaders. The experiences in those two countries suggest that similar agrarian reform programs will be moderate but nevertheless capable of revitalizing agriculture.

Colombia and Ecuador have also made some progress in agrarian reform and colonization, but the programs are much more limited than those of Chile and Venezuela. Until Peru's latest agrarian reform law, decreed by President Velasco in June 1969, distribution in that country had benefited only 8,000 families, and the reform was limited to the Andean highlands, with the more productive coastal strip exempted.

The shift in power and the progress of an agrarian reform are both slow, however, while populations and food imports are growing rapidly. For this reason there is a tendency to adopt noncontroversial short-term solutions based on technology, mechanization and modernization of the agricultural infrastructure.

But the short-term, technical solutions do not solve the social problems and in some cases aggravate them. Rural conditions have worsened rapidly in the last two decades. Agrarian reform is an extremely complex process, interlocked with the whole of the sociopolitical and economic structure of a nation, and of necessity a prolonged, difficult and costly undertaking. The programs now in existence give ample proof that a country must be willing to dedicate major quantities of capital and manpower to the development not only of the land but also of the man. Unwillingness to make this investment may prove even more costly in terms of violence in the countryside and stagnation of the economy and society.

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SOME DILEMMAS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

By George K. Tanham and Dennis J. Duncanson

A reviewer of Senator Fulbright's indictment of President Johnson's policy in Viet Nam has pointed out that "it is possible to argue that the false starts of American policy in Asia and elsewhere have been at least as much due to the illusions of liberalism as to the 'arrogance of power'."[1] Obviously, particular policies and actions may be judged as making a bad situation worse, but they may not be the cause of its being bad in the first place. Much of the hawk-versus-dove dispute stems from shared misconceptions about communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia and therefore also about the resulting counterinsurgency actions—misconceptions which form part of an ethos largely inapplicable to that troubled region today.

In this article, it is proposed to put aside this debate over the rights and wrongs of Viet Nam and the counterinsurgency effort made by successive American administrations and to dwell instead on certain counterinsurgency dilemmas. They are intractable enough to tax the most statesmanlike minds. It is doubtful that these problems involve ethical issues; therefore, choosing the right solution cannot be said to confer any special righteousness upon the solver or wickedness upon one who makes an unsuccessful choice. Furthermore, the article does not try to offer solutions but rather attempts to delineate a few of the more perplexing and practical dilemmas faced by those governments dealing with communist insurgents.

All measures of defense taken by a government can be represented as a choice between evils, in so far as it stands to gain nothing by them, only to avoid defeat, and this invariably at considerable cost. In the broadest sense, counterinsurgency is a branch of defense and therefore inherently also a choice between evils. In Southeast Asia the defense is against communist revolutionary warfare, and the choices present themselves to the governments of the region as a series of acute dilemmas, precisely because war and revolution are intertwined, yet may demand different solutions. Naturally, the communist strategists try to

[1] Coral Bell, "Power and Anguish," *International Journal* (Canadian Institute of International Affairs). Toronto, v. XXIII, n. 3, 1968, p. 475.

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make things as difficult as they can, deliberately contriving to add to the dilemmas of the government they wish to overthrow. This makes it harder for the defense to choose a solution and to pursue it consistently; the result is often vacillation and hesitation, muddle and even chaos. And in the longer term the strength of the defense will be dissipated and worn down as much by its own efforts and consequent internal strains as by the damage the insurgents can inflict on it directly.

A well-known and much discussed military dilemma illustrates the nature of the problem. Should the primary military effort be directed to search-and-destroy operations, the usual military strategy, or to the more passive secure-and-hold tactics? If the former, the elusive enemy may lead the pursuing force a long chase without itself being destroyed, while no permanent friendly base can be established because adequate forces will not be available to protect it. Yet if too many forces are allocated to secure-and-hold operations, the enemy may also secure and hold his area, and this may result in the de facto loss of part of the country—an outcome the counterinsurgent government is trying to prevent. The debate over this dilemma in Viet Nam need not detain us here, but the problem will be faced in other areas where insurgency breaks out.

The dilemma of the police chief faced with civil disturbance is a familiar one. Usually the margin of error in judging the precise degree of force to employ in restoring order is very narrow; and if, after it is all over, he seems to have used either too much or too little he stands to be roundly condemned.

This dilemma, which has arisen many times in Southeast Asia in the past, is a crude one when compared with the more subtle applications of the underlying principles developed by the Marxist-Leninists in recent times. These turn mainly on "front" tactics. The communists will try to penetrate and dominate other organized bodies, such as peasant coöperatives, women's organizations, schools and trade unions; and in Viet Nam use has been made of certain religious bodies. Because of the very nature of fronts and the lack of accurate intelligence, it is often difficult to tell which are true voluntary organizations of the people and which have been cleverly subverted or created by the communists for their own ends. The communists may, of course, allow organizations they dominate to continue their overtly useful functions, and yet mobilize them skillfully for certain unannounced

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objectives. Some of the activities may serve to promote communist goals but they will be portrayed as normal protest—strike demonstrations, mass protests and even sit-ins. These may not only sap a government's resources but also, and even more importantly, lead it into unfortunate actions which cause it to lose support at home and abroad. It seems to be almost a rule of public opinion that people are more prone to believe that a government is deliberately repressing worthy causes than to believe that these causes are being exploited for undisclosed political ends. If an organization is found to be a communist front, what is the best way of dealing with it, both in terms of effectiveness and with regard to worldwide and local psychological impact?

II

Dilemmas in other fields hamper the actions of governments, regardless of whether the states are newly emancipated or have never been colonized and whether or not they seek foreign aid and advice. At the head of the list are those which arise as a result of the communist strategy of trying to gain power first in the countryside. In most of the countries of Southeast Asia the issues involved here are very complicated and include long-term political factors as well as immediate administrative ones. Southeast Asian countries exhibit only to a limited extent the characteristics of the modern nation-states of the West. Their traditional notions of government rest on the dichotomy between central sovereignty and peripheral self-administration. Frontiers were not conceived as fixed lines until modern conditions produced maps requiring sharp definition or the state developed into a more identifiable entity. In China itself, the state consisted historically of a central throne whose authority in local affairs tended to diminish with distance; beyond the borderlands lesser states and petty principalities reflected China's image to a greater or less degree. Some broad areas between the various realms were in effect rulerless, inhabited by minority peoples lacking a central authority of their own but lending allegiance from time to time to one neighbor or another. Sometimes an energetic prince, or the Son of Heaven himself, would impose his authority for a time, but radical changes in the political balance were rare and short-lived.

Colonial administrators tended either to step into the shoes of traditional rulers, usurping their sovereignty outright, or to leave them undisturbed except to establish a paramount suzerainty

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which similarly found a place in local tradition. In either event, the relationship between subject and ruler remained essentially unchanged—especially over such matters as taxation (or tribute), labor and military service, and, in most of Southeast Asia, the regulation of irrigation.

All this is fully understood by the communists of Southeast Asia, if not by their "revisionist" brethren in Europe. After the general failure in the 1930s to achieve "proletarian revolution," the Asian communists formulated the idea of capturing the periphery and working back toward the centers of power. In other words, the revolution would now seek its "contradictions" and exploit conditions and issues in the borderlands and the outlying villages where a political vacuum prevailed and where the Leninist dynamic of struggle could be cultivated. "Contradictions" were not to be found exclusively in class conflicts, but wherever any type of social tensions could be built up—in religious differences, minority grievances, tribal rivalries, local ambitions or personal feuds. The revolutionary apparatus would find its bases far from the capital and gradually work inward against the government in the hope that after a number of years it would be strong enough either to assault the capital itself or bring the government to its knees in a protracted struggle. The application of this doctrine of "using the countryside to surround the towns" was perfected in the lands of Indochina during the 1950s and 1960s.

The first of the dilemmas it poses is that if urgent steps are taken by the government to fill the political vacuum in the borderlands by providing officials who can promote the welfare of the people as well as enforce law and order, the communists can represent this response as a policy of oppression. Because of the tradition of local autonomy and suspicion of outsiders, problems will arise even where officials are able and dedicated, which of course they frequently are not. On the other hand, if no such steps are taken and the area is left unoccupied by government forces, the vacuum, though relatively harmless in the past, will provide a field in which the revolutionaries can operate unhindered and where in addition they can claim that the government is ignoring and neglecting the people.

The second dilemma arises when a government resolves the first and decides it must take action in rural areas. In addition to the general need for modernization and public welfare felt

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in underdeveloped countries, defense of the state and the people in the face of a Marxist-Leninist bid for power necessitates new administrative undertakings. Should these be organized by the central government or entrusted to village or local government? If the administration is undertaken from the center there may be problems. Officials, possibly many from new agencies, with no experience and no precedents, little local knowledge and no established relationships, may descend on village leaders and the rural population. The resulting inefficiency may be compounded by resentment against the intruders; and there will be opportunities for corruption which may be difficult to detect in the novel situation. The whole attempt may become raw material for communist propaganda and blackmail.

Yet if the task is left to local authorities, in order to foster local government, inefficiencies of another sort are almost bound to occur: policies may not be fully understood; there may be no control to ensure that policy, if understood, is properly carried out; and almost certainly local officials will be inadequately trained to formulate and execute programs in accordance with the overall policy and strategy. Furthermore, there may be local corruption, which is no less reprehensible and no more acceptable publicly than under a centralized system and, in any case, is equally helpful to the communist cause.

While most governments usually resolve the first dilemma by deciding that some action must be taken in the rural areas, the second one is not so easily determined. There is no body of principle or experience to help a government decide to centralize or decentralize its effort, or to determine what the blend should be. The uncertainty often leads to switches of emphasis from one to the other with consequent loss of momentum and continuity—all to the advantage of the communists.

III

Another dilemma which receives considerable attention because of its ideological implications stems from a government's desire to obtain support while engaging in activities which may not be popular but may be necessary. It is assumed in the West that popular support can be won and held only by arousing mass enthusiasm for a cause. The communists, like most of the governments they are trying to overthrow in Southeast Asia, know that this assumption is largely untrue in their type of society. They

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aim to obtain total support in practical matters as they bring areas progressively under their control. They want to leave no time, energy or material resources for allocation to private priorities, no opportunity for individuals to opt out. More often than not, individual actions spring from fear or the hope of personal gain and less frequently from principle or belief. Even in the dedicated cadre, ambition and personal needs may be powerful motivations. The greater the anxiety not to be the odd man out, the more total popular support can be made. The involvement is often slow and subtle; contributions in money or kind, performance of errands and collection of intelligence grow ultimately into full commitment and enrollment in fighting units. In many cases, in Southeast Asia at least, conversion to the communist cause follows subversion to the movement.

Southeast Asian governments have a tendency, strongly encouraged by the Western world, to hold elections in order to prove that they are popular with the people and thus preferable to the communists, who also claim popular support. But parliamentary democracy is still relatively new to most people in Southeast Asia, and conditions of insurgency are not generally propitious for introducing it. If the elections are completely free, in the sense that the government does not vet the candidates (as communist governments vet theirs), then the insurgents can put up their own men and let it be known that, even though the government may guarantee secrecy of the individual ballot, there will be trouble for constituencies which do not elect them. What would actually happen in a Southeast Asian country that did try to introduce parliamentary democracy during counterinsurgency operations is a matter for conjecture, for it has never yet been achieved. It remains a dilemma how much democracy should and can be started or expanded by a government while it is engaged in a protracted conflict with a strong monolithic enemy.

IV

Dilemmas also exist in development, both economic and social; in practice they are difficult to separate from those that are political, and they are even more numerous. That the social and economic development processes summed up in the word "modernization" are good in themselves is not seriously disputed. But in practice, ordinary peasants often resent the details of its realization because of strong local beliefs, traditions and leadership

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which run counter to modern ideas. This dilemma is generally ignored or denied.

To many Western observers communist insurgents owe their hold over the masses to their promises to redress such grievances as social neglect, ethnic discrimination or economic exploitation. There is truth in this view, but it is only one among many factors. Many Southeast Asians, including ignorant peasants, understand better than Westerners that the communists who come into their midst are interested in their grievances not so much to right them as to exploit them as pretexts for seizing power. Moreover, not all alleged grievances are real; hence their redress is unlikely by itself to avert or halt a communist insurrection.

And yet, whatever the truth about "popular aspirations" and "popular support," a government which proposes to rule by consent of the ruled, signified even in the most general and vague fashion, must offer positive attractions of some kind. The political philosophies of ancient China and ancient India, which between them have shaped the outlook of Southeast Asia, are at one with modern Western thought on this point. The need for a government to appear responsive and popular would seem to be greater than ever when it inaugurates a new régime—one recently emancipated from colonialism, or seated in power by a coup d'état, or incorporating in itself unfamiliar institutions such as an elected parliament and a ministerial organization.

One path that may seem to avoid the dilemmas reviewed so far is to offer free social services or free bounty; that is to say, to make the fruits of development available to the outlying population without drawing on local resources and without introducing any measure that smacks of control. It is this contention and this policy which have provided, after the requirements of military defense, the most plausible argument in favor of massive American aid to the countries of Southeast Asia which are menaced by communist insurgency and unable to afford such a remedy for themselves. Yet it leads straight to yet another dilemma involving governmental civic action, perhaps the most confusing of all those considered here.

To see clearly its implications, we need to look again at the manner in which the communist fights. It is true that at times he fights like a boxer, but at other times he is more like a wrestler. The secret of wrestling is to fell one's adversary, not by means of his weakness and one's own strength, but by means of *his*

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strength, which by cunning and skill can be turned against him. In its early stages, a communist insurgency usually draws most of its money and its material resources, including weapons and ammunition, from or through the population it is subverting or intimidating. In Southeast Asia, especially in the borderlands, the population has been accustomed by centuries of experience both to a host of petty exactions, material and otherwise, and to buying off bandits and secret societies. It is a tradition that insurgency prospers on. But substantial external aid across a friendly frontier can be expected only after the insurgency has become sufficiently well established to make good use of such aid and to be able to cover up, through enforcing silence on its own people, the source of supply. It is a widespread misconception that because the inspiration, and even the direction, of an insurgency may be external, the source of supplies must also be external; or conversely, that when supplies clearly are local, it follows that the direction must also be indigenous and not from outside.

In reality, the Marxist-Leninists of the East not only take pride in winning power with a minimum contribution from their own side, but have found from experience that this is a more reliable road to victory. Besides concealing the directing hand, it leaves the door open to repudiation of unsuccessful insurgencies—like the one in Malaya. Also, surprising as this may sound at first, it has the psychological merit of appearing more convincing in peasant eyes.

It is the probable, not the desirable, that commands peasant support. If the conflict appears to be between two forces both sustained logistically from afar, then the outcome is likely to turn on the size of the investment each backer is prepared to put into it. What each will amount to cannot be told until the day of decision, so the peasant in his rice field will be cautious about committing himself. If, however, it is clear that one side is dependent on supplies from afar, and that the insurrectionists can leech off a fairly constant proportion by purchase, theft or capture, then it becomes only a question of patience and endurance (the true meaning of "protracted" in the Chinese phrase translated as "protracted war") until the cleverer insurgents exhaust the morale and the resources of their opponents.

The dilemma facing the defenders, who frequently cannot tell friend from foe, is now plain: whatever is done in the hope

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of convincing peasants that they have a vested interest in the victory of the established government, whatever improvements are made in social services or however much outright bounty is distributed, it will be seen that the insurgents are also benefiting; and thus the operation will be stripped of some of its persuasiveness. If measures are taken to avoid this situation, in which the insurgents are actually being supplied by their opponents—and they are most difficult and costly—they may be so oppressive or so poorly executed as to spoil the desired effect on the population. The dilemma is clear but not easily resolved: how to gain active popular support and help the people without helping the insurgents also.

V

The dilemmas inherent in civic-action programs are compounded when one considers foreign aid. In the first place, what we have just said about a Southeast Asian government's efforts to win the peasant's heart by providing benefits applies with even greater force to schemes visibly financed by a distant nation. The foreigners may leave at any time; they cannot play as enduring a role as that of the insurgents, who are local actors. Furthermore, foreign aid is just as subject to the leeching-off process as are the government's locally derived resources, and it may even be used as a means to avoid tax collection. This merely deprives the peasant of an excuse for not contributing to the insurgents' exchequer, for whatever he does not pay to the government he will be expected to pay, as a levied "voluntary" contribution, to the insurgents.

Another difficulty with foreign aid for an already harassed government is that it places on the administrative machinery an additional burden which in nearly every case is more than can immediately be borne. "Foreign aid corrupts," we are often told by critics. But corruption is unhappily a superficial symptom of the deeper problem resulting from accelerating the adjustment of the native culture, the native bureaucracy and traditional relations between administrators and administered to modern ways. Modernization is made both more difficult and more urgent by the communist challenge. A remedy may be sought in setting up parallel government agencies alongside the traditional ones, to operate in fields and at a tempo designed to meet that challenge and make use of foreign technical advice.

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But the psychological result will be that the impermanence of the operation will be emphasized in the public mind. Two additional dangers are that the ad hoc agencies will encounter envious opposition from the traditional bureaucrats, and that they themselves will acquire a vested interest in the perpetuation of the insurgency they are being employed to terminate.

There are no preordained outcomes to revolutionary warfare: recent history contradicts the faith of Mao Tse-tung in his own historical "science." Insurgency is a form of struggle which presents almost endless fresh chances to both sides. So long as the defense is alive to the true nature of the dilemmas described here, and is not diverted by falsely romantic views about how Marxism-Leninism works, the ability to match cunning with skill remains. If the difficulties are not understood, they are insuperable; once they are understood they can be resolved. All the dilemmas are practical and as neutral in an ethical sense as the laws of physics; only pragmatic statecraft and the instincts of the indigenous leadership can spot the means of solving them, case by case, moment by moment. And yet, idealism has played its part. Without it, American aid would not have flowed to developing and harassed countries and we would have no policy in Southeast Asia to argue about; the Marxist-Leninists would probably long since have had their way by default. Perhaps, in the end, the hardest of the dilemmas of counterinsurgency turns out to be the most ancient political dilemma of all: how to marry idealism to statecraft.

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THE NEW WORLD OF ASIA

By George Thomson

PROBLEMS loom larger in the world today than the power or the policies to solve them. The American decision to halt military escalation in Viet Nam; the British decision to withdraw from Singapore in 1971; the Russian decision to occupy Czechoslovakia; the French decision to devalue—these are not confident, controlled decisions foreseen or foreseeable as planned projections of previously defined policies and aspirations, or as consistent with the image each country sought to create of itself and for itself. They are adjustments to the unfulfilled or the unexpected. Similarly, the international organizations—the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Organization of American States, the Afro-Asian grouping—have found that new names do not dissolve old realities. The decline of the arrogance of idealist power is matched by the decline of the arrogance of military power, leaving a climate for mutually conceding and mutually beneficial compromises of interests. Leadership is at a discount: the crescendo of charismatic contrivance has passed even in Communist China, and none too soon; with it has gone the illusion of morally legitimate and psychologically satisfying fulfillment of inevitable and predictable destiny. A new generation of leaders capable of achieving an institutional and pragmatic fulfillment of previous promise has yet to emerge.

This turbulence at the turn of an historical tide occurs at a time when a new generation has come of age in a world of broken bench-marks. Half of the world's population is under 21 years of age, born since the end of the war of 1939–45. In the Asian context, they have been born since Gandhi's assassination. This is not merely a difference of background and a contrast of contemporary experience. The leaders of the world, mainly belonging to the generation over 50 years of age, were born near the end of the First World War, and lived through the hopes and delights of the 1920s, the world economic crisis, the rise of Fascism, Nazism and Communism, the Spanish Civil War, the collapse of the League of Nations, the failure to prevent a Second World War, and the disintegration of the old imperial power structure concentrated in the decade 1947–57. For the

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boys born in 1945, the problems of the world in which they live are complicated enough to cause war and put them into uniform. They know that war, with its simplistic psychology of solubility, is a symptom, not a solution, of certain strain and stress; and many, looking to Marcuse on the campus or to Guevara in the jungle, have retreated into the kind of rebellious romanticism of Rousseau, who contributed to the climate of revolution which brought a Robespierre and then a Napoleon in France.

On the clouded, crowded stage of the world today, the consequences of concurrent political, industrial and social revolutions, the simultaneous summation of revolutions which the West created and experienced in series, are being judged by the people of the new states by their pragmatic results rather than by their professed principles. To reverse the old dictum: when justice appears to be done, justice is done. Historically, it is at a time when the West, Hamlet-like, is most divided and despondent that the new countries, in their search for modernization, seek to absorb the explosively evolved experience of the developed countries into their own patterns of ideas and institutions.

Since the end of the most revolutionary of wars, that of 1939–45, we have misjudged or misdefined the essence and extent of its explosive effect, and, therefore, the complexity and the magnitude of the postwar task of building a new basis, a new structure and a new balance for today's newest of worlds.

The War of 1939–45 was indeed a World War, with every continent feeling the threat if not the fact of war, and with participants from every continent, each with their distinct and explicit expectations from the outcome. Yet the great powers, whose pattern of thought dominated the peacemaking by defining the purpose and the justification of that war, thought not in terms of the discontinuity created by their own success but in terms of the continuity of their own aspirations and interests. These had been conceived by the United States and the Soviet Union in their isolationist and idealist years between the wars and were deceptively defined in universalized terms, each according to its ideology. America, the "Associated Power" after 1917, and Russia, the disassociated power after 1917, became the dominant war powers of 1942–45; and if Clemenceau and Lloyd George, representing European interests, were to outmanœuvre President Wilson at Versailles, Franklin Roosevelt and Stalin aimed to set the pace of peace at Yalta. Stalin on the

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defeat of Japan was more concerned to erase the humiliation of Russian defeat in 1905 than with the future implications of the atomic mushroom over Hiroshima. Although there was more realism at the creation of the United Nations than at the creation of the League of Nations, as illustrated by the downgrading of the founding document from a Convenant to a Charter, this realism was a projection of the past rather than an anticipation of the future.

Applying the lessons of its own success and of the failings of its predecessors in power, the United States confidently took over the responsibility for the effective use of the power it superabundantly had; the ideals of the Atlantic Charter, broadened to an Asian-African Charter, would replace those of "Das Kapital" as they had those of "Mein Kampf." In 1945, there was a feeling of success in finding, in the second attempt, the correct solution to the problem of an essentially unchanged world; and the Allied Powers having won the greatest war by any standards, not least those of the mobilization of men, materials and mechanism, felt that man was at last in control of his future and could surely achieve the greatest, the longest and the best peace. Yet Viet Nam 24 years later does not fit this picture.

Stalin at Yalta pursued the policy that One Socialism in One Country was on the way to One Socialism in One World; yet in 1969, Peking and Prague are unpredictable problems for Moscow. Churchill's Gibbonish growl that he had not become Prime Minister to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire proved to be a personal opinion rather than a national policy when his Fabian successor, Attlee—by giving independence to India and Pakistan—reduced by 75 percent the greatest empire the world had ever seen. As the Malay proverb has it, when the elephant breaks through the stockade, the lesser animals will follow.

These changes were not temporary aberrations of an old world, but permanent manifestations of a new world which needed to be understood by the great powers which created it and which must ensure its survival. The dissolution by presence of mind of the British Empire which had been created, to use Professor Seeley's classic phrase, "in a fit of absentmindedness," is one of the greatest revolutions of power-structure of all time, destroying irrevocably the congenial climate of imperial ideas and the operative calculus of imperial power. The euphonious and

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euphoric British phrases of Commonwealth fulfillment and coöperation in a pattern of constitutional change, still symbolized by a redefined British Crown, masked the revolutionary change in the pattern of world power. The world role of the British navy and of sterling as the currency of half the world; the rights of Commonwealth citizens in the United Kingdom now under frenetic discussion; the validity of British passports and of the promise of Palmerstonian protectiveness, as in the historic Don Pacifico case—all presupposed British power to hold, after the dissolution of imperial institutions, its primacy of leadership, obligation and capacity.

In fact, whatever the United Kingdom had been, it had now become a nation of 50,000,000 people which was required to redefine its aims and reassess its strength—strategic, diplomatic and economic—in national rather than imperial terms. The logic was expressed by Mr. Harold Wilson in his speech at the Guildhall in November 1968, when he said that in the Commonwealth "Britain had also achieved its independence among the 28 sovereign members." But British policy gives the appearance of minimal and reluctant adjustment to technically unforeseeable and morally undeserved external pressures rather than a necessary redefinition of image and ideas and restructuring of institutions in terms of a nation.

The age of Empire is past; and the age of nation-state has emerged. Out of the 11 empires of this century came the new nations and the 126 members of the United Nations. The U.N. Charter was originally signed by 51 states, the sum total of the roll of freedom at the time. In 24 years, 75 have been added to that roll—making more than have ever existed at any time since men thought and spoke in terms of nation-states. This is indeed a population explosion in the birth of nations. Only Russia and Portugal retain their imperial gains, though not unchallenged. Power has been both reallocated and dispersed, and the units of political decision have multiplied in number and their contrasts of size magnified. China's population today is 750,000,000, twice as large as that of the British Empire at its peak on Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee; the smallest member of the United Nations has a population of less than 100,000.

The political contours of the map of the world have been transformed. The high imperial mountain ranges have collapsed; a large number of isolated hills, and among them the

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high isolated peaks of the two superpowers, have emerged, while two other peaks, China and India, are rising. Round the great powers are foothills or piedmonts of power. It is as if the Andes and the Himalayas were to sink in a geographical seismic revolution and new compensating contours were to arise from the plains. Just as what was geographically visible would be accepted, analyzed and adjusted to, and from the new map new routes of travel would be evolved, there must be a parallel adjustment to the new political map.

Four of these major changes in the pattern of power are illustrated by, and focused on, Southeast Asia. There the intelligence and the will of the world to adjust ideas and policies to the revolutionary changes of strategic and political infrastructure which have already taken place are under experimental testing.

They are: the change of focus to the area of Asia and its two oceans; the problem of great-power status without an imperial infrastructure; the problems of nation-building which confront more than half the nations of the world; and the problems of building a stable balance of power out of the new pattern of multiple national power of the post-imperial age. Power, having been dispersed, must be harmonized before it can be harnessed to whatever purpose mankind defines for itself.

II

Because the maps of the schoolrooms of the '30s dominate the decisions of the men of the '60s, the Asian-centered world is the most decisive change, and the most difficult to accept.

Asia's population is nearly 60 percent of the world's population. If China and India alone were to go to war, nearly 40 percent of the people of the world would be at war, more than were involved in the so-called First World War. It is an area of new problems, which past books or past diplomatic files have neither defined nor wrestled with; and these problems are faced by new leaders with new administrative organizations and acting in the name of peoples who for the first time are actively and consciously associated with these problems. This is not a new dimension of an old world; this is a new world with a new focus.

Basic to an understanding of Asian problems is that Asia is one continent but a continent of two oceans, the Indian and the Pacific. As it develops, it must look southwards and seawards. The high Himalayas, the inhospitable Tibetan plateau and the

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deep ravines through which all the great rivers of Asia flow to their fertile deltas and the sea, have kept India and China apart. It is only now that India and China have become in any real sense adjacent, although it is not yet possible to travel by road or rail between the twin foci of Asian history and politics—Delhi and Peking. The pattern of military roads is changing this but overland transport can never develop as a quick and cheap route for mass transport. There was the mediæval northern silk route—long, difficult and dangerous; the North of Asia is now part of Russia, which occupies more Asian real estate than any other political unit on the continent and which hitherto has insulated itself ideologically and strategically. With new road patterns planned from Moscow through Afghanistan and beyond, and with non-communist airlines (JAL the first) being allowed to fly across Siberia, Russia may seek to build herself into the world pattern of communications. But time and costs of construction and of operation are not likely to allow land transport to compete (unless strategic calculations supervene) with the traditional and cheaper communication by the sea to the south.

And it is more than symbolic that the British withdrawal from Singapore is visualized in naval rather than military or air-force terms. In Stalin's classic classification of states as land and sea animals, Asian states are land animals; and Asia and Africa are as vulnerable to foreign naval power today as when Vasco da Gama found the "soft underbelly" of Asia (to adopt Winston Churchill's wartime phrase from its European context) and outflanked Asia's land defenses, which only Alexander the Great had penetrated. Whether for peace or war, the last dimension of indigenous Asian power, the sea, is beginning to be developed.

Its focal position in Asia forms the world aspect of the problems of Southeast Asia, 60 percent of whose area is sea, 60 percent of whose population lives on islands, all of whose capital cities except Vientiane are accessible from the sea, and whose basic pattern of communications, to realize the wealth of its islands and peninsulas, must be by sea. Lying astride the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, no major Asian power can be disinterested in Southeast Asia's control of Asia's major arterial highway, which runs through the Straits of Malacca. Already Japan must bring over 80 percent of its oil supply from the Middle East by this route, and it has signed an agreement to bring iron ore from India. A 230,000-ton tanker has already berthed in

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Singapore, and as it found difficulty in negotiating the shallow waters of the Straits of Malacca, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have been engaged since January in a joint survey of the Straits. And with 400,000-ton tankers on the drawing board, cheap, bulk transport by sea is established as an essential element of Asia's emerging economy.

Though the Pacific and Indian Oceans may be seen as Asian and African waters, it does not follow that Africa is seen as the eastern limit of a Western-controlled Atlantic or that Asia is seen as the western limit of an American-controlled Pacific. In this context, there emerges clearly the crucial problem of the Indian Ocean, the real power vacuum which is revealed, though not created, by the British withdrawal from the illusion of control of the past decade. The Russian flotillas in the Indian Ocean in 1968 and exploratory visits by American fleet units, with continuing Polaris submarine patrols, concern power and not prestige. They serve notice that the arch of British power from South Africa to Australia, with India as the coping stone, requires the concern of the new architects of new power, whether or not the builders are the countries surrounding the ocean, with or without naval assistance from outside the area. But as the Afro-Asian ocean, in a world which has made Afro-Asia conceptually a reality, the Indian Ocean is a vacuum which cannot be left unfilled.

Russia's growing interest derives from her own marine transport from the Black Sea to Vladivostok; and her wish—and that of the other East European powers—to play a part in the Asian economy as buyer, seller and carrier gives long-term projection to her short-term interests involved in the Viet Nam conflict and its effect on her relations with China. Russia has no wish to see the Straits of Malacca under the control of China, or any other great power which could deny their use to her.

Australia too is a child of the two oceans—the Indian and the Pacific. If the sea channels through Southeast Asia are blocked, the link of the two oceans must run south of Australia, which is looped irrevocably into the magnetic field of Asian urgency or turbulence, with all the limitations it imposes on Australia's options. With its cluster of population on the Pacific-oriented coast, it feels protected by the United States in that ocean. Yet West Australia, where its newly discovered mineral resources are concentrated, faces onto the Indian Ocean, without Aus-

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tralia's defense commitments having been adjusted to its two-ocean orientation. The wish of Malaysia and Singapore for joint defense arrangements with Australia stems not only from a wish to retain old friends, or to perpetuate a relationship of Commonwealth origin, but from their joint interest in contributing to stability in the insular area between the two oceans of which Australia is a geopolitical part. The policies of insular Australia, however continental the country's dimensions, cannot be based purely on a Pacific orientation.

III

More nations are a-building today than ever previously existed in world history, and this is essentially a political problem, in true lineal descent from the Greek concept of building an organic "polis," a common way of life. This involves a choice both of pattern and process, and a fulfillment both of normative as well as constructive politics, as when Richard Henry Lee spoke for the 13 United Colonies in saying that "they are and of right *ought to be* free and independent states."

The lack of new political ideas today, compared with the period from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, masks the fact that this is the most political period of human history, when more men organized in more units are making more contemporaneous experiments in nation-building in more cultural contexts than ever before. And these nations are the new basic units through whose success alone the new world can be built. Nations are not happening; they are, with varying degrees of success, being laboriously built out of colonial units. A nation is a new focus of loyalty, a new core of cohesion, a new integration of interests, a new center of decision-making and a new way of life. A nation requires intellectual definition, emotional attunement and practical embodiment. As against the individual or communal basis of a past colonial society and an alternative basis of future unity in class or creed or color, the political nation-state must establish itself by coming to terms with other foci of loyalty. National politics, a national economy and a national culture must be simultaneously and harmoniously planned.

There must be broader-based and more productive national economies to prevent the revolution of rising expectations from becoming, in the words of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's Prime Minister, "the revolution of rising frustrations." And

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there must be a commonly shared way of life, satisfying the people internally, and distinctive from the ways of other nations. This change from colony to nation is a revolution in political fundamentals requiring the state to define aims, take initiatives and administer and finance new policies and institutions. And as the people were essentially involved in the process by which pressure was brought on the colonial régime to withdraw, their past routine has been disturbed and their future expectations are roused. As the chorus in the drama of creating nationalism, they remain on stage for its fulfillment. Their participation in creating power and their anticipation of the fruits of power make for turbulence in the process, and the magnitude of the problem of meeting their needs makes for difficulty and delay in the achievement.

The process of nation-building is forward-looking, and countries with inherited traditions must adjust to the new types of leadership and to the new role of the ordinary man, whether as worker, fighter, voter or consumer. They must also adjust to the social changes of urbanization and modernization necessary for the deployment and enjoyment of the new technological forces. Confucius is in conflict with Maoist Marxism, Gandhi's spinning wheel with the textile machines of Ahmadabad, whose owners financed the Congress Party.

The process of change has been the more complicated in Southeast Asia because, in addition to traditional indigenous differences, four empires had brought there four European traditions and languages. India had been united by the British Raj and knew one foreign language and one tradition of law, language, political ideas and institutions. These they used to get independence in unity (with the exception of Pakistan). But Southeast Asia was divided by its languages and political inheritances from the British, Dutch, French and Spanish-cum-American empires. Anticolonialism did not inherit or create regional unity. Mutual assistance was minimal. In this setting Thailand, which had never been a colony, has been the catalyst and core of regionalism.

The nations of Southeast Asia also illustrate that the method by which power is achieved determines the method by which it continues to operate. As India continues, though with less success, to be governed by the Congress Party under Mrs. Gandhi, so in Indonesia, Sukarno, who always appeared in uniform, was suc-

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ceeded by General Suharto. In the Philippines power was achieved by political leaders in the American tradition, and so it continues; in Singapore, control gained by a political defeat of the communists continues to prove the effectiveness of political power; while Malaysia, uncertain of its inheritance, contains elements of both a multiracial political basis for power and a monoracial military base.

Southeast Asia also illustrates the difficulties of nations re-emerging within boundaries derived from the accidents of imperial rule. None of the boundaries of Southeast Asia are the expressions of Southeast Asian history, nor were there settled pre-colonial boundaries to which to return. Sabah and West Irian are outstanding cases of disputes based on Western antecedents. Indonesia's basic claim to West Irian is as successor-state to the Dutch, while Cambodia inherits from the proud days of Angkor Wat its differences with Thailand and Viet Nam—held in abeyance during the colonial era. With such significant minority groups in so many nations of Southeast Asia the passive multiracialism of an expatriate colonial régime must be transformed into the active multiracialism of an indigenous national régime.

Thus in Southeast Asia more indigenous and colonial traditions are at work than in any other comparable area in the world, and the richer the mix the more difficult the sorting. Here are illustrated the problems of nation-building in all their varied complexity, whether of size, as between Indonesia with its 112 million and Singapore with its 2 million, or of pattern of politics —military, communist or parliamentary. National salvation is being sought by self-isolation, by alliance with an external great power, by regional association and by striving for a balance of world and regional power which minimizes the risks of war and maximizes economic opportunity. Learning from European experience, Southeast Asia does not want to be Balkanized, when its combined population of 250,000,000 could give it the weight of a great power. Nor, after watching 27 years of war-clouds over Viet Nam, does it wish to be the "Cockpit of Asia."

IV

Each new political unit first seeks the sovereignty of itself, then seeks security and strength in new voluntary associations to replace the involuntary associations of empire. Association by

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geographical contiguity was accepted in Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, which sanctioned the sub-internationalism (or super-nationalism) of regionalism. This reflected American policy in South America, as well as the hard experience of the nations which emerged in 1919 from the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In accordance with the old pattern of empire, association continued, out of old habits or new incentives, between the colonies-become-nations and the former metropolitan countries. Finally, the climate of the cold war dramatically and urgently suggested at least the short-term need for ideological and military alignment.

But to assume that these were other than provisional alignments ignored the psychology of new-born states, as it was expressed by George Washington (for a nation which Professor Seymour Lipset has suggestively described as the "First New Nation") in the classic argument of his Farewell Address. For Washington in 1797 or for Nehru in 1947, nonalignment was a policy of self-withdrawal and disinvolvement as a necessary preliminary to self-discovery and self-fulfillment; and only through experiencing the vulnerability of self-defense and the limitations of self-subsistence did the new states come to realize the disparity between their capabilities and their interests and aspirations. To remedy these hitherto intractable incapacities they seek voluntarily chosen and interest-oriented alignment. Paradoxically it is the most aligned nations which have achieved least in self-reorganization; they have sought insurance against change by alignment in defense of the status quo. It may well be that today's aligned nations may become the nonaligned nations of tomorrow, when the normalcy of change finds a congenial climate or becomes an irresistible urge; while today's nonaligned may become the more aligned because their alignments will then be an expression of proven indigenous urges and needs.

In the face of indigenous and imperial traditions of division, Southeast Asia has graduated to regionalism both in membership and in the purposes of its regional organizations.

SEATO, set up on September 8, 1954, declared itself a "Collective Defense Treaty," an exercise of Dullesian desperation after the Geneva Conference accepted the logic, both in French politics and international relations, of the battle of Dien Bien Phu. It was in fact a military alliance seeking diplomatic justification. It was a temporary alliance hoping it contained seeds of

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permanence. It was an alliance *about* Southeast Asia, for with only two of its eight members being in Southeast Asia, it could not be an alliance *of* Southeast Asia. Nor was it so defined, for its declaration of principles was called "The Pacific Charter."

The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), established July 31, 1961, by Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines was the first regional grouping all of whose members were Southeast Asian and whose horizon was regional. The inaugural declaration explicitly stated that the Association "is in no way connected with any outside power and is directed against no other country." But it represented a consensus of conservatism by states contented with the status quo.

Maphilindo, established by the Manila Declaration of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia in 1963, was essentially a racially divisive alliance in a multiracial area—a projection of Sukarno's guided democracy into Southeast Asia made possible by its value to President Macapagal as an Asian counterbalance to American influence.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which replaces ASA and Maphilindo, is the largest purely regional grouping yet. It includes 80 percent of the people of Southeast Asia; it includes all the nations of the Southern tier; and it includes the island and peninsular states at a time when the seas are of growing strategic and economic importance. For the first time, Indonesia, which has half the population of Southeast Asia, has accepted a regional role on terms of equality; and as it is an alliance which includes Thailand, it links the twin centers of Southeast Asian history. Burma and Cambodia declined membership, but its doors are open to both and to Viet Nam. It gives the right priority to economic purposes and aims to go no further than the immediate national interests of its members will allow; it seeks regionalism as an extension of nationalism, and it recognizes that the countries of the region must accept the primary if not the sole responsibility for their security and prosperity. In short, it is the fruit of past experience and present necessity.

V

The problems of the great powers are no less new and distinctive. Nor are they made more precise in definition or amenable to solution by being considered in terms of the past imperial pat-

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tern of world power. It made sense for Britain in her heyday to find sobering yet satisfying similarities with the Roman Empire, but it makes less sense to analyze the present power patterns of the United States or the U.S.S.R. in terms of European empires now dismantled. When the Indians in the Mutiny said, "British, go home!", the slogan had no sounding board of world opinion and was ruthlessly rejected; and the logic of Lucknow in 1858 was the logic of Amritsar in 1919. Authority was imperium, with a majesty of its own over the people, not from the people.

Powers continue to be Great, and there still remain the problems of the arrogances and diffidences of power; of the responsibility of the power-rich to the power-poor; and of the relationship of large powers to small powers which contribute to world opinion and which are parts of one whole, yet cannot, and will not, passively or involuntarily, be fitted into the pattern of others in the interest of others and under the compulsion of others. These are problems of hegemony in the original Greek sense of "leadership" and they are set in the new climate and context of international power relationships. Bentham defined political power in terms of the habit of obedience, and empire was a school of habitual obedience.

Now persuasiveness sets the path to power. The new climate differs in that obedience is no longer habitual, nor does it exist as a relevant attitude in idea or in fact. Smaller nations follow greater, according to their assessment of their own interests. But the power is not institutionalized as in empire; it remains contingent on mutual interests or expediency and cannot have the climate of permanency with which empire deluded itself. Whitehall in the nineteenth century could act in the delusion of dominion—but neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. today is allowed to have an illusion of permanency, any more than such illusions would be consistent with realistic fulfillment of their long-term interests. Great powers face the anxieties rather than the arrogance of power.

Building persuasive power in the precinct of the world, in which the list of voters grows, requires an acceptance by the great powers of a wariness toward the "haves" of power and also the "have-nots" in seeking and safeguarding their separate national identities.

These problems are focused in the Viet Nam war, which can be variously defined as a problem in the exercise of the relation-

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ship of great powers, one of Bismarckian dimensions and complexities; or as a problem of the prolonged gestation of a nation; or as a problem arising from the lack of regional ideals and institutions. For the United States the Vietnamese war could be as crucial in its development as a great power as the Boer War was for Britain. For her in the latter part of the nineteenth century even the Gladstonian doubts of dominion did not dim the delights of domination. The tide, however, turned with the Boer War. For all her imperial and industrial power, Britain could not defeat a small rebellious group of Boer guerrillas; she stood friendless, impotent and criticized in the world, suffering the economic drain of her resources and the political drain of her prestige. For the Boer War, Kipling wrote his "Recessional" with its rueful refrain "Lest We Forget." In the light of the Boer War, the radical J. A. Hobson wrote his critical analysis of imperialism, without which Lenin would not have developed his international projection of Marxist anti-capitalism as the opposition to imperialism, against which the workers of the world could unite. The gloom of empire cast its shadow over the glory of empire; and the working class in the ascendance, through Lloyd George and later the Labor Party, preferred the price of welfare to the price of warfare.

Similarly, America is experiencing the difficulties and dangers of power. The introvert isolationism desired during the creation of power in the 1930s has become the undesired extrovert isolationism of the expenditure of power of the 1960s. Britain's use of her institutionalized imperial power gives no guidance to America as to the new style of power which it must learn and live. In 1941, the United States involuntarily and integrally entered the Second World War in response to Pearl Harbor, bringing its ideals of the Atlantic Charter to the Pacific. In 1950, it was the pacesetter for the ideals of the United Nations in the policy and practice of the Korean War. But involvement in the Viet Nam war has been neither involuntary, integral nor international; and the war has brought neither the psychological satisfactions nor political prestige of victory. There will neither be an aloof, arbitral peace as in the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 nor a unilateral, victorious, slate-wiping peace as in 1919 or 1945; there will be a peace on points at best. America has learned the price of the responsibility of power: in the use of its economic resources, in the impossibility of winning worldwide popularity,

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and in the need to choose between internal and external priorities.

On the other hand, America, caught between two oceans, must have a two-ocean outlook and policy. It can withdraw from neither nor from both. Yet historically and culturally it is predominantly Europe-oriented and draws unrealistic distinctions between policies toward Asia and Europe. Those who argue against the presence of American troops on the Asian mainland accept the presence of American troops on the European mainland. It was a reflection of the attitudes of both states that when President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev held talks in 1962, they met in Vienna in the shade of the Congress of 1815. Instinctively, the United States and the Soviet Union look toward one another across Europe. Yet had they met in the Bering Straits they would have reminded themselves, and demonstrated to the world, that only in the North Pacific are the two countries visible to each other. Vladivostok is as near American territory as is Hawaii; and Hawaii, in turn, is as far from the American mainland as the Azores in the Atlantic.

Does the United States, reflecting past attitudes, see itself as the extended front of a European bastion, or as a mediator and moderator in time and space between the world of the Atlantic and the world of the Pacific? Is it the Newer World between the Old World and that Newest World of the Asian-Pacific area? Asia must not be seen as an area of temporary, peripheral and abnormal relationships in contrast to Europe as an area of permanent, basic and normal relationships. The question is not whether America should build up a stronger, more equal and more varied web of relationships within the political neighborhood of the Pacific, but how quickly and how effectively. To quote Singapore's Foreign Minister, Mr. S. Rajaratnam, in a speech of March 1966 to the Singapore Institute of International Affairs: "In the Pacific the nations of the world could learn how to build truly a world civilization through coöperation and peaceful competition."

Russia, too, is inextricably involved as China becomes the focus of the problem of the Asian Balance of Power, for the U.S.S.R. owns more Asian real estate than any purely Asian power and depends increasingly on Asian seas for communication between the parts of its own territory, for trading its surplus, for widening the range of consumer purchases and for the food from its two oceans. As a great power it seeks to be wherever the

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Americans can be, and in so doing it is learning that it is the greatness of power itself and not the declared purpose of power which causes apprehension, that it is an expensive and hazardous role to play and that it cannot win universal friendship in a world of national interests. And Soviet power in the world, especially the communist world, requires the containment, voluntary or involuntary, of China. Thus Peking, having wished to expel one policeman from Southeast Asia, has succeeded in establishing two. If America has decided it cannot be the world's one policeman, with the burden of cost and of criticism the role entails, there is now a second policeman, if it can afford the cost and accept the criticism. And in the mutual vigilance of the United States and the Soviet Union, and in the climate of being assessed by the smaller powers, may lie a temporary pattern of power, till a coöperative, collective, regional, self-policing force emerges in Southeast Asia.

The process of solving the problems of nation-building and regional coöperation among the new nations of Southeast Asia would be long and difficult, even if Southeast Asia were left alone. But with the continental and ocean pressures of the great powers converging on the area, the difficulties are increased. International, regional and national problems overlap. There the world is on trial.

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INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY AND FOREIGN AID

By Edward R. Fried

BEFORE the end of this year, the Special Drawing Rights machinery of the International Monetary Fund should come into operation, ushering in a new era of multilaterally created international reserves. This is no small matter. The international community has not heretofore created anything so deadly serious as money.

Nor will creation begin on a niggling scale. The principal financial countries agreed in July to support activation of $9.5 billion in this new international money over the next three years, and the other members of the Fund will surely go along with this decision. This quite respectable sum adds new interest to an old issue: Is it practical to link a man-made stream of liquidity to foreign aid? At a time of faltering foreign aid, the issue takes on added importance.

It is an intriguing question. Nevertheless, it should not obscure the fact that the primary interest of all countries—rich and poor alike—lies in the success of Special Drawing Rights as a basic reform of the international monetary system, and specifically, as a means of avoiding growing restrictions on trade, aid and investment. From this standpoint, the new reserves will come none too soon. Gold and dollars have dried up as sources of new international liquidity.

Gold fell victim to the persistently held speculative dogma that the monetary price would have to rise. This credo was so stubbornly believed that in recent years new gold production went largely into private hands—as a bet on a rise in price—rather than to monetary reserves. During the four months of speculative madness that followed devaluation of sterling in November 1967, the international monetary system actually lost over $3 billion in gold reserves to the private market. When the active gold-pool countries decided in March 1968 to insulate monetary gold from these private pressures, the drain stopped. Under the two-tier arrangement they set up, the world's stock of monetary gold is kept virtually stable, remaining by far the largest single element in total reserves, but new gold production is for all practical purposes demonetized. It moves haltingly,

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but inexorably, into the market to satisfy the variety of demands for gold as a commodity, at whatever price these demands will support. It is no longer, however, a serious potential source of new international liquidity.

Dollars as an international reserve followed a somewhat similar course, but more by circumstance than by explicit arrangement. Some years ago, a number of the principal European central bankers began to lose enthusiasm about adding to their official dollar holdings, preferring gold instead. While by no means universal among industrial countries, this attitude existed on a sufficiently wide scale to force the United States to finance a large share of its balance-of-payments deficits in gold. Official holdings of dollars, which had risen steadily through the postwar period, reached what appeared to be a ceiling about five years ago—even while private uses of the dollar continued to grow in international trade and payments. When the United States achieved a substantial balance-of-payments surplus on an official-settlements basis in 1968–69, these official dollar holdings abroad were sharply drawn down. Thus, the course of events for both gold and dollars as international money put pressure on the reserves of the principal industrial countries, with potentially serious consequences for world trade and income.

This is the kind of contingency the financial experts had in mind when they laboriously worked out the plan for creating a new international money. Special Drawing Rights, or SDRs, will do what gold and dollars are no longer doing—make it possible for world reserves to grow as production and trade grow, and thereby remove a source of pressure on the principal industrial countries to adopt unnecessarily restrictive policies. Moreover SDRs will do the job better. Gold and dollars, in recent years, were added to reserves as the haphazard consequence of uncertain factors; SDRs, by contrast, will be issued on a regular and carefully calculated basis. And, unlike gold, SDRs will be created without cost in real resources.

By any standard, therefore, issuance of SDRs will mark the auspicious launching of a most important international undertaking. Nevertheless, a gnawing question exists. If the international community can create money by fiat, why should the lion's share be distributed to rich countries? Or, putting aside this issue of alleged inequity, is it possible to use the new machinery to carry forward two internationally agreed and criti-

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cally important objectives at the same time? Can SDRs, either directly or indirectly, be a significant source of development finance without impairing their primary function of ensuring adequate international liquidity?

For more than a decade a number of economists who foresaw the need for new sources of international liquidity—most notably Sir Maxwell Stamp and Robert Triffin—advanced proposals to link the creation of new reserve assets with the means to finance economic development. Indeed, the government financial experts who did the spadework which resulted in SDRs looked into the possibilities of establishing such a link. The Congressional Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments consistently advocated careful exploration of these possibilities. In the end, the financial authorities of the industrial countries rejected this approach, deciding that the new instrument could not serve two masters. But neither in their deliberations nor in the specific provisions of the new facility did they rule out the possibility that, once SDRs were created for liquidity needs, and with the amounts determined solely on this criterion, they might subsequently serve as a means of mobilizing funds for economic development.

It is well worth looking into this possibility. Long-term, untied, low-interest capital is a key determinant of development prospects. It is the most urgently needed, the most difficult, politically, for donor governments to provide, and an endless source of burden-sharing controversy in international negotiations. The experience of the World Bank's International Development Association succinctly demonstrates the case. IDA can effectively lend far more capital than the donor countries have been willing to subscribe. Could SDRs change this on a scale that would put new life into the world's development business?

II

A qualified yes is a reasonable answer to that question—even as the SDR system is now structured. But that answer presupposes growing domestic understanding of a slippery set of issues and the success of a complicated international negotiation.

Distribution of SDRs is now made in proportion to a country's quota in the International Monetary Fund. This provision gives the industrial countries almost three-fourths of all SDRs created and will give them, as a group, average receipts of $2.3 billion

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a year over the next three years. These SDRs will appear in official accounts as incoming assets for which no payment will have been made. The offsetting bookkeeping liability must be invented; in the United States it will take the form of a contingent liability in case the United States withdraws from the scheme or if the entire facility is liquidated.

For present purposes, however, another adjustment must be made. The rules provide in effect that 70 percent of any country's total SDR receipts represents a non-repayable claim on the resources of other countries. Allowing for this, the industrial countries over the next three years will be receiving an average of $1.5 billion a year in unconditional reserves—fully equivalent to the receipt of gold or any acceptable currency.

Instead of receiving these non-repayable reserves free, as is now the case, these countries could agree to invest an equal amount of their currencies in subscriptions or loans to IDA along the lines of a number of recent proposals, most notably a suggestion made by Italian Minister of Finance Colombo at the 1968 annual meeting of the Bank and Fund. Doing this would not affect the reserve position of these countries as a group, since the funds they loaned or subscribed to IDA would come back in payment for goods and services purchased from them by the developing countries. These purchases could not be expected to follow the same pattern as the IDA subscriptions of individual countries; consequently, some industrial countries would gain and some lose reserves as a result of this first round of transactions. Or, put differently, the effect of this procedure on the reserve positions of individual countries would be a different distribution of SDRs from that called for by their IMF quotas.

The impact on economic development could be substantial. It would make possible an almost four-fold increase in IDA's resources, which would then constitute roughly one-fourth of current official development finance. On a scale of $1.5 billion a year, IDA long-term, low-interest loans could be a strong foundation and stimulus for bilateral and other multilateral aid programs. The debt-servicing problem which now hangs over development finance would become much more manageable.

III

Perhaps the clearest argument for linking receipts of SDRs to the provision of foreign aid rests on this chain of reasoning:

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As an international reserve, SDRs, or "paper gold," are the equal of commodity gold.

In the past, countries added commodity gold to world monetary reserves by paying goods and services to gold producers.

SDRs are a substitute for gold. Being cost-free they will make possible a substantial saving in real resources for the international community.

Rich countries could reasonably be asked to forgo their share of this saving and let it accrue to the benefit of poor countries. They could do this by earning paper gold in the same way they formerly earned commodity gold that was added to world reserves.

Thus, where the production of commodity gold gives rise to income for capital and labor in gold mines, the production or activation of paper gold would give rise to resources that would be channeled through IDA to support an internationally agreed objective—economic development.

Moving in this direction would have political attractions, both domestic and international. For one thing, it would be easier to obtain approval in the U.S. Congress and in parliaments abroad to finance IDA in this form, since there would not need to be a budgetary appropriation. If this seems like a painless form of foreign aid, the reason lies neither in subterfuge nor legerdemain, but in the mechanics of the system: governments will be receiving monetary assets without having to pay for them. They can sterilize their SDR allocations. Or they can pledge them to the Federal Reserve Bank for cash—as is usually done to finance incoming gold reserves—and thus obtain the funds to support IDA without a budgetary appropriation. Too much should not be made of this curiosity. A transfer of resources to the developing countries would indeed take place, and this, in a very real sense, would constitute a tax on the industrial countries. Nevertheless, it would be no different than the burden a society imposes on itself when it chooses to add to its gold reserves—a burden which also is not financed through the budgetary process. And in the final analysis, the burden of such a tax would depend on whether the industrial countries at the time would otherwise have used the resources and the industrial capacity going into these exports.

Internationally, an arrangement of this kind could ease some of the political frictions that lie beneath the surface of the new reserve facility—specifically those relating to the system of distributing SDRs among the participating countries. Differences over this issue should not be exaggerated, and the debate, sensibly enough, has been carried on in low key. Once the system goes

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into operation and SDRs are established as a first-rank international reserve, however, the tone may become more strident.

One source of friction is the controversy over SDR distribution between industrial and developing countries. The poor countries argue that the principal financial powers, who after all were primarily responsible for drawing up the plan and who have the voting muscle in the Fund, stacked the deck in their favor. The industrial countries reply that this charge stems from a misunderstanding about the purpose of the system. SDRs are designed to finance flows that will reverse themselves over time, not a continuing one-way transfer of resources; basing distribution on IMF quotas, while not perfect, is at least a reasonable, and certainly the best available, approximation of each country's need for international liquidity. This is an essentially fruitless controversy, but linking SDRs to development finance would very effectively end it. The industrial countries would continue to receive the bulk of the liquidity and the developing countries would receive resources for development.

Second, the distribution system also gives rise to some jockeying for position among the industrial countries. Surplus countries now show a new-found interest in increasing their individual quotas in the Fund, which, of course, would entitle them to a larger share in future SDR allocations. This is all to the good as far as liquidity is concerned, but the bickering, if carried too far, could be destructive. This problem would also tend to diminish if industrial countries took on the obligation to provide capital to IDA as a counterpart to their SDR allocations.

Arguments against link proposals, developed over a decade or so of discussion, traditionally followed three lines: these proposals would make it more difficult to negotiate a satisfactory system of creating reserves; they would interfere with the operation of such a system and eventually cause it to collapse; and they are wrongly conceived, since they seek to relate operationally two logically separate issues, each of which on political grounds should be faced and decided on its own merits.

All this was serious reason for caution. If consideration of the two issues together did indeed stand in the way of timely and effective monetary reform, everyone would lose. The developing countries, themselves, have far more to gain from reserve creation—and certainly from the SDR system that was ultimately negotiated—than from any additional development assistance

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they might receive from a link arrangement. On the other hand, now that the SDR system is in place and the decision has been made to put it into operation, the discussion takes on a different character. Past doubts can now be weighed in light of a specific reserve mechanism and a specific schedule for creating reserves.

One set of fears—that a foreign-aid link would endanger the possibility of negotiating any system at all—obviously is no longer relevant. The record suggests it had a good deal of validity, which is useful background to keep in mind. Until the very last negotiating meeting, the draft agreement included a provision that would have permitted the World Bank or any other development institution to hold SDRs if an 85 percent majority approved. The Bank would not have shared in allocations, but countries, on their own volition, would have been able to transfer SDRs directly to the Bank, which might have encouraged them to vote a special allocation for this purpose. The surplus countries insisted on eliminating this provision at the Ministerial meeting of the Group of Ten in Stockholm precisely because they feared it might lead to an operational connection between SDRs and foreign aid which could get out of hand.

A second area of concern—that foreign-aid considerations would cause a chronic overissue of international reserves—turns out to be procedurally manageable under the SDR system. In theory, the danger seems real enough; foreign-aid requirements are certainly higher than those for liquidity. If the world's financial authorities—either under mandate from the system or under pressure from the developing countries—seriously considered both factors in determining how many SDRs to activate, there would be a strongly upward bias. Decisions made under these conditions could lead to a loss of confidence in the reserve mechanism and, if carried far enough, to some inflationary pressures on the world economy. Such theoretical concerns are now past history. The decision on quantity has been made for the next three years; it has been made solely on the basis of liquidity needs; and it is modest. Any tie-in to development finance at this point would be incidental to the operation of the SDR mechanism and could not be a force driving it in undesirable directions. Furthermore, the voting system eventually worked out for activating SDRs, which requires near unanimity among the major industrial nations, is ample insurance that liquidity needs alone will determine future decisions.

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Even if there is no danger of overissue, generating funds for loans or subscriptions to IDA through SDRs would, as noted earlier, amount to a de facto change in the distribution of new reserves among the industrial countries. Might this hamper the operation of the system? There is of course nothing technically sacred about the present method of distribution beyond the fact that it formed the basis of agreement. Neither the United States nor any other industrial nation intends to use SDRs as a means of financing a permanent deficit. What these nations seek from the new facility is relief from restrictive policy pressures inherent in a monetary system that lacks sufficient reserves. A modification in the present distribution system to reflect IDA subscriptions would achieve this end about as well as any other.

Nevertheless, possible effects on the distribution of SDRs resulting from an IDA link could have some disadvantages; but they do not appear to be significant and would be mitigated over time. To take the worst case: The most recent pattern of procurement with IDA loans suggests that, after the first round of transactions, the United States would lose at most about one-third of the initial benefit received from its share in the SDR distribution. Japan, Canada, Germany and, interestingly enough, the United Kingdom would be major gainers. The fact that so much of IDA's current lending is concentrated in India, whose procurement in the United States is low, is a major reason for this distribution. With a large increase in its capital, IDA would lend more in other areas—notably Latin America, where procurement in the United States is traditionally high. Over the longer term, using the SDR system in a way which made it possible to supply more untied funds for development, allowing the recipient nations to buy in the open market, would be to everyone's advantage.

The third area of concern is political: a link arrangement might be criticized and opposed as a "back door" way of getting additional funds for foreign aid. Here again, the argument seems manageable when applied to the specific proposal discussed here. Congress approved U.S. participation in the creation of SDRs; it would also have to approve use of SDR counterpart funds for loans or subscriptions to IDA, even though no budgetary appropriation was needed. Comparable action would be required in other industrial countries. Any appearance of subterfuge, therefore, would be out of the question.

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A more important obstacle than any of these specific concerns is the fact that there is no compulsion to move. An aid link is not necessary to create SDRs; there is no pool of resources behind SDRs which must be divided; and, as matters stand, the industrial countries will receive the SDRs without charge. Why change this happy situation?

The best way to answer this question is to remind ourselves of the relationship of SDRs to gold. By substituting for gold, SDRs will make possible a continuing saving in resources—a saving which is, in a real sense, the technological product of international action. What is the justification for three-fourths of this saving going to the industrial countries and only one-fourth to the developing countries? Lending SDR counterpart funds to IDA could reverse this proportion, while keeping intact the ability of SDRs to meet world monetary needs. It would automatically fulfill one of the promises inherent in any effective system for creating new reserves: more development finance on untied terms.

The best reason to fulfill this promise is to be found in the sorry state of development finance. A deep malaise surrounds foreign aid; budgets in donor countries get tighter while in the developing countries needs and capabilities for absorbing aid rise. New capital for IDA, on a potential scale of $1.5 billion a year, made possible by the new era of international money, would not be a cure-all but it surely would be an exhilarating tonic. It is an opportunity rather than a requirement, but the economics and the politics, on all sides, look very good.

IV

If the basic proposal is sound, what procedures, domestic and international, should be used to carry it out?

In the United States, SDRs will be deposited in the Exchange Stabilization Fund. The legislation providing for U.S. participation in the SDR facility authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue special certificates covered by SDRs which he can sell to the Federal Reserve Banks for cash. This is the same procedure used to finance an inflow of gold to monetary reserves. In the case of SDRs, however, the Secretary may issue certificates only "for financing the acquisition of Special Drawing Rights or for financing exchange stabilization operations." This provision permits him to get funds to pay for SDRs received

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from other countries, but not to get cash from the Federal Reserve for IDA as a counterpart to SDRs obtained from IMF allocations, which are acquired without payment.

If given this as a problem, Treasury's corps of imaginative lawyers might argue that authorization to monetize free SDRs in fact exists since the use of such funds for loans to IDA would have benefits for world exchange and therefore comes under the heading of "financing exchange stabilization operations." In the absence of a legislative record to support such an interpretation, however, no Secretary of the Treasury would take this tack.

More appropriately, the Administration could request of the Congress an amendment to the SDR legislation, specifically authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue certificates for a fixed proportion of the SDRs allocated to the United States by the IMF, and to use the funds for loans or subscriptions to IDA. On the reasoning outlined earlier, this proportion could feasibly be set at 70 percent to cover the non-repayable share of this inflow of international reserves.

Congress would have to decide whether to make use of the funds conditional on all, or almost all, other industrial countries contributing equal proportions of SDR counterpart funds to this purpose—or to permit them to be used to finance the U.S. share of the next IDA replenishment, whether or not other countries follow suit. The former approach—a kind of all-or-nothing proposition—would put more pressure on all industrial countries to move. The second approach would make it possible, in the event no international agreement could be negotiated, for the Administration to take a strong lead in pushing for a large increase in IDA's capital in the next replenishment.

There would be no need for Congress to give the Administration a blank check on the future, which would circumvent normal restraints of the budgetary appropriation process. Each amendment to the legislation could apply to a specific IMF allocation decision—in the first instance to the decision activating an average of roughly $3.2 billion a year in SDRs over the next three years. Congressional authorization could be given for the U.S. share, which amounts to $750 million a year in total SDRs, of which approximately $500 million would be non-repayable. In this case, the Congress would automatically have review authority, as will the IMF, in light of each past period of SDR operating experience.

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How other industrial countries would handle this situation legislatively is not yet clear. Their statutes are likely to be similar to those in the United States, but in parliamentary governments the process might well be easier.

Internationally, a negotiation looks promising. Shares in SDR allocations are not drastically different from those in the most recent IDA replenishment negotiations; in some cases, where there are differences, trade will provide offsetting compensations. For example, the major difference is in the U.S. share: under an SDR counterpart proposal, the United States would supply about one-third of IDA capital, instead of the 40 percent it now supplies, but it would benefit less in trade than other countries. The U.K. share would go up from 13 percent to 16 percent, but it would gain in trade; while the EEC share would remain pretty much the same. These differences would, themselves, change over time. The main point, as far as balance-of-payments considerations are concerned, is that all the industrial countries would have been paid in advance, in the form of increased international reserves, for more than their capital subscription to IDA.

Timing is also auspicious. Present IDA financing, the product of a drawn out and difficult negotiation, runs out in the summer of 1971. Assurances for the future will be needed some time next year, to make possible continuing commitments. The World Bank will thus soon have to initiate negotiations for the next IDA replenishment. Basing these negotiations on SDR counterpart financing would greatly enhance prospects for the kind of quantum jump in IDA capital which is now required.

There are more ambitious proposals than the one here outlined for linking SDRs to aid, such as amending the IMF agreement to permit SDRs to be allocated directly to development institutions. There is much to explore in these proposals, but also many old and difficult arguments to answer, and a long process of negotiation and ratification to confront. A more promising and urgently needed step would be to pursue what is possible now. New forces are needed to put substance into the concept of a second development decade. SDRs, which already mark a breakthrough in international money, can be the basis for a similar—if smaller—breakthrough in developmental finance. The timing is right; the results would be significant.

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WAR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

By Russell Warren Howe

IN civil war, hatreds are more intimate than in international conflict. The enemy is less awesome; he is killed with more conviction that he deserves it. Invariably—inevitably—the death tolls are higher. The American Civil War set records for its day. Despite the limited weaponry and skill, the Biafran war has taken the lives of an estimated two million people, mostly starved children. And now a war that is already engaging about 26,000 black guerrillas and approximately a quarter-million white or white-officered troops in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia (the United Nations' new name for South West Africa) offers such a prospect of escalation that it can hardly help but be bigger, in cemetery terms, than Viet Nam. In this corner of the globe, whose fair hills make a savage contrast with the ugliness wrought by man, the restless spirit of Nazism, with its accent on genetic myth and legal caste, will perhaps be put to rest in a swamp of blood.

The chain of austral African wars is poorly reported: correspondents are limited to nibbling in from the fringes—and there are many fringes. Some front-line reporting is possible in Angola from the guerrilla side, thanks mostly to the self-confidence of the guerrilla leader, Holden Roberto. Under the late Eduardo Mondlane, a similarly responsible attitude to world opinion was being cultivated in those parts of Mozambique controlled by resistance forces. And earlier this year, this correspondent made a brief foray into Rhodesia with the Zimbabweans (as Rhodesia's black majority call themselves). Reporting in Namibia, however, is difficult from the resistance side. In South Africa, it is practically impossible for the moment, unless one is a Russian and lands from the same submarine as the resistance fighters. Because of the extent of the war, and because of press censorship in South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia, no war reporting of any consequence seems to have been possible, so far, from the side of the white-minority governments.

II

The liberation forces are as follows:

In Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) over 2,000 black guerrillas are cur-

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rently engaging nearly 10,000 régime troops, including South African reinforcements. Most of the Zimbabweans are members of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), now under the interim presidency of James Chikerema in Lusaka. The remainder are members of the Reverend Ndabaninghi Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), under the interim leadership of Herbert Chitepo.[1]

ZAPU forces mount combined operations with militants of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. The joint raids have two objectives: first, to establish "reactivatable" bases and arms caches, and to build a network of resistance supporters among whom the liberation forces can work in the later, "direct action" phase; and secondly, to guide, and interpret for, the South Africans until they reach the Limpopo River at the South African border.

In Rhodesia, the joint forces wear uniforms. But so far, the rebel régime has executed its prisoners of war, and ZAPU does the same. Eventually the nationalist intention is to institutionalize uniformed warfare under Geneva Convention rules. ZAPU will then borrow Viet Cong techniques—such as mobile cages—to keep prisoners alive. They will be prepared to exchange them for their own captured comrades or for political prisoners. Taking civilians as hostages is also envisaged, but only if this appears to be the only way to open the concentration camps.

ZAPU activity is focused on the northeast, Rhodesia's fertile equivalent of Kenya's "White Highlands." Many European farmers there have evacuated their families to Salisbury. The West Zambezi Valley, where few whites live, was an important field of operations for the guerrillas in 1967–68 but is fairly quiet this year. Presumably, the preparatory work which is the object of this phase of guerrilla activity is fairly complete there now; but this underpopulated zone could have renewed importance if neighboring Botswana were better able to help the resistance fighters by offering a sanctuary for hard-pressed combat teams.

ZANU forces concentrate in the north and center and the populous southeast. They wear civilian clothes, carry forged *situpas* (identity cards) and are mainly concerned with sabotage (though they have so far eschewed terror).

[1] Nkomo has been in a concentration camp without trial for over five years. Sithole, also detained without trial, was sentenced in February to six years' hard labor for allegedly organizing a plot against the life of white rebel leader Ian Smith.

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The ANC troops operating with ZAPU shed their uniforms at the Limpopo, but their objectives in South Africa are similar to those of the Zimbabweans in Rhodesia: the establishment of bases. In South Africa, however, purely "resistance" activity is expected to continue for some time before the area is ready for guerrilla warfare; unless a fresh "Sharpeville" changes the climate, the emphasis will be on sabotage and, possibly, terror. Neither Zimbabweans nor South Africans, at this stage, fight unless obliged to.

In Namibia, almost all guerrilla activity is controlled by the South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), under Sam Nujoma. According to Lourens Muller, South Africa's Minister of Interior and Police, about 2,000 ANC and SWAPO guerrillas entered Namibia and South Africa during the first few months of this year. If this figure from Muller's intelligence services is reliable, probably the bulk of these reinforcements were destined for Namibia and would seem to outnumber resistance forces already there earlier.

SWAPO concentrates mainly on the Caprivi Strip and Okavango, in the north. The new Bantustan of Ovamboland will also be a prime target. The Cunene Dam on the Angolan side of the border—a project estimated to cost $210 million and supposed to attract half a million new colonists—is such an obvious target, strategically and politically, for Angolan and Namibian forces that South Africa agreed earlier this year to help finance and man Portuguese defenses in the district.

SWAPO strategy is different from ANC's, ZAPU's or ZANU's: Nujoma's men make simple hit-and-run raids on South African military camps and related targets. The bare vastness of Namibia makes territorial occupation unthinkable without air protection. The main aim seems to be to give added meaning and urgency to the diplomatic activity now going on in Namibia's behalf at the United Nations.

In Mozambique, about 9,000 guerrillas of FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front) now occupy all of the Niassa and Cabo Delgado districts except the Niassa town of Vila Cabral and some fortified villages—notably the important Portuguese stronghold of Mueda. These outposts must be supplied by air and their main purpose seems to be to "show the flag." FRELIMO forces, now in the "direct action" phase of occupying territory, are pushing into Zambézia. FRELIMO

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and a splinter group, COREMO, are now active all over Tete, the panhandle district that extends into Zambia. This is the key area of present fighting because it contains the $288 million Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project, destined for completion in 1972 and intended to lure a million Portuguese immigrants in the decade to follow.

In Angola, Holden Roberto's GRAE (Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile), which has broken relations with the OAU, has about 8,000 men all over the northeastern quarter of the country (which the Portuguese call the "rotted triangle"). The GRAE has two big Congo bases, one in the lower Congo Valley and a newer one in Katanga. A Roberto unit this year took a Swiss television team for a 600-mile, 51-day walk through its bailiwick, starting from the lower Congo Valley, touching Luanda province on the coast and exiting into Katanga. Two other guerrilla movements are also active in Angola—MPLA (Peoples' Angolan Liberation Movement) and Unitá.

III

Ranged against the liberation forces are the following European or white-led forces:

In Mozambique are about 60,000 metropolitan troops of Portugal and 40,000 native soldiers. The air force includes Saber jets provided under NATO aid and Alouette "gunships" sold by France.

In Angola, the size of the army and type of armaments are almost identical with those in Mozambique.

In South Africa and Namibia, there is a standing South African army of 5,700 and a selective-service contingent raised this year from 10,500 to 22,300 to deal with the escalation of the conflict, and to enable men to be sent to neighboring buffer war zones. At present, in fact, one-third of the original force of 16,200 is abroad—in Rhodesia and in Tete. (Unconfirmed British reports say some forces are also in Angola.) There is a selective-service reserve of 42,000. Except for some Eurafrican noncombatants, the armed forces are white.

The South African army has Sherman and Centurion tanks, but these veteran war vehicles are being phased out in favor of France's AMX-90 and AMX-60 tanks and Panhard armored cars. At Uvongo, the French are assisting with experiments to produce a South African SAM based on France's "Cactus"

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system. France-Presse agency, relating both these developments, also noted that research is continuing on an atomic bomb, but of course this would be useless internally.

The navy that defends South Africa's long coastline concentrates on anti-submarine craft. After a Pietermaritzburg court was told in February that twelve ANC guerrillas had admitted to seeking a submarine landing site in Zululand, north of Durban, France announced that it would build Pretoria's first (Daphné class) submarines—three by 1971, three later—and an unspecified number of new sub-chasers. Defense Minister Pieter Botha said in an April white paper that still more sub-chasers would be constructed locally, and that a $20,160,000 submarine base will be built at Simonstown.

The 3,000-man air force includes a flight of Shackleton marine-reconnaissance flying boats and crack squadrons of French Mirage fighter-bombers and Mirage III pursuit planes, whose pilots were trained in France. The Mirages have air-to-ground "anti-guerrilla" rockets. South Africa is building up its helicopter force, which numbered forty a year ago, by purchasing the highly manœuvrable Alouettes and Super-Frelons, both from France.

Police number 28,600, with 15,000 reserves. They have eighty Panhard armored cars and 430 steel-plated French riot trucks. Rural whites are organized in over 200 *kommandos*. According to the Institute of Strategic Studies, these have 51,500 members, 250 of them light-plane pilots. In the decade since Sharpeville, the South African defense budget has risen from $55 million to nearly $450 million and is expected to increase steadily over the next few years.

In Rhodesia, the rebel régime has an army of 3,600, in two separate "regiments"—black and white—plus about 3,000 reservists under arms and 2,700 white South Africans. There is a small air force, but guerrilla reports, not denied by the Smith régime, indicate that most of the Hunters and other fixed-wing craft have been grounded as a result of economic sanctions. Now the main air weapon appears to be the Alouette "gunship." South African air crews have allegedly dropped fragmentation bombs and napalm from Buccaneers.

White Rhodesia's potential is hard to estimate exactly: of the 36,000 Rhodesians who have emigrated to South Africa or elsewhere since the rebellion against Britain began, it is unclear

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how many were males of military age. The white half of the 3,000 called-up reservists are probably all the whites available, since recent figures indicate that two-thirds of the 20,000 police reserves are white. As the air force numbers 900 men, its reserves must be negligible. The regular Rhodesian police number 6,400, two-thirds black.[2]

IV

Despite the disparity of armaments, the guerrillas have several advantages over their enemies. They can move much faster in the bush when the enemy is also on foot. They are guerrilla-trained, and have real confidence in the value of their training. Field reports show that Rhodesian losses are higher than those of the guerrillas—although the Smith régime helps to conceal this fact by conducting military funerals at night, by cordoning off roads when mortuary convoys pass and by the orthodox lies of war.

The government troops' lack of guerrilla training shows in such tactics as firing into impenetrable bush, thereby revealing their position, or the use of classical pincer movements against targets so small—a guerrilla camp, for instance—that each flank is raked with the fire of the other. Until earlier this year Rhodesian radio operators obligingly announced frequency changes at the end of each twelve-hour period. All radio traffic goes in clear.

The guerrillas have the advantage of being "motivated." This is true of many white Rhodesian troops, but not of most of the pallid Portuguese conscripts, or the Portuguese or Rhodesian black levies, who face an obvious dilemma. In a 1968 clash, guerrillas monitoring enemy communications heard a South African officer, after ordering helicopter fire and being told the chopper crew could not distinguish between *askaris* (native mercenaries) and "terrorists," scream, "Fire! Fire anyway!" The gunner didn't but the anecdote makes one suppose that askaris may be unenthusiastic about guiding South Africans.

The general quality of white troops appears to be poor: this

[2] Rhodesian defense figures seem to be at least slightly inflated where whites are concerned. If the Rhodesian white population is 170,000, there are 85,000 males, about 28,000 of them between eighteen and forty-one—say, 25,000 fit to fight. If there are 1,800 in the regular army, 900 in the regular air force, 2,200 in the regular police, 1,500 called-up white army reservists, and 13,300 white police reserves, this gives an "armable" figure of 19,700, which would leave very few younger males in the economy. Rhodesia's claim that the immigrant population surpasses 200,000 seems refuted by electoral roll figures.

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is particularly true in Rhodesia, where anyone with the womb-to-tomb advantages of being white would probably have to be the worst of dropout material to become an enlisted man in the army or police. South African troops are little better, although the South African white mystique has given a certain Israeli-like prestige to soldiering. Few soldiers in this part of the world have any war experience, and that of some middle-aged officers is a quarter of a century old. Except in Portuguese Africa, the white régimes are still far short of the famous ten-to-one ratio for counterinsurgency.

The rebel régime in Rhodesia can pressure villagers for information on guerrilla movements; but although there are many cases of paid informers, the bulk of the population, at least in the northeast, seems to have thrown in its lot with the resistance. Guerrilla reports, which seek to impress the sedentary leadership with their problems, only rarely complain of villagers' disloyalty to the African cause. This rural identification with the liberation struggle has probably increased South African reluctance to participate. The headman of a ZAPU relay station village told me of the instructions he received from the commander of a local South African company: "Tell us if the terrorists come, but wait three days before you send the messenger." The first military funeral of the Rhodesian war in Johannesburg brought a small public demonstration against "dying for the Pommies" (the English—meaning white Rhodesians).

But the resistance fighters admit that the enemy's advantages are considerable too: air cover and air supply, better radio and land communications, better feeding and sleeping arrangements and medical care. And if the Zimbabwean peasant seems relatively impervious to intimidation by the white government, Pretoria and Salisbury have been more successful in pressuring Botswana into refusing transit facilities to black guerrillas. The Botswanan authorities arrest guerrilla sanctuary-seekers for "armed border violations," and subsequently sentence them.[3] Zimbabwean returnees from Gaberones say that, while under arrest, they were tortured on the orders of white police officers for information which—while useless to Botswana—was no doubt highly saleable in Pretoria and Salisbury.

[3] Sir Seretse Khama has, I understand, an agreement with President Kaunda that, whatever the sentence, arrested guerrillas will be released to Zambia after twelve months; Zambia expects them to go on to Tanzania.

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Access to the world outside the zone of conflict is a major strategic factor in the campaign to liberate southern Africa. Zambia's oil pipeline to Dar-es-Salaam diminishes South African leverage on Lusaka, and has enabled President Kaunda to authorize Zimbabweans to destroy Rhodesian oil stocks. (Formerly, he feared reprisals against his own incoming supplies.) But he is still dependent on the Cape railroad for essential Euro-American imports and Wankie coal, and consequently vetoes attacks on it. Zambia will have a blacktop road to Dar in two years, a direct rail link to Matadi by about the same time, and perhaps a Peking-built "Tan-Zam Railroad" by 1974.

Kaunda also fears Beirut-type punishment raids, because of his help to guerrillas. Although most Lusaka diplomats think these unlikely (Zambia still has five thousand South African "hostages" working in its mines), fear of reprisals and general "espionitis" were increased last year. One cause was a raid by South African irregulars on a Malawian rail bridge of great importance to Zambia; another was the sentencing of a middle-aged Rhodesian spy arrested in Lusaka with explosives intended, he told the court, to blow up ZAPU's Lusaka headquarters.

Zambia also faces enemy reconnaissance overflights and even "hot pursuit" infantry raids. Kaunda told me recently that he had opted against a missile system in favor of a larger air force, because of the great length of his hostile frontiers. As he feels his British and Canadian army and air force advisers may be unreliable, in view of their association with Portugal in NATO, Kaunda is gradually replacing them with Indians and Zambians.

The freest of the countries neighboring the liberation war zone is Tanzania, where Nyerere shows a confidence which is apparently the result of his country's stability. Tanzania is also firing Canadian officers, but otherwise shows no signs of anxiety over its open role of support for the liberation wars.

If U.N. action forced nationhood in Namibia, Botswana would acquire friendly access to the sea and consequently would have a freer hand to help its black neighbors. Similarly, if FRELIMO liberated the embryonic Ncala rail line, Zambia and Malawi would have a new friendly access to the ocean. Although changes of government in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland would probably not greatly alter policy in these virtual Rand client-states, Malawi, after the death of Banda who is already in his seventies, is expected to change radically. If Tete

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were liberated and Banda gone, Malawi would probably become the main springboard for the liberation of Rhodesia.

Meanwhile, the top sabotage objectives in Rhodesia are oil stocks, the railroad from Durban and Lourenço Marques (whose importance has increased with the British blockade on Beira) and the feeder line from Bulawayo to Salisbury. For oil targets, the guerrillas now have rocket launchers. ZANU claims to have cut the Durban rail line three times with plastic, but bridge destruction would presumably be more effective.

V

The guerrillas are almost totally dependent on the socialist powers. Training is now conducted primarily in Tanzania by Russian, Chinese, Cuban and Algerian instructors. The guerrilla company with which I spent some time this year was Russian-armed, Czech-uniformed and Cuban-trained except for its leader, a veteran of earlier operations, who was trained in Algeria.

Nationalist leaders, speaking privately, seem to scorn the ineffectual OAU liberation committee, which in May this year admitted to having collected dues from only 4 of the 41 member states. The committee is based in Dar, but of the guerrilla movements only FRELIMO has its headquarters there—while planning to move into Mozambique itself before very long. The other liberation movements are based in Lusaka or the Congo.

The liberation committee appears to spend on junketing most of that small fraction of its official current budget actually collected. The committee's Secretary-General, George Magombe, earns 50 percent more than his compatriot and neighbor, President Julius Nyerere. The 1967 OAU summit raised guerrilla hopes by promising to appoint a military committee to run the liberation budget, but the politicians have so far prevented its emergence. Except for Algeria, Zambia and Tanzania, Africa is dramatically absent from the war to liberate southern Africa.

Russia and Algeria reserve all or most of their aid for movements having OAU liberation committee approval. China takes the others. Cuba seems iconoclastic. Thus the committee, by taking sides, has deepened divisions, and has injected the Peking-Moscow conflict into the theater of war in austral Africa. The source of a party's aid, however, says little about its own ideological orientation.

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More positively, the OAU's "approbation" has permitted an alliance between ZAPU, ANC, FRELIMO and SWAPO, with links to PAIGC (African Independence Party for Guinea and the Cabo Verdes) and some others. This has thrown the "disapproved" ZANU, PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa) and the GRAE together. The openly anti-communist GRAE is alone in getting Western arms (American and Belgian), channeled through the Congolese army. FRELIMO, thanks to Janet Mondlane, Eduardo's active American widow, gets Western support for its civil budget—thus freeing more funds for arms from other sources.

It is difficult to gauge how ideologically committed the guerrillas are to socialist doctrine; the country which probably comes closest to being their model is Algeria, where urban terror had precedence over guerrilla fighting and where enthusiastic amateurs humbled a modern army of half a million.

The most successful campaign in the area is certainly in Mozambique. Much of the credit for this must go to the late Eduardo Mondlane, the 48-year-old Oberlin and Northwestern graduate who was assassinated in Dar-es-Salaam in February by a bomb. A number of diplomats in Dar-es-Salaam concur with FRELIMO in attributing this "sophisticated" assassination to PIDE, Portugal's secret police, which has a long history of political killings. From Lisbon's and Pretoria's point of view, Mondlane was dangerously attractive to such Western figures as the late Robert Kennedy and U.S. Ambassador John Burns in Dar. He has been replaced by a triumvirate which lacks much of Mondlane's public relations consciousness, reads Mao and espouses Eastern-bloc causes like North Viet Nam. But the senior member of the triumvirate, Uria Simango, is continuing Mondlane's efforts tactfully to persuade the West to let Portugal fight alone. With defense currently taking an admitted 48.7 percent (reportedly more) of the Lisbon budget, Simango believes Portugal would collapse in "two or three years" if it fought without big-power aid, with only South Africa to lean on.

When Dr. Salazar finally dies, real if gradual changes of policy may prove possible in Portugal. Professor Caetano is not expected to accept the total loss of power in Angola and Mozambique easily, but he may well compromise with white home-rule movements which are probably prepared to compromise in their turn with any reasonably "moderate" liberation movement like

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the GRAE and perhaps FRELIMO. Both these groups and the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau have apparently told President Senghor of Senegal they are willing to envisage a gradual transfer of power over ten years, and independent membership in a Luso-African commonwealth. In a recent interview with this correspondent, Senghor offered, on the strength of these assurances, to mediate with Lisbon to arrest a conflict in which Portugal now never takes the offensive. Despite having the largest army in Africa, Portugal seems resigned to losing slowly, limiting its efforts to containment by defoliation and to defense.

There is, of course, pressure from Salisbury and especially Pretoria to continue the fight, and Pretoria has supplied two battalions to Tete. An area specialist of London's Institute of Strategic Studies, which keeps a close watch on the South African forces, says that Mozambique is used to give combat experience to draftees, led by career cadres.[4] South Africa is particularly anxious that Portugal should follow through with its plans to bring one and a half million more immigrants into Angola and Mozambique.

Of all the countries under immigrant government, Rhodesia seems likely to be the first to be liberated. Assuming there is a limit to how far South African help will go (would the local white public agree to provide Rhodesia with forces outnumbering the Smith régime's own troops?), the Zimbabwean campaign can be reduced to the mathematics of military power. This gives a gradually developing advantage to the guerrillas. South African politicians—though not the military—mostly feel that, if necessary, Pretoria could live with a landlocked black Zimbabwe, just as it has reached a facile modus vivendi with Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The jovial Nkomo looks as reassuring as that lifelong conservative, Jomo Kenyatta. A white exodus from Rhodesia, mostly to South Africa, would even be a bonus for the Republik.

Portuguese Africa will presumably follow Zimbabwe into majority rule. Namibia's fate may depend on the United Nations. South Africa is obviously by far the hardest nut to crack.

[4] This reinforcement for Portugal is thought by area specialists to be provided for by the "Unholy Trinity" pact reportedly made between South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia in October 1965. The report that a pact was *signed* is denied by the governments involved, crown colony Rhodesia being unauthorized to make its own defense arrangements; but the terms of the denial—"We do not need a solemn treaty"—could either be an ambiguous confirmation or an indication that common plans were drawn up without benefit of a legal treaty.

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Yet of all the minority governments in the area, the South African Government is also the one which most openly admits its fears of a future holocaust, the only one which does not pretend that a turning point in decolonization has been reached, reversing the current of history. Salisbury and Lisbon counter white fears by downplaying their wars, emphasizing unspecified victories and asserting that although decolonization is a historical trend which has reached their very borders, historically it will go no further. South Africa counters white complacency by emphasizing the dangers, and implying that only its own apartheid system is proof against the winds of change.

With expanding defense budgets, and five years of oil stocked against the expected blockade, Pretoria is also plowing aid with obvious conditions into surrounding black client-states. An agreement with Malawi to build a $42 million capital at Lilongwe, Banda's birthplace, is predicated upon the acceptance of senior South African administrators in key posts throughout the country (a situation which enhances Banda's capacity to keep track of domestic opposition). More recently, a South African trade and investment delegation has been to Madagascar, which seeks new trading partners for those lost through the Suez closure; the two countries have even talked of exchanging embassies. Radio South Africa, using only BBC-type voices and copycatting BBC taglines, has won a wide audience for its powerful transmitter, although the attempt to deceive listeners into thinking RSA is the BBC annoys as much of its audience as it initially deceives.

South Africa can also be expected to augment aid to lobbies and pressure groups in Britain and America, including purely local organizations that promote race friction. Extremist black movements in the United States may well receive subsidies (as Marcus Garvey did from the Anglo-Saxon Movement); they are segregationist in spirit, and "prove" South Africa's point that political freedom for blacks means violence. South Africa's espionage network can be expected to expand; one identifiable agent was reportedly spotted in Conakry, recently, in the entourage of a presumably unsuspecting Stokely Carmichael.

VI

South Africa's feverish foreign-policy manœuvres aimed at survival have no direct domestic parallel, for the top black leadership within the country is neutralized in such a way—on

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Robben Island—that only military action or a potent threat to Pretoria could liberate them. White liberals are muffled; since their aim was always compromise—meaning compromise with white power realities—they can doubt if they are needed, or welcome, in the activist phase. White identification with guerrilla activity—with its implication of "Kill my neighbors' kids, not mine"—would be nearly impossible. Verwoerd, the jittery *uitlander,* has gone. Vorster, who spent two years in Smuts' penitentiaries as a Nazi in World War II, and the rest of the war under house arrest, can now permit the sale of books by Eldridge Cleaver, Malcolm X and Carmichael.[5]

Meanwhile, the bogey of partition remains. The traditional Afrikaner, imbued with his sense of history, can find little comfort in what the past offers him as "tribal land by right." Jan van Riebeeck may have landed in Table Bay on April 6, 1652; but when Britain took the Cape two and a half centuries later, during the Napoleonic wars, the 1808 census showed a total population of 29,000 Europeans and Eurafricans, and 20,000 Hottentots. Since Eurafricans ("coloreds") still comprised 53 percent of the last Cape Province census, they presumably formed the bulk of the 29,000. The descendents of most early white settlers are to be found in the Catfish Row of Cape Town's District Six.

Nor were the "Great Trek's" numbers very great by modern standards: by 1850 there were only an estimated 3,000 "Europeans" (presumably, whites and near-whites) living outside the Cape, mostly in Natal. Only Sir Bartle Frere's Zulu wars, starting in 1877, dispersed immigrants who had stayed put for the previous three centuries. Gold and diamonds did the rest. But for an Afrikaner looking for a homeland he could legally claim, before the World Court if necessary, it is uncomfortably obvious that most white South Africans are first and second-generation citizens only—that white South Africa, populous as it is, is as recent an innovation as colonial Nigeria or Tanzania. A "homeland" claim could only stand in the poorly endowed Cape, where the white 39 percent and the black 8 percent of the population are outnumbered by the Eurafricans. White South Africa, if partition is inevitable, may well be something *less* than the whole Eastern and Western Cape.

[5] And, for that matter, myself. I am also still syndicated in South Africa, though forbidden entry: the fear is no longer that the eccentric outside world will come and subvert the only soldiers of white civilization who are in step, but that what we would see and write about might subvert the State Department or the Quai d'Orsay.

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Most outsiders—including black African intellectuals—feel a multiracial solution must somehow be possible. This would mean dismantling the black job ceiling, the "race tax" (huge wage differentials) and the segregated budget, with its black-subsidized facilities for non-Africans. It would mean giving blacks freedom of movement, property rights, a choice of jobs. It would mean, of course, a black majority in a parliament where there are now no blacks, no Asians, no Eurafricans. It would mean "integrating" a majority community (comprising 69 percent of the population) with more grievances than black Americans ever had. It would mean persuading white unionists to accept a meritocracy. It is probable, however, that whites would prefer a poorer, smaller, all-Brahmin state (or emigration) to a multiracial, prosperous South Africa in which they were no better off than the other castes.

Encouraged—or deluded—by the boom, and by the eclipse of white liberals and vocal black nationalists, most South African whites do not share the fears of their government. Of course it couldn't happen here! The traveler is reminded of Tuscaloosa in 1956. Ninety-four weekly flights to and from Johannesburg stop off every week in nineteen African capitals, including supposedly radical cities like Brazzaville and Dar-es-Salaam, putting hundreds of potential South African hostages for the liberation of Robben Island's inmates into the hands of African governments. The supposition clearly is that "the kaffirs wouldn't dare."

Kenneth Kaunda, who sees the holocaust developing, privately believes that because Moscow and Peking are the main outside supporters of liberation, the West will tumble into the "Unholy Trinity" camp. Britain, however, which has $3 billion of investment in South Africa, presently obeys the U.N. arms ban. So do countries with less at stake—West Germany, Canada, Switzerland. France and Italy alone reject and exploit the ban on armaments—and France's role may change somewhat now that de Gaulle has gone.

The United States, which also observes the U.N. arms ban, has very limited interests in coöperation with the régime in Pretoria. U.S. investment in South Africa is about $800 million—less than in pre-Castro Cuba. Nearly a quarter of this is portfolio investment which will presumably start to decamp long before an outright showdown; nearly a quarter of what remains

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is locally generated profits, reinvested. Gold's continuing monetary role is an inhibiting factor in dealing sternly with Pretoria, but not an overriding one.

Positively, beyond banning new investment in South Africa, the United States could be instrumental in applying pressure to South African sensitivities: religion plays an important role in white South Africa; so does sport—whites would feel deeply about a total ban on South African participation in international games and athletics. America could demonstrate sympathetic solidarity with the courageous English-language press and the restless student bodies of South Africa. The South African reaction to a tougher U.S. stand would probably be, not retaliation, but diplomatic efforts to redress a diplomatic defeat.

Perhaps the single most decisive American entanglement in the area is Portugal's NATO membership, in return for which Lisbon contributes real estate for the Santa Maria air-sea base in the Azores, and 0.28 percent of the NATO budget. Some experts view the base as redundant; in any case, Portugal could not remove the United States against its will. In dealing with Portugal, the United States is principally inhibited by the existence of the NATO treaty itself. But since 1959, Portugal has received nearly $400 million in American aid under NATO, and used a large part of it south of the Tropic of Cancer—a breach of treaty terms. There are, in southern Africa, many American diplomats who talk in terms of ridding NATO of its least useful member as a first step to positive intervention in the area's crisis.

The southern African racial conflict seems to be escalating into war—which may be alleviated and foreshortened by agitation, pressure and eventually negotiation, but cannot be forestalled. It is hard to believe that a majority in the West do not regard the present South African and Rhodesian régimes with aversion. But at present, intervention is left to the communist bloc. Like Moscow, the West is discouraged by the disunity among nationalist movements, and especially by the personal ambitions almost unrelated to policy on which this disunity is founded. Ultimately, decisions on intervention will probably depend on how much strength the Africans themselves can bring to bear. They are now, I think, beginning to show their mettle, to indicate their capacity to overthrow their occupiers. It is in this historic development that we can discern the passing of a formidable point of no return.

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NORTH KOREA'S NEW OFFENSIVE

By Joungwon A. Kim

LAST year both South and North Korea celebrated the twentieth anniversary of their establishment as separate political entities. Each had, at its inception, claimed the entire Korean nation as its legitimate domain, and each vowed to rid the other of the foreign power that was said to have created it. The year 1968 was also an anniversary of two other events. It was the 4300th anniversary of the legendary founding of the Korean nation, and the 1300th anniversary of the Silla Unification in A.D. 668, when the nation was brought under a single, centralized political rule. The irony of commemorating concurrently two decades of cold-war division and thirteen centuries of unified nationhood under a highly centralized political system was not lost on the Korean people.

The three dynasties which had ruled Korea during its thirteen-hundred years of unification had brought about one of the most completely homogeneous nations in the world. No minority ethnic groups are present within the borders of Korea, which for centuries have remained unchanged. Almost every other nation in the modern world is faced with problems of ethnic division; in Korea, one national ethnic group has been divided between two régimes. The long historical period of unification also brought Korean linguistic and cultural unity. The minor distinctions of speech from one region to another are not greater than the differences in English spoken in Texas and Maine. Unlike most of the "emerging nations," there are no language barriers in Korea. Furthermore, there are no religious divisions of any significance. A large majority of the population belong to no organized religion; systems of belief and ethics have been transmitted almost exclusively through the family. Finally, until 1945 Koreans had been under a common political and social system throughout the peninsula for thirteen centuries.

Forty years of alien rule by the Japanese aroused a zealous sense of nationalism in the Korean people. It was stimulated by Japan's efforts to wipe out the national language, to outlaw the teaching of Korean history and to impose discrimination against the Koreans in education and employment. Predictably, the Korean reaction was a fiery defense of the national heritage and

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national identity, especially in view of the fact that the Koreans had historically considered the Japanese to be their cultural inferiors, as Chinese culture had been transmitted to the Japanese islands by way of Korea. This aroused sense of Korean nationalism is a heritage with which the North Korean leaders (no less than those in the South) must reckon in order to remain in power.

Kim Il-sŏng, the rotund leader of the North Korean régime, was born under the name Kim Song-chu on the outskirts of Pyongyang. His family emigrated to Manchuria during his early childhood. According to Kim's official biographers, his father was a medical doctor, a practitioner of traditional Chinese medicine, who was captured and tortured to death by the Japanese for Korean independence activities. Whatever the unverified truth of this story, Kim became involved in communist activities in Manchuria after his father's death, and spent a few months in jail at the age of seventeen—perhaps the cause of his apparent failure to graduate from high school. At twenty, he joined the Chinese Communist Party, operating in Manchuria, and became involved in guerrilla activities there during the mid-1930s. Eventually, he became the commander of a small unit, using the name Kim Il-sŏng, which he borrowed from a legendary Korean hero.

On one occasion in 1937, when he was twenty-five, Kim and about one hundred followers actually penetrated into Korea to the border town of Pochunbo, caught the Japanese off guard and destroyed the village. This skirmish has been exalted as a famous "battle" in North Korea's rewriting of the history of the independence movement, as Kim seeks to capture the mantle of Korean nationalism. By 1941, the Japanese had defeated the harassing guerrillas (whom they called "bandits") in Manchuria, and Kim and a handful of followers retreated into the Soviet Union. Entering a training school there, they emerged in 1945 as officers in the Soviet Army (Kim is said to have been a major) and returned to North Korea, where the Russians installed their Manchurian candidate at the helm of the Soviet-sponsored régime, backed by Russian occupation forces.

Originally imposed upon North Korea by external forces, and ruling less than one-third of the Korean populace, the North Korean régime is now well aware of the necessity of identifying itself with Korean nationalism in order to survive. In an effort to secure a nationalist image, Kim Il-sŏng has become the center

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of a cult of personality of ludicrous extremes. The "life and works of Kim Il-sŏng," which involve a heroic legend of his independence activities during the Japanese rule, must be absorbed by the populace in Leader Study Centers provided for all citizens (including Koreans in Japan). A sample extract from the Pyongyang press refers to him as:

> . . . the great Leader of the 40 million Korean people [North Korea has only 13 million], peerless patriot, national hero, ever-victorious iron-willed genius-commander and one of the outstanding leaders of the international communist movement and working-class movement, who had been confidently leading our revolution solely along the one road of victory, pulling through in person all storms, and taking upon himself the destiny of the fatherland and the nation for 40 years and more since he started his revolutionary activities in the early years.

Each time Kim's name is mentioned, the whole formula must follow again. The consequence is that every article is filled with continuous repetitive verbiage, leaving little space for anything else. Gaps are filled with odes and poems such as "Kim Il-sŏng is the Red Sun." Yet unlike Lenin, Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi Minh, Kim's achievements before his sudden thrust into leadership were negligible, his "thought" is devoid of a hint of originality and his claimed commitment to the national interests of Korea is questionable, except where they serve the advancement of his own political career.

No government, in either North or South, can secure permanent legitimacy in a divided nation. So long as the division persists, Kim's position can be continuously undermined by the existence of an alternative focus of loyalty in the South. The continued possibility that one régime may be able to "outbid" the other in the competition for national loyalty derives from the influence of a nationalism which denies the legitimacy of the national division. Therefore each régime must go out of its way to "prove" that it alone represents genuine nationalism and that the other is a foreign puppet. North Korea must depict the Southern government as a "stooge of American imperialism," just as the ROK government must paint the Kim Il-sŏng régime as a "puppet of international communism." Indeed, the Southern government is no less pressured than is the Northern one to lay out a timetable for the national unification.

Recent crises—the attempted assassination of South Korea's President Park Chung Hee by a North Korean commando unit in January 1968, the capture of the American intelligence ship

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Pueblo and its crew two days later, the shooting down of the American EC-121 reconnaissance plane in April of this year, and the increasing harassment of South Korea from the North through stepped-up infiltration and shooting incidents—these provide indirect confirmation that North Korea's overall policy aims have not altered. Kim has mapped a consistent path for reconciling the basic needs of his survival with the reality of national division. To the extent that these conflict, the régime is left with little alternative but to pursue an aggressive policy to eliminate the division.

One of the costs is the tremendous burden of defense expenditures which drain the economies and manpower of both North and South. With a population of only 13 million people—as opposed to South Korea's 30 million—the cost to North Korea of maintaining an army poised against the South is overwhelming. The extent of the military burden is dramatically illustrated by a comparison with Communist China: although the total population of Korea is about 5 percent of the population of Communist China, the standing armies of North and South combined total one million men—which is over one-third the size of Red China's standing army. These figures do not include the "people's militia" of the North, whose claimed strength is 1,300,000, or the "home guard" of the South, just being formed, whose total strength is to be 2,000,000. Korea almost certainly carries the heaviest per capita military burden in the world; its two armies, exclusive of the militia forces, constitute the fourth largest standing army in the world, topped only by those of the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China. (South Korea alone has the fifth largest standing army, the fourth place being held by India.) The two Germanys, with almost twice Korea's population, have less than half the combined armed strength of the two Koreas. Indeed, North Korea must be the most thoroughly militarized society in existence; it maintains an army more than two-thirds the size of South Korea's from a population not much greater than one-third that of the South, and its military expenditures are estimated at more than two and one-half times the defense budget of the South (in part due to the fact that North Korea invests heavily in military production). It is no wonder that Pyongyang's behavior appears erratic and that pressure to remove the cause of these conditions—the existence of an alternative government in the South—should lead to plans of war.

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II

Korea was separated into two zones of operation in 1945 for the purpose of accepting the Japanese surrender. Russian troops, which had entered the war in East Asia only a week before the Japanese surrender, occupied the area north of parallel 38°; American troops moved into the South a month after the war had ended. When the two superpowers departed in 1948, after three years of military rule, Korea was a divided nation.

The Soviet Union, utilizing Kim Il-sŏng and his small entourage, and a large contingent of Soviet-Koreans (Soviet citizens of Korean ethnic origin), quickly created a régime in the North. Kim assumed the post of first secretary of the North Korean Communist Party in December 1945; by February 1946, he was also chairman of the central "People's Committee," later to become the Council of Ministers (Cabinet). Thus, even before the opening in May 1946 of the futile U.S.-Soviet negotiations designed to create a unified trusteeship government, Kim had already been placed in a position of dual power.

In the early days of the Kim régime, subordination to Moscow was complete. Soviet-Koreans, still members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, acted on the orders of their superiors from home. It was only with the outbreak of the Korean War, and the entrance into Korea of Chinese "volunteer" troops, that Kim was able to begin the consolidation of internal political control which ultimately enabled him to resist blatant Soviet domination. Consolidation was effected in three stages. In the early war years, Kim managed to mobilize anti-Soviet sentiment among new recruits into the party to diminish the influence of the Soviet-Korean hierarchy; this anti-Soviet sentiment had developed as a result of Soviet unwillingness either to commit troops to North Korea's defense or to provide adequate air cover for the invasion of the South. His manœuvring apparently had the backing of the Chinese-trained Koreans and probably the tacit support of the Chinese military.

The second stage of Kim's consolidation was his purge, at the close of the war, of the major South Korean Communists who had been brought into the party in the North prior to the invasion. A number were executed—among them South Korean Communist Party chief Pak Hŏn-yŏng, one of the founders of the original Korean Communist Party established in 1925. No internal rival to Kim Il-sŏng would be tolerated.

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So long as Chinese Communist troops remained in North Korea, Chinese policies were emulated in many fields. Collectivization of agriculture began concurrently with that in China, and followed the same "three-stage" pattern. When China took its "Great Leap Forward," North Korea undertook its parallel *Ch'ollima* ("Flying Horse") campaign. The acceptance of Chinese support in carrying out these policies did not bring North Korea under Chinese domination, but rather created an independent power base for Kim. Collectivization resulted in effective political reorganization and the emergence of a new élite owing its existence neither to the U.S.S.R. nor China but to the Pyongyang régime under Kim Il-sŏng.

In 1956, at the start of the move toward de-Stalinization, the Soviet Union acted to restore its control over the North Korean party. Under the guise of "collective leadership," the Russians encouraged a restoration of Soviet-Koreans in the higher party hierarchy. It was Leonid I. Brezhnev, representing the U.S.S.R. at North Korea's Third Party Congress, who told the North Koreans that they would have to establish collective leadership in the party and modify their economic plans. Encouraged by this apparent Russian endorsement, Soviet-Koreans and the Korean Communists from China began to criticize Kim Il-sŏng's "cult of personality." In retaliation, they were purged from the party, but were then taken back, reportedly at the urging of Russia's Anastas Mikoyan and China's then Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai, who commanded the Chinese forces in Korea (and was later purged himself, presumably for being too close to Moscow). As soon as Chinese troops withdrew in 1958, however, a thorough purge—the third stage of Kim's political consolidation—removed all the Soviet-Korean and China-trained Korean members known to be associated with the "anti-Kim" move. Since then, Kim's control has remained essentially unchallenged, and today the top leaders are *all* drawn from those who were associated with Kim in Manchuria before 1945; since October 1966, the Party Secretariat has been entirely composed of these Manchurian-Koreans.

Although the Pyongyang régime is committed to communism, it has not been able to avoid severe conflict with both of its giant neighbors. Given its geographic location bordering on the two most powerful communist régimes and its military and economic dependence on both, it is inevitable that North Korea should

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have found itself in a difficult position when the Soviet Union and Communist China were suddenly at each others' throats. Walking the tightwire between the two disputants, both of whose support Pyongyang needed, proved increasingly difficult. An even more important problem in North Korea's relations with its communist allies, however, has arisen from the discrepancies between the exigencies of rule in North Korea and the foreign policy objectives of both the U.S.S.R. and China. The major difficulties have resulted from Kim Il-sŏng's commitment to unification under his rule.

During the Korean War the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to press for Korean unification at the risk of major war with the United States was unmistakably demonstrated. Russia's call for an armistice meeting in 1951 enabled Kim to mobilize internal resentment against the Soviet-Koreans who had controlled the régime, and to assume the actual decision-making himself. The Russian attempt to create "collective leadership" in 1956 further antagonized North Korea's rulers, for it would have undermined Kim's own power and the unity of leadership needed to carry out an effective offensive policy.

After the armistice Kim attempted to create an independent economic base in North Korea, despite Soviet insistence on integration of the economies of the communist-bloc countries; he stated quite bluntly that without economic independence North Korea could not hope for political independence. Apparently convinced that the U.S.S.R. would not again endorse an attempt at military reunification of the country, North Korea hoped to achieve a capability to fulfill its goals by unilateral action.

When the Soviet Union failed to reverse North Korea's policy through economic pressures, it cut off economic aid in 1963. North Korea charged the Soviet Union with economic imperialism, and in an angry diatribe called the Russians "great-power chauvinists" who think that everyone else is ignorant and therefore can be ordered around. The U.S.S.R. then discontinued its military assistance.

Throughout the North Korean-Soviet dispute, Peking, involved in its own split with Moscow, sided with Pyongyang; and conversely, by virtue of its antagonism toward the Soviet Union, North Korea appeared to be endorsing the Chinese position. In 1965, however, Kim Il-sŏng's régime and that of Mao Tse-tung came to a parting of the ways. The break was apparently the re-

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sult of the U.S. commitment of troops to South Viet Nam and the effect of the Viet Nam war on South Korea. Seoul agreed in 1965 to send forces to South Viet Nam, dispatching some of them as early as September of that year and doubling its commitment in 1966. In exchange for its troops, South Korea began to receive increased military assistance from the United States. American support of South Viet Nam generated growing confidence in the willingness of Americans to defend South Korea, and brought new strength to the South Korean economy. Foreign investment began to flow in, and foreign loans became available to the Seoul government on favorable terms. Korean production of some materials for the war (*e.g.* combat boots) helped boost the economy. The evidence of real economic achievements and the American recognition of South Korea as an important Asian ally gave rise to a new South Korean élan.

All of this had a crushing effect on North Korea and seemed particularly serious because South Korea's military was receiving some modern weaponry, while North Korea was no longer getting military aid from Russia. Especially in view of his expansive goals, Kim Il-sŏng could not afford to allow the North's military capacity to fall far behind that of the South. America's stepped-up assistance to South Korea was dashing North Korea's hopes of appealing to South Koreans on the basis of its superior economic achievements; without Soviet assistance the North's economy was faltering at the same time that South Korea was making genuine progress. Yielding to the pressure of strategic circumstances Pyongyang began to reconcile its differences with Moscow.

Swallowing its pride, Pyongyang accepted the advances being made by the post-Khrushchev government in Moscow, although Leonid I. Brezhnev, the man who had instigated the move to undermine Kim Il-sŏng in 1956, now headed the Soviet Party. In 1965, North Korea and the Soviet Union concluded an agreement for military assistance, which was followed in 1966 by renewed economic aid. In view of old resentments and conflicting objectives, however, this reconciliation can be only temporary. North Korea continued to insist on its independence from Moscow, and, indeed, did not attend the summit meeting of communist parties held in Moscow last June, despite the fact that its relations with Peking were now acrid.

The goal of unification seemed to Kim so overriding, and its

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achievement would give him a so much better base from which to resist the tremendous pressures of his erstwhile allies, that he was willing to risk rupturing his country's ties with both China and Russia in order to achieve his objective.

III

North Korea's rulers have taken to heart the communist commitment to "transform" the economy and the society. Even before the Russian occupation troops had been withdrawn from North Korea and the government formally inaugurated, nationalization of industry, land reform and political and administrative reorganization had been carried out. Almost immediately the régime began to adopt economic plans, though only on an annual basis. Tremendous difficulties were encountered: not only was the previous integration with the Japanese economy ended, but the national division resulted in shortages of agricultural commodities and consumer goods produced in the South. Furthermore, the Soviet Union apparently took advantage of its dominance to exploit the resources of the peninsula—according to Kim Il-sŏng's later accusations. The lack of adequate technicians, skilled labor or trained managerial personnel was also a tremendous handicap. As if this were not enough, the Korean War devastated the industrial base left by Japan. North Korea's first postwar economic plan, of three years' duration, could do little more than restore production to 1949 levels, even with the help of large amounts of economic aid from the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe.

The second postwar economic plan, North Korea's only Five Year Plan, was designed, according to party spokesmen, to create a socialist economic base, both in industry and agriculture. In 1958, midway in the plan, the *Ch'ollima* campaign was launched. Like China's Great Leap Forward, it was designed to mobilize the people for rapid increases in production. Economic growth was in fact quite rapid, and most of the plans were fulfilled more than a year ahead of schedule, although the consequence was a breakdown in coördination of different economic sectors and exhaustion of machinery and manpower. By 1960, North Korea was bragging that it would soon catch up with Japan in per capita production of some industrial products, including steel.

The overwhelming concentration of investment in heavy industry in the first two postwar plans produced dynamic indus-

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trial expansion but also resulted in an extreme shortage of consumer goods and a slow rate of growth in the agricultural sector. By the end of the Five Year Plan, sufficient housing had not yet been constructed to replace that destroyed in the war, and agricultural production had declined in proportion to the population. The goods available were of poor quality, and the press continually complained about work teams which over-fulfilled their quotas with goods of such poor workmanship that they were unusable.

As much to increase political control as to expand agricultural production, the postwar plans also provided for rapid collectivization of farms. Although this policy was not undertaken on a significant scale until 1954, by 1956 80 percent of all farmers had ceased to be classified as "private," and by 1958 all farmers were organized in collectives. Large numbers of farm workers were shifted into industry and the bureaucracy. Whereas in 1946 74.1 percent of the population had been farmers and in 1953 66.4 percent, by 1958 less than half were employed in agriculture and the proportion continued to decline. By 1960, 38.3 percent of the work force was classified as industrial. Between 1953 and 1967, the urban population grew from 17.7 percent to 47.5 percent of the total. The increase in central political control thereby achieved was evident from the tremendous growth of the Workers' (Communist) Party. From 366,000 members in 1946, and 750,000 in 1948, the party grew to 1,164,945 in 1956. By 1967, its 1,700,000 members constituted 13.7 percent of the population, higher than in any other communist society—more than five times that of Communist China. Kim Il-sŏng justified the unusually large number of members on the ground that they would be needed to carry out the reunification of Korea.

The major occupational and geographic shifts which took place during the 1950s significantly uprooted old patterns of life and replaced much of the previous dependence on the family and clan with dependence on the political régime. Universal elementary education has created a literate, if highly indoctrinated, populace. The complete elimination of the Chinese writing system in favor of the 24-letter, purely phonetic Korean alphabet (originally invented in the fifteenth century by a Korean king interested in the science of linguistics) has made reading and writing readily accessible to all. And universal compulsory vocational education at the junior-high level was recently intro-

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duced, in order to instill in every member of society the mentality of a "worker."

The Seven Year Plan was introduced with much fanfare at the Fourth Party Congress in September 1961. Spokesmen for the government endorsed the plan as one which would insure North Korea's economic independence, provide a comfortable standard of living for all and prepare the way for national reunification. Almost immediately the plan ran into difficulties. Only the steel and electricity sectors seemed able to meet their annual quotas (based on annual growth rates in 1960). By 1964, after the termination of Soviet economic assistance, the plans had obviously been laid aside, and goals were set lower than the (unfulfilled) annual plans for 1963—in some cases lower than the realized output of 1963.

The end of Soviet military assistance destroyed any hopes of recouping the shattered plans. Citing what he said was the increasing hostility of the United States, Kim Il-sŏng announced that the economic plans would have to suffer because of the need for greater military expenditures. Statistics on production, which during the 1950s had filled the newspapers and journals of the North, began to disappear from the press and were replaced by articles on "American atrocities," "South Korean militarists" and North Korea's need for an improved defense posture.

Renewed Soviet economic assistance in 1966 was accompanied by an extension of the Seven Year Plan to 1970. Statistics did not reappear, however, and as recently as last March, Kim Il-sŏng stated that economic planning in North Korea was "unsatisfactory." Current economic difficulties have led to attempts to divert popular attention to external crises. Kim cannot help but reflect that national unification would give him a more viable economic base.

IV

Kim Il-sŏng has made it clear that he intends to unify Korea, under *his* leadership, by the time of his *hwan-gap,* or sixtieth birthday. In Korea, the sixtieth birthday has traditionally marked the end of an individual's first life cycle and the beginning of his second. A person's life goals should have been fulfilled by the time he reaches his *hwan-gap*. Kim was born on April 15, 1912; since Koreans count the first year of life (before the first birthday) as age one, he has only until early 1971 to ful-

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fill his "life goal." Failure to achieve his objective would mean a loss of face rarely courted by an oriental leader.

A Westerner may easily dismiss this non-rational system of policy-planning; to a Korean, it is not only credible but familiar. For example, did not President Syngman Rhee, despite his Princeton Ph.D. and forty-year residence in the United States, promote as his successor Lee Ki-pung, a fellow clansman of the succeeding clan generation, much as a traditional monarch without heir would have chosen his successor? (Lee committed suicide when Rhee was forced to resign.) South Koreans were not being irrelevant when they knowingly observed that the American EC-121 was shot down on Kim Il-sŏng's birthday. Therefore, the significance of Kim's *hwan-gap* is a part of the war of nerves with the South.

The selection of 1971 as the deadline for political unification is not based solely, however, on Kim's adherence to traditional cultural concepts. The year 1971 is a significant one for many reasons. In South Korea, a Presidential election is to be held, involving either an acute succession crisis or a divisive political fight to amend the constitution so that President Park may seek a third term—or both. Furthermore, American economic aid to South Korea is scheduled to be discontinued, and U.S. military assistance has been declining for some time, despite occasional increases in response to a crisis. U.S. military aid to South Korea declined from 72.4 percent of the national defense expenditures of the Republic of Korea as recently as 1962, to 26.7 percent in 1968. The increases in the financial burden of maintaining the world's fifth largest army and creating a national militia are surely enough to absorb the economic gains which the country has made in the past few years, leaving little actual improvement in the living standards of the South Koreans. Indeed, in recent talks with South Korean inductees, I found the most common complaint to be perpetual hunger, indicating that the South has begun cutting vital corners in its defense outlays. Another factor is that the first payments on many of the loans taken out by the South Korean Government during the euphoria of rapid economic growth in the first years of the Viet Nam crisis will fall due in 1971.

North Korea's current economic plan will end in 1970 and its military aid agreement with the Soviet Union will also expire then. Under this agreement, North Korea has acquired consider-

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able military equipment, including 500 jet fighter planes, about 60 of them MIG-21s. The end of the economic and military aid agreements will give Kim the choice of recommitting himself to subservience to the U.S.S.R., or moving against the South immediately, before his large-scale hardware becomes obsolete or worn down. (Unlike the South, North Korea can produce most of its small-scale weaponry and ammunition.) Certainly, if Kim seriously intends to make another attempt to reunify Korea by military means, he must see the advantage in acting before American forces have been withdrawn from South Viet Nam. Also, controversy over the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the return of Okinawa may arouse opposition in the United States and Japan to America's Asian involvement, and complicate the movement of American forces in East Asia. Finally, Kim might be inclined to take advantage of recent trends in American public opinion: if public reaction was responsible for the cessation in the bombing of North Viet Nam, it might well prevent an American bombing of North Korea in retaliation for acts against the South. If the United States should also prove unwilling to cross the DMZ into North Korea again, in view of the fact that Pyongyang concluded bilateral defense treaties with both the Soviet Union and Communist China in the summer of 1961, then the North Korean régime might feel it would not be risking much by launching an offensive.

North Korea has been preparing its people for a renewal of war. Appealing to the reservoir of Korean nationalism, Kim Il-sŏng has introduced as a policy slogan the concept of *chu-che,* roughly translatable as "autonomy." Pointing out that Korea cannot rely on others and yet maintain its own independence, Kim calls for both resistance to Soviet and Chinese intervention and an aggressive push to drive American influence out of the South. "It is clear that we cannot make a revolution by relying on others," he says, "and that no one can make the Korean revolution for us. . . . *Chu-che* in ideology, independence in politics, self-reliance in economy, and self-defense in national defense—this is the stand our Party has consistently adhered to." Under the slogan, "A Gun in One Hand and a Hammer and Sickle in the Other," every man and woman has been exhorted to be ready for mobilization against an "American invasion," and a militia of "Workers-Peasants' Red Guards," with a total strength of 1,300,000, has been formed of men and women between the ages

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of 17 and 45, each armed with a rifle manufactured in the North. In Pyongyang and other major cities, underground concrete bunkers and air-raid shelters have been constructed.

At the same time, offensive training for infiltration activities has been expanded. According to the accounts of Kim Shin-jo, the captured member of the unit sent to assassinate President Park, the key infiltration group, the élite 124th Unit of the North Korean Peoples' Army (NKPA), formed entirely of 2,400 officers and placed directly under the Chief of Staff of the NKPA, is divided into eight sections, each with responsibilities for a province in South Korea. Reports of other defectors and captured infiltrators indicate that the unit is intended to gather information, recruit adherents in mountainous areas of scant population and form an underground party. One infiltration tactic has been to include in four-man units one individual with relatives in the South. The aim is to secure coöperation of Southerners by threatening harm to remaining members of the family in North Korea. (Despite this tactic, infiltrators who make themselves known to their relatives are ordinarily turned in to the police.)

In 1968, infiltrators detected in an attempt to cross the DMZ totaled 1,087; it is impossible to estimate the number undetected. Agents discovered entering by the coast numbered 160. The level of infiltration has been stepped up in 1969. North Korea has also sought to recruit South Korean students abroad to return home and organize Southern intellectuals to press for reunification. It has gained the coöperation of some students by providing them with financial assistance to complete their education abroad. Several students returning from Europe have been arrested in South Korea for involvement in underground activities.

Kim Il-sŏng's intention to create disruption in the South is evident. His willingness to risk war with the United States in pursuit of his goals has been demonstrated in recent crises. In large measure, his belligerency derives from the difficulty of maintaining his rule in the unique conditions faced by North Korea. Whatever the outcome, the cost of a new offensive is certain to be high for the Korean people.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Robert D. Crassweller, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR: FROM THE KOREAN WAR TO THE PRESENT. By André Fontaine. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969, 523 p. $10.00.

In this, the second volume of a major study, the foreign editor of *Le Monde* traces the main milestones of the cold war since the Korean War. He does the job well, on the whole objectively and with considerable narrative skill. The wane of Europe is seen as the main cause of the cold war; the rise of Europe between the superpowers is the author's hope.

A LONG ROW OF CANDLES: MEMOIRS AND DIARIES [1934–1954]. By C. L. Sulzberger. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 1,061 p. $12.50.

Twenty years of impressions, mostly European, recorded by the well-known columnist of *The New York Times*. Many of the vignettes are sharply etched and accounts of interviews with statesmen and others are often of historic interest, but the book is overlong and sometimes a bit meandering.

THE POLITICS OF PEACE-KEEPING. By Alan James. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Strategic Studies), 1969, 452 p. $11.00.

This is one of the best books in the recent literature on the United Nations. The author combines thorough factual information with intelligent analysis. His conclusions exhibit good common sense. He suggests that great-power consensus will continue to provide the best context for U.N. peacekeeping operations.

YIELD OF THE YEARS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Dexter Perkins. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969, 245 p. $6.95.

Fifty years of history—in education, politics and foreign policy—as seen through the eyes of a leading American historian. A liberal optimism and a great human warmth permeate the entire book.

HOW TO CONTROL THE MILITARY. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969, 69 p. $3.95; New American Library, 60 cents (Paper).

A passionate plea to place the military under firm political control. "This means electing a President on this issue next time," the author asserts.

GIFTS AND NATIONS: THE OBLIGATION TO GIVE, RECEIVE AND REPAY. By Wilton Dillon. The Hague: Mouton, 1968, 113 p. Gldrs. 19.

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In this highly original case study drawn from Franco-American relations during the Marshall Plan period, the author suggests that donor nations must find ways to let recipients somehow reciprocate for gifts received or else face a "Gaullist" backlash triggered by wounded self-esteem.

THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF POWER AND PURPOSE. By Gabriel Kolko. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, 166 p. $5.95.

This is a highly sophisticated though very polemical book. "The predominance of the economic ruling class" is seen as the key to politics at home and policy abroad. Charles Beard and Karl Marx are brought up to date and applied to Viet Nam and beyond.

TOWARD DISENGAGEMENT IN ASIA: A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Bernard K. Gordon. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969, 186 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.45).

A most persuasive argument that Asian effort and Asian manpower must gradually become the primary means of providing Asian security. The book explores various types of Asian regionalism as counterweights to possible one-nation dominance.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: ITS ORIGIN AND ITS FUTURE. By John J. McCloy. New York: Columbia University Press (distributor for Carnegie-Mellon University), 1969, 83 p. $4.00.

A reasoned case for the continuing existence and development of NATO as the best guarantor of peaceful United States-Soviet relations.

ON BORROWED TIME: HOW WORLD WAR II BEGAN. By Leonard Mosley. New York: Random House, 1969, 509 p. $8.95.

This book covers familiar terrain in a competent and readable manner. The "weakness, stupidity, ignorance and maladroitness" of the French and British leaders made World War II inevitable, in the author's view.

WORLD WAR II AND ITS ORIGINS: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1929–1945. By Pierre Renouvin. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 402 p. $8.50.

The author, a French diplomatic historian, has presented one of the most balanced interpretations of the background of World War II to appear in recent years. (The French original was published in 1958.)

POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES. Edited by William C. Cromwell. Bruges: College of Europe, 1969, 458 p.

Three scholars (the editor, Nigel Forman and Joseph Joffe) look at the Atlantic Community from the American, British and German points of view. The result is a highly intelligent, at times provocative piece of political analysis.

THE FIRST SUMMIT: ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL AT PLACENTIA BAY 1941. By Theodore A. Wilson. Boston: Houghton, 1969, 344 p. $7.50.

A workmanlike monograph on the August 1941 meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt. Good portraits of the two leaders as the bond between them deepened.

THEORY AND RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES OF WAR. Edited by Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969, 314 p. $4.95 (Paper).

An uneven collection of essays with a pronounced behavioral bent.

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DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT. By Thomas Barman. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 273 p. $6.95.

The somewhat meandering, though often amusing, memoirs of a former diplomatic correspondent for the BBC.

HITLER'S PLOT TO KILL THE BIG THREE. By Laslo Havas. New York: Cowles Book Co., 1969, 280 p. $5.95.

A rather sensationalist account of an abortive assassination plot that never even got close to the three targets.

THE TREATY TRAP. By Laurence W. Beilenson, assisted by Bernard M. Dain. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1969, 344 p. $7.00.

A well-researched indictment of uncritical reliance upon treaties in matters of vital national interest. The author maintains that most states are habitual treaty-breakers if the national interest so dictates.

VERSAILLES AND THE RUHR: SEEDBED OF WORLD WAR II. By Royal J. Schmidt. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968, 310 p. Gldrs. 36.

The author of this monograph locates the origins of World War II in the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. Conscientiously researched but not particularly original.

THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL. By Walter R. Sharp. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 322 p. $8.75.

A straightforward description and analysis of ECOSOC, the first such book to appear in the literature on the United Nations. The treatment is excellent and exhaustive on ECOSOC itself, but somewhat weak on the political context in which it functions.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

TO LOSE A BATTLE: FRANCE 1940. By Alistair Horne. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969, 647 p. $12.50.

This is a splendid and probably definitive chronicle of the German defeat of France in 1940. The sharp contrast between the deadly efficiency of the German generals and the obsolescence of the French military emerges with devastating clarity.

THE SECRET ROAD TO WORLD WAR TWO: SOVIET VERSUS WESTERN INTELLIGENCE, 1921–1939. By Paul W. Blackstock. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969, 384 p. $9.50.

The author of this highly informative book on the struggle between Soviet and Western espionage services during the interwar period claims that the Nazi security police played a major role in the Tukhachevsky affair, which was the prelude to the Great Purges in the Soviet Union.

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE. By Anthony Verrier. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 373 p. $8.95.

This may well be the definitive account of the Anglo-American air offensive against Germany in World War II. The book not only captures the drama and the terror but also supplies valuable information on the technical aspects of the bombing raids.

ABM: AN EVALUATION OF THE DECISION TO DEPLOY AN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM. Edited by Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 282 p. $5.95; New American Library, 95 cents (Paper).

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An impressive group of scholars, scientists and statesmen attack the decision to deploy the ABM system on grounds of strategic soundness, economic and technical feasibility, as well as political and diplomatic wisdom.

WHY ABM? POLICY ISSUES IN THE MISSILE DEFENSE CONTROVERSY. Edited by Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr. New York: Pergamon Press, 1969, 321 p. $6.95.

A collection of papers prepared under the aegis of the Hudson Institute. The nine contributors, including experts such as Donald G. Brennan, Herman Kahn and Albert Wohlstetter, are all friendly toward some kind of missile defense.

THE WAR BUSINESS: THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ARMAMENTS. By George Thayer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969, 417 p. $6.95.

The author maintains that U.S. arms policy is "overblown, overstaffed, misguided and almost out of control." He argues for a "flexible, reasonable and minimal" arms policy. The quality of the research is high and the case is persuasively made.

SLIM AS MILITARY COMMANDER. By Geoffrey Evans. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1969, 239 p. $8.95.

An excellent though somewhat worshipful biography of the British Field Marshal, written by his Divisional Commander in Burma.

THE PANAY INCIDENT: PRELUDE TO PEARL HARBOR. By Hamilton Darby Perry. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 295 p. $6.95.

The publisher of *American Heritage* magazine tells the story well, largely from the American point of view. The book complements the study by Manny T. Koginos, who is more thorough on the Japanese side.

GET YAMAMOTO. By Burke Davis. New York: Random House, 1969, 231 p. $5.95.

A fast-paced thriller narrating the story of the successful mission to shoot down the planner of Pearl Harbor.

THE SECOND D-DAY. By Jacques Robichon. New York: Walker, 1969, 314 p. $6.95.

A somewhat pretentious account of the Allied reconquest of southern France in 1944. (Originally published in Paris in 1962.)

PERILS OF THE PEACEFUL ATOM: THE MYTH OF SAFE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. By Richard Curtis and Elizabeth Hogan. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969, 274 p. $5.95.

A passionate, at times almost maudlin, plea against nuclear power.

General: Economic and Social

L'IMPÉRATIF INDUSTRIEL. By Lionel Stoleru. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1969, 294 p. Fr. 21.

Graduate of the École Polytechnique, Ingénieur au Corps des Mines, Ph.D. in economics from Stanford and now on the staff of a French bank, M. Stoleru has written an outstanding book. A merciless (but understanding) analysis of French industrial policy provides a foundation for solid proposals on how to do better in the future. The principles of accepting open frontiers and making competitiveness the aim are valid for more countries than his own.

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THE PRICE MECHANISM AND THE MEANING OF NATIONAL INCOME STATISTICS. By Dan Usher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 180 p. $6.25.

Warnings about the pitfalls of statistics are always in order. The cautions in this book are particularly timely at a moment when loose comparisons of the income of different countries are rife. The British author, who has advised governments of less developed countries, shows that the poor are not quite as poor as they seem and the rich not as rich, and explains why.

SOME PATTERNS IN THE RISE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE. By Jack N. Behrman. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1969, 180 p. $2.95 (Paper).

Back in academic life, a former Assistant Secretary of Commerce has made a very useful contribution to the growing but sometimes confused discussion of international business. Basic data on investment and original research on the organization of firms are combined with an effort to distinguish the characteristics that separate the multinational enterprise from others.

DIE KENNEDY RUNDE: EINE ANALYSE DES WELTWEITEN GENFER ZOLLSENKUNGSABKOMMENS. By Ferdinand K. Liebich. Freudenstadt: Eurobuch-Verlag Lutzeyer, 1968, 237 p. DM. 24.

Useful statistical analysis and concise commentary about the major trading countries and most products. The only book of its kind.

TOWARD AN ORDERLY MARKET: AN INTENSIVE STUDY OF JAPAN'S VOLUNTARY QUOTA IN COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS. By John Lynch. Tokyo: Sophia University (in coöperation with Tuttle, Rutland), 1969, 215 p. $6.75.

An American Jesuit who lives in Japan makes his main contribution through what he says about Japanese attitudes toward "voluntary" export quotas and about the way they fit into the "live and let live" philosophy.

AMERICAN FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY. Edited by Benjamin J. Cohen. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 442 p. $5.95.

The connecting tissue of the readings is long and strong enough to constitute in itself a short treatise with some suggestive ideas.

STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY: THE ORIGINS AND THE PROSPECTS OF OUR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. By Richard N. Gardner. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, 423 p. $8.95.

The original text of this standard work which first appeared in 1956 plus a long introduction reassessing some points and bringing others up to date.

RECIPROCITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TRIANGLE, 1932–1938. By Richard N. Kottman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968, 294 p. $7.50.

Interesting material from U.S. archives and private papers about the interplay of trade policy and foreign policy in American-British-Canadian relations in the 1930s.

MONEY AND PLAN: FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REFORMS. Edited by Gregory Grossman. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, 188 p. $6.00.

Studies of high quality about the place of money and credit in the eastern economies.

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ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA, AND ASIA. EDITED BY MIGUEL S. WIONCZEK. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 566 p. $15.00.

A valuable collection of documents on trade, finance, banking and development including the texts of all major agreements.

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. BY GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. New York: Praeger, 1969, 237 p. $12.00.

A thorough review of postwar British practice serves as a basis for criticism of proposed international arrangements to safeguard investment.

MAN AND THE COMPUTER: TECHNOLOGY AS AN AGENT OF SOCIAL CHANGE. BY JOHN DIEBOLD. New York: Praeger, 1969, 157 p. $5.95.

Revised version of interrelated papers on the impact of technology on education, business and international relations.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF AGRICULTURE IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES. EDITED BY UGO PAPI AND CHARLES NUNN. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, 671 p. $21.00.

A large number of papers, including some substantial contributions to the analysis of difficult and persistent problems that face all industrial countries in one form or another. (Proceedings of an International Economic Association conference.)

OVERCOMING WORLD HUNGER. EDITED BY CLIFFORD M. HARDIN. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall (for the American Assembly, Columbia University), 1969, 177 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

Leading authorities analyze the food and population problem, mostly in less developed countries.

A CENTURY OF PAY. BY E. H. PHELPS BROWN WITH MARGARET H. BROWNE. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, 476 p. $16.00.

A major study of wages in relation to production in France, Germany, Sweden, Britain and the United States from 1860 to 1960.

The United States

THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968. BY THEODORE H. WHITE. New York: Atheneum, 1969, 459 p. $10.00.

Nixon's "strategy of blandness" defeated Humphrey's "gypsy carnival," in the author's view. The book is better and more revealing on Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy than on the two main contenders. On the whole, this is the most personal and the least objective of Mr. White's three post-mortems.

NO EXIT FROM VIETNAM. BY SIR ROBERT THOMPSON. New York: McKay, 1969, 208 p. $4.50.

The author urges the United States "to keep its pledge and stand by South Vietnam" by adopting a "long haul low cost strategy." Grit and bear it.

AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY. EDITED BY MARK E. SMITH III AND CLAUDE J. JOHNS, JR. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, 551 p. $12.00 ($5.00, Paper).

This is the second edition of a most worthwhile undertaking: a systematic study of U.S. defense and security policy. The contributors to this volume are well selected, the spectrum covered is wide and the treatment of the subject is balanced and sophisticated.

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THE KOREAN WAR AND AMERICAN POLITICS: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AS A CASE STUDY. By Ronald J. Caridi. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969, 319 p. $10.00.

How did the Republicans use the Korean War as an instrument in their rise to power? The author probes this terrain intelligently and well. The result is a fine case study illustrating the primacy of partisan politics in the shaping of foreign policy. The author does not draw analogies between Eisenhower and Korea and Nixon and Viet Nam, but many a reader will.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: PERSPECTIVES AND PROPOSALS FOR THE 1970s. Edited by Paul Seabury and Aaron Wildavsky. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, 215 p. $5.95.

Ten distinguished political scientists reflect on the future of American foreign policy in the world's pivotal areas. The quality of discourse is uniformly high.

THE MOST UNSORDID ACT: LEND-LEASE, 1939–1941. By Warren F. Kimball. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, 281 p. $7.50.

The author of this well-researched monograph maintains that the Lend-Lease Act "was the most significant of all the steps toward war taken before December 7, 1941." The case is argued most persuasively.

AMERICAN APPEASEMENT: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND GERMANY, 1933–1938. By Arnold A. Offner. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969, 328 p. $10.00.

This first-rate study of American policy toward Germany in the 1930s systematically sets forth the crimes of omission committed by the American leadership which, in the author's view, further weakened Britain and France and further whetted Hitler's appetite for aggression. One of the best books on a tragic chapter in the history of the Western democracies.

COME TO THE PARTY. By Hugh Scott. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 269 p. $5.95.

The former National Chairman of the Republican Party argues for a broadly based GOP. The right wing is treated with an acid pen. Example: Goldwater "kidnaped" the Party in 1964.

AMERICA AND EAST ASIA: A NEW THIRTY YEARS WAR? By Richard Harris. New York: Braziller, 1969, 80 p. $3.50 (Paper, $2.45).

An intelligent though very broad-brush prescription for the resolution of the present conflict between "the world's two ideological civilizations," East Asia and America.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY SYSTEM. Edited by Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenberg. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 375 p. $6.95.

An authoritative collection of essays, many by former presidential advisers, all previously published.

AMERICA AT WAR: THE HOME FRONT, 1941–1945. Edited by Richard Polenberg. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 175 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

The editor has pulled together a number of nostalgic vignettes, often quite evocative, from the American home front during World War II.

The Western Hemisphere

THE UNREVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY: THE POWER OF LATIN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN A CHANGING WORLD. By John Mander. New York: Knopf, 1969, 331 p. $6.95.

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A vivid, imaginative and sprightly inquiry into the entire Latin American scene, with particular emphasis upon nine of the more important nations, by an author who takes all life and all literature as his domain. His conclusions stress the continuity and enduring tenacity of the culture pattern.

TRADITION AND REVOLT IN LATIN AMERICA AND OTHER ESSAYS. By R. A. Humphreys. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 264 p. $7.50.

An eminent British authority on Latin America brings together twelve essays largely historical in content, reaching back to the eighteenth century. The treatment and the style are urbane, graceful and literate.

LATIN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Edited by Carlos Alberto Astiz with Mary F. McCarthy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969, 343 p. $8.95.

Sixteen authors describe various aspects of the foreign policies and regional and world postures of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.

ROADS TO POWER IN LATIN AMERICA. By Luis Mercier Vega. New York: Praeger, 1969, 208 p. $6.00.

An excellent and exciting book that provides a very interesting analysis of the Latin American state and its functioning as a society in its own right. Comments on class structure and power patterns are incisive, and the treatment throughout has the ring of authenticity, as if the volume were written from life as well as from the library. (The French original was published in Paris in 1967.)

POLITICS IN THE ALTIPLANO: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN RURAL PERU. By Edward Dew. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1969, 216 p. $6.00.

A meticulous account of social, economic and political change among the Indians and Mestizos of southeastern Peru during 1956–1966. Clearly written and admirably free of stylish academic jargon.

THE ARMY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1928–1945: YRIGOYEN TO PERÓN. By Robert A. Potash. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, 314 p. $8.95.

The first of two volumes devoted to analysis of the political role of the Argentine military. The scholarship is competent and the treatment both broad and detailed.

AN INTRODUCTION TO ARGENTINA. By Robert J. Alexander. New York: Praeger, 1969, 197 p. $6.50.

A survey of all aspects of the Argentine nation and people, past and present. The large sweep of the subject and the small format necessarily dictate brief treatment.

THE MODERNIZATION OF PUERTO RICO: A POLITICAL STUDY OF CHANGING VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS. By Henry Wells. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 440 p. $9.95.

Written in depth and in clear, uncontaminated prose, this is the best study to date of the vast changes, particularly in politics and culture, that modernization and the American presence have brought to Puerto Rico. The insights into socio-culture and value patterns, and the personality and role of ex-Governor Muñoz are highlights.

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FIDEL CASTRO. By Herbert L. Matthews. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969, 382 p. $6.95.

The revelations and disillusionments of the twelve years since the famous interviews in the Sierra Maestra have not dimmed the author's sympathy for Castro and his revolution, or persuaded him in this political biography to balance praise with reference to the dark side of the Cuban experiment.

"CHE" GUEVARA ON REVOLUTION: A DOCUMENTARY OVERVIEW. Edited by Jay Mallin. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1969, 255 p. $7.95.

A useful and well-edited selection of documentary materials, speeches, messages, diary summaries and captured guerrilla communications. A bibliography of Guevara's works is included.

THE YOUNGEST REVOLUTION: A PERSONAL REPORT ON CUBA. By Elizabeth Sutherland. New York: Dial Press, 1969, 277 p. $5.95.

This account of Cuba under Castro is impressionistic, reportorial, subjective and sympathetic to the revolution. The illustrations are striking but the lack of an index is unfortunate.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: NATION IN TRANSITION. By Howard J. Wiarda. New York: Praeger, 1969, 249 p. $7.00.

The physical, historical, social, economic, political and personal aspects of the Dominican Republic are all reviewed in necessarily abbreviated form.

DICTATORSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT: THE METHODS OF CONTROL IN TRUJILLO'S DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. By Howard J. Wiarda. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968, 224 p. $3.75 (Paper).

A carefully researched and useful monograph study, leading to interpretations that on occasion run counter to generally held views, as in the case of Trujillo's ideology.

BLACK INTELLECTUALS COME TO POWER: THE RISE OF CREOLE NATIONALISM IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO. By Ivar Oxaal. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1968, 194 p. $7.95.

The development of society and culture in Trinidad up to 1962, as a part of the nationalist movement, and the impact of outside influences, are described by a first-hand observer. The footnotes are workmanlike and the illustrations good, but an index would have been appreciated.

Western Europe

BRITAIN'S FUTURE. By David P. Calleo. New York: Horizon Press, 1969, 252 p. $6.50.

A brief but brilliant inquiry into the options open to Britain today, by an American political scientist who fully understands the importance and nature of British cultural traditions. A broadly gauged, elegant and timely work.

THE FUTURE OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. By Max Beloff. New York: Taplinger, 1969, 154 p. $4.95.

A British companion piece to Calleo's study; a leading scholar urges a European course for Britain, convinced that there has been a "sudden tearing down of the veils between Britain's true position and the way in which her people have perceived it." Are the veils really down?

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OBSOLETE COMMUNISM: THE LEFT-WING ALTERNATIVE. By Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, 255 p. $5.95.

A leader of the international student movement discusses his revolutionary role and ethos, which condemns the very idea of any leadership. A readable and instructive attack on what he considers the main evil of the day, bureaucracy, which corrupted communism long ago. Among young revolutionaries, someone is likely to pen an answer entitled "anachronistic anarchism."

EUROPEAN FASCISM. Edited by S. J. Woolf. New York: Random House, 1969, 387 p. $8.95 (Paper, $2.45).

A series of essays on fascism in various countries, with a valuable, concluding essay on "Fascism in Contemporary Europe."

FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE. By Etienne-Sadi Kirschen with others. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 144 p. $6.50.

Useful as a succinct, documented account of the harmonization of economic policies in the Common Market countries, the development of European capital markets, and the work of common financial organizations such as the European Investment Bank.

L'EUROPE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER. By S. C. Constant and others. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1968, 199 p. Fr. 24.

A broader economic and geographical survey of the six countries of the European Community than the title might suggest.

BUSINESS REGULATION IN THE COMMON MARKET NATIONS. VOLUME I: BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, LUXEMBOURG. Edited by Ruth B. Ginsburg and others. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, 576 p. $32.50.

Laws about anti-trust and related business matters in the Benelux countries summarized and analyzed in their economic and political setting. The first of what promises to be a valuable series, under the general editorship of Harlan Morse Blake, sponsored by a special committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.

AN ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE COMMON MARKET. By Geoffrey Parker. New York: Praeger, 1969, 178 p. $6.00.

Succinct, comprehensive, slightly dated. Strong, naturally enough, on transportation and location. The British author considers his own country's ties to Europe.

ACTION THIS DAY: WORKING WITH CHURCHILL. Edited by Sir John Wheeler-Bennett. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, 272 p. $5.95.

Six wartime associates recall their chief, remembering his courage, his zest and his untidiness as an administrator. We probably owe this interesting and pleasant book to their anger at Lord Moran's disparaging—and perhaps inaccurate—indiscretions. "Moran was seldom, if ever, present when history was made; but he was quite often invited to dinner afterwards." The essay by John Colville stands out as especially perceptive.

CHURCHILL REVISED: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT. By A. J. P. Taylor and others. New York: Dial Press, 1969, 274 p. $5.95.

The inevitable effort at revision, pressed with vigor and considerable insight. Five essays of uneven quality, including a suggestive interpretation of the man behind the legend by Anthony Storr, a British psychiatrist.

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THE COMMONWEALTH EXPERIENCE. By Nicholas Mansergh. New York: Praeger, 1969, 471 p. $12.50.

The gradual transition from Empire to Commonwealth, described and analyzed in this comprehensive survey of Britain's progress in turning some colonial dependents into equal partners. Informative and readable, by a well-known British historian.

L'IRLANDE. By Georges Langrod and M. Clifford-Vaughan. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1968, 303 p. Fr. 35.

A sensible and empathetic survey of Ireland's past and present, based on wide reading and strong on social developments.

L'EXPLOSION DE MAI: 11 MAI 1968—HISTOIRE COMPLÈTE DES "ÉVÉNEMENTS." By Lucien Rioux and René Backmann. Paris: Laffont, 1969, 614 p. Fr. 27.

Two French journalists from *Le Nouvel Observateur* try their hand at composing instant history. The drama of last year's explosion is vividly depicted, and their insistence that France will not be the same again after May 1968 seems persuasive.

LES SOCIALISTES DANS LA RÉSISTANCE. By Daniel Mayer. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1968, 247 p. Fr. 24.

A short account of the Socialist role in the French Resistance, by one of the major leaders. Illuminating documents, some never before published, are appended.

MODERN BELGIUM. By Frank E. Huggett. New York: Praeger, 1969, 296 p. $7.50.

An informative survey of the present, troubled state of Belgium, divided by linguistic and nationalistic barriers. Aware of the Belgians' venerable traditions and successful past, the British author warns: ". . . it seems doubtful if they, any more than the British, can continue to muddle through."

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE DUTCH JEWS. By Jacob Presser. New York: Dutton, 1969, 556 p. $10.00.

Perhaps the fullest account yet written of "genocide by the civil service" and the responses of its victims and their non-Jewish compatriots. A ghastly but indispensable work, written with scholarly scruple by a Dutch historian, who as a Jew suffered through the years of horror.

REICHSKOMMISSARIAT NIEDERLANDE. By Konrad Kwiet. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1968, 172 p. DM. 9.80.

A scholarly study of early and abortive Nazi efforts at governing conquered Holland with some measure of popular support. Hitler's habit of improvisation, of terminating periods of neglect with sudden decisions, abetted the inherent Nazi tendency to violence. A valuable contribution to the literature on occupied Europe.

NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE AUSSENPOLITIK 1933–1938. By Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1968, 944 p. DM. 98.

The most thorough and authoritative analysis to date of the substance, style and bureaucratic basis of Hitler's foreign policy before 1938, by a German scholar. Based on a staggering mass of printed and unprinted sources, full of facts and figures, with new material on Nazi organizations in foreign countries. Jacobsen stresses the continuity of revolutionary aims in Nazi policy from the early 1920s to the increasingly open aggressiveness, as manifested by the ***Anschluss***.

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DIE DEUTSCHE DIKTATUR. By Karl Dietrich Bracher. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1969, 580 p. DM. 26.

The first scholarly synthesis of all aspects of the Nazi phenomenon, by Germany's leading expert on the subject. Judicious, thorough and incisive, this study, likely to become a standard work, offers a further commentary on the precariousness of modern democracy and the ways by which it can be perverted.

KURT GERSTEIN: THE AMBIGUITY OF GOOD. By Saul Friedländer. New York: Knopf, 1969, 228 p. $5.95.

A painstaking reconstruction and analysis of the life of an SS officer who at great personal risk sought to warn the West about Nazi extermination of the Jews, which he himself witnessed at close quarters. Written by a well-known specialist of the Hitler period and its conspiracy of silence.

SPEAK OUT! By Günter Grass. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969, 142 p. $4.95.

Germany's eloquent voice for democracy, a poet who talks toughminded politics in the marketplace. This collection of his major pronouncements since 1965, many delivered on behalf of the German Socialists, is an appeal to reason, "that wallflower in our so incompetently governed country."

SPAIN. By Stephen Clissold. New York: Walker, 1969, 211 p. $6.50.

Spain, its past and present, in seven pleasant, compressed chapters.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

RUSSIA'S ROAD FROM PEACE TO WAR: SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1917–1941. By Louis Fischer. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 499 p. $12.50.

Mr. Fischer here returns to the scene of his earlier "The Soviets in World Affairs" (first published in 1930), and presents a wide-ranging, informed but essentially informal history of Soviet foreign relations up to the German attack in June 1941.

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1956–1967. By William Zimmerman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, 336 p. $9.50.

A study of recent changes in the outlook of the Soviet leadership with respect to the nature and management of international relations. The author is particularly concerned with the degree to which ideology continues to play a role in the post-Stalin era.

AN IDEOLOGY IN POWER: REFLECTIONS ON THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By Bertram D. Wolfe. New York: Stein and Day, 1969, 406 p. $10.00.

A substantial collection of Mr. Wolfe's essays on Marxism, revolution and the Soviet system. They have been written over a period of 25 years, but demonstrate a remarkable unity of perspective and insight.

ABSCHRECKUNG ODER VOLKSKRIEG. By Helmut Dahm. Olten: Walter-Verlag, 1968, 414 p. Swiss Fr. 35.

An extensively documented presentation of Soviet and Communist Chinese strategic and military doctrine.

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MARSHAL ZHUKOV'S GREATEST BATTLES. By Georgi K. Zhukov, edited by Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 304 p. $6.95.

A translation of Marshal Zhukov's important articles on the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin, with helpful commentary by Harrison E. Salisbury.

STALIN AND HIS GENERALS. Edited by Seweryn Bialer. New York: Pegasus, 1969, 644 p. $10.00.

A most welcome and revealing selection and translation of military memoir material from leading Soviet officers. Well introduced and well edited, the book adds considerably to our knowledge of Stalin's leadership in the war. The picture, not unexpectedly, remains a very mixed one.

INTERNATIONALISM OR RUSSIFICATION? By Ivan Dzyuba. London: Weidenfeld, 1968, 240 p. 42/.

A Soviet Ukrainian literary critic voices his alarm at recent trends in the still vexed course of the nationality issue in the Ukraine: "I am firmly convinced that today a Ukrainian who is devoted to the cause of building communism has every reason to be worried about the fate of his nation."

ENTWICKLUNGSPROBLEME DER EMPIRISCHEN SOZIALFORSCHUNG IN DER UdSSR (1917–1966). By René Ahlberg. Berlin: Osteuropa-Institut, 1968, 237 p. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, DM. 38.)

An historical analysis of the vicissitudes of empirical social research in the U.S.S.R.—the effort to get some positivism into the dialectic.

SOVIET ETHICS AND MORALITY. By Richard T. De George. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969, 184 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.95).

An exposition and evaluation of Marxist-Leninist writings on ethical theory and the official stance on communist morality. Nothing very inspiring seems in prospect.

THE SOVIET PREFECTS. By Jerry F. Hough. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 416 p. $12.50.

A close and scholarly examination of the role of local party organs in industrial decision-making. Of particular interest in the light it casts on the actual functioning and structure of the bureaucracy.

HISTOIRE DES DÉMOCRATIES POPULAIRES. II: APRÈS STALINE, 1953–1968. By François Fejtö. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1969, 533 p. Fr. 36.

In this volume a leading student of Eastern Europe picks up the thread of his preceding book (published in 1952) and carries his analytical history down to the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

EASTERN EUROPE. By Norman J. G. Pounds. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969, 912 p. $12.75.

This volume in the series of Geographies for Advanced Study is an authoritative survey both of the region as a whole and of the constituent countries—East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania.

LITHUANIA: 700 YEARS. Edited by Albertas Gerutis. New York: Manyland Books, 1969, 474 p. $12.00.

Despite the title, the bulk of the book is devoted to the last fifty years, and the final chapter is "The Prospects for Lithuanian Liberation."

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WARSAW DEATH RING, 1939–1944. By Wladyslaw Bartoszewski. Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, 1968, 450 p. Zł. 100.

A detailed account of the staggering tragedies and horrors that befell the inhabitants of Warsaw from the time of the occupation of the capital in October 1939 up to, but not including, the uprising of 1944.

LA LIBERTÉ EN SURSIS: PRAGUE 1968. By Roger Garaudy. Paris: Fayard, 1968, 156 p. Fr. 15.

A useful collection of Czech statements and texts relating to developments in Prague in 1968.

A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN GREECE. By C. M. Woodhouse. New York: Praeger, 1968, 318 p. $6.50.

A concise, knowledgeable survey, the last third of which deals with Greece in the twentieth century and brings the story up to the latest in a recurrent series of military coups.

FINNISH NEUTRALITY. By Max Jakobson. New York: Praeger, 1969, 116 p. $5.95.

Tactful, informative essays on Finnish foreign policy since the Second World War. The author is Finland's Ambassador to the U.N.

The Middle East

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, 1946–1967: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY. I: THE MIDDLE EAST. By Rosalyn Higgins. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1969, 674 p. $15.50.

A truly impressive legal and political study of U.N. peacekeeping and observation in the Arab-Israeli conflict (UNTSO and UNEF), in Lebanon (1958) and in Yemen (1963–64). Extensive documentary texts are put in context by the author's informed commentary.

SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by J. C. Hurewitz. New York: Praeger (for the Academy of Political Science, Columbia University), 1969, 250 p. $7.00.

In this well-planned volume a dozen authors assess the present state of the cold war and engage in some speculation on its future. The papers on arms competition and the military balance stand out.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARAB WORLD. By William R. Polk. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 377 p. $7.95.

In this revised edition of his 1965 book, the author presents three new chapters describing and analyzing the main events of the 1960s. He concludes with some well-reasoned remarks on the Arab-Israeli problem and a list of suggestive proposals for a settlement.

THE ARABS IN ISRAEL: A POLITICAL STUDY. By Jacob M. Landau. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1969, 300 p. $9.95.

A very competent and honest study of a difficult subject, analyzing *inter alia* Arab leadership, intellectual trends, voting patterns and political activity. The author eschews definite conclusions, but his hope that "confrontation may well change into coöperation, and thence into integration" hardly seems justified by his evidence, especially as the problem of the Arabs in occupied territories interacts with the older one of the Arabs in Israel.

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THE EVASIVE PEACE: A STUDY OF THE ZIONIST-ARAB PROBLEM. By John H. Davis. London: Murray, 1968, 124 p. 28/.

The former Director of UNRWA, giving his views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, calls for justice for the Arab refugees and de-Zionization of Israel as vital elements of a peace based on principle.

PRÉLUDE À SUEZ: JOURNAL D'UNE AMBASSADE, 1953–1956. By Jacob Tsur. Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1968, 448 p. Fr. 28.

The diary of Israel's Ambassador to France during the years preceding the Sinai-Suez crisis touches on both French and Israeli politics as well as international affairs. No sensational revelations but many items of interest on the forging of the Paris-Jerusalem axis and notes on some fascinating conversations with leading figures of the day.

LES DEUX EXODES. By Jacques Derogy and Édouard Saab. Paris: Denoël, 1968, 286 p. Fr. 19.

The book is evenly divided between two essays by a Jewish and an Arab author, one on the Jewish migration to Palestine in 1946–48, the other on the plight of the Palestine Arab refugees.

ESKALATION IM NAHEN OSTEN. By Günther Wagenlehner. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1968, 284 p. DM. 12.

Mechanistic in concept, staccato in style, this rather unusual book's greatest value is in tracing the interaction of interests and attitudes of the local contestants and outside powers in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

COUNTDOWN IN THE HOLY LAND. By Lester Velie. New York: Funk, 1969, 224 p. $5.95.

A *Reader's Digest* editor's semi-sensational account of what went before and what came after the six-day war, with Israel playing the hero's role, the United States that of dupe. Fact and fiction are not easily separable.

IRAQ UNDER QASSEM: A POLITICAL HISTORY, 1958–1963. By Uriel Dann. New York: Praeger, 1969, 405 p. $10.00.

An Israeli scholar's thorough combing of the Iraqi press, radio broadcasts and other sources has produced a detailed and remarkably objective study. Most of it is devoted to the stormy events of Qassem's first year and the struggles of Nasserists, Baathists and Communists about him and against him.

THE SHAH OF IRAN. By Ramesh Sanghvi. New York: Stein and Day, 1969, 390 p. $10.00.

An Indian journalist's highly flattering account of the Shah's role in the history of his country.

South and Southeast Asia

TIME OUT OF HAND: REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Robert Shaplen. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 465 p. $8.95.

An interpretive analysis of each of the Southeast Asian countries and how they have influenced the Viet Nam war. These are *New Yorker* contributions with extensive revisions, some reformulation of ideas and two new sections.

ISSUES IN THE FUTURE OF ASIA: COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST ALTERNATIVES. Edited by Richard Lowenthal. New York: Praeger, 1969, 177 p. $6.00.

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Five essays on questions of potentially vital importance to the political, economic and cultural life of Asia.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION. By Satish K. Arora and Harold D. Lasswell. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, 312 p. $6.95.

A fascinating study of the public utterances of top Indian and U.S. figures placed in an analytical framework designed to reveal differences or agreements on key issues. Main sources were *The New York Times* and *The Times of India.*

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN INDIA: AN ANALYSIS OF ELITE ATTITUDES. By Michael Brecher. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University), 1969, 193 p. $12.50.

The causes and results of the Congress setback in the Fourth General Elections of 1967 and how they changed India from a one-plus political system to an embryonic multi-party system. Emphasis is on views, opinions and perceptions of ranking Congress leaders.

INDIA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By D. N. Verma. Patna: Bharati Bhawan, 1968, 350 p. Rs. 30.

How India, having no power to control its own internal affairs independently, influenced international behavior of truly sovereign states through its membership in the League of Nations.

DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF EAST PAKISTAN. By Jayanta Kumar Ray. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1968, 400 p. Rs. 28.

The emergence and frustrations of the new Bengali Muslim élite in East Pakistan in achieving its cultural-economic-political goals because of what the author considers use of force and intrigue by West Pakistani authorities.

WAR, PEACE, AND THE VIET CONG. By Douglas Pike. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 186 p. $5.95.

The author, who contends that differences between North and South Vietnamese are more emotional than real, updates to 1969 appraisals contained in his earlier "Viet Cong." His information comes from North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front leaders and from documents picked up on the battlefield.

VISIONS OF VICTORY: SELECTED VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY WRITINGS, 1964–1968. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1969, 276 p. $6.50 (Paper, $1.85).

Twelve documents selected and introduced by Patrick J. McGarvey, a research member for the U.S. Viet Nam Mission to Paris, showing that North Vietnamese strategy has been dictated by immediate battlefield and political realities, not by automatons who follow a predetermined course of action.

GENERAL GIAP: POLITICIAN AND STRATEGIST. By Robert J. O'Neill. New York: Praeger, 1969, 219 p. $6.95.

The constant interaction between the military and political spheres that has led to the continuing success and influence of this North Viet Nam Army chief and Defense Minister—and possible successor to Ho Chi Minh.

ANATOMY OF A CRISIS: THE LAOTIAN CRISIS OF 1960–1961. By Bernard B. Fall; edited by Roger M. Smith. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969, 283 p. $5.95.

The origins, major actions and probable consequences for Asia, the United States and the world of the still unresolved controversy between the Pathet Lao and the Royal Laotian government forces. (Epilogue by the editor.)

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More comprehensive than the title suggests, this is a highly informed addition to the pitifully small literature on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

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Containing country-by-country reviews, short general analytical essays and a rich assortment of documents, this useful reference volume is intended as the first issue of an annual publication. The absence of statistical data on foreign aid to African economies is one of the more striking deficiencies of this first volume. In general, an excellent addition to African bibliography.

AFRICA YESTERDAY AND TODAY. Edited by Clark D. Moore and Ann Dunbar. New York: Praeger, 1969, 394 p. $7.95.

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By Donald Wasson

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

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